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I.

INTRODUCTION

Today, most Americans take incarceration for granted. It is the
routine sanction for serious crime in our modem system of justice,
* M.A., M. Phil., J.D. Yale University. - Ed.
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seemingly as elemental and inevitable a part of that process as police
arrest, state prosecution, and judgment by one's peers. Punishments
by their nature are meted out in units of years and months (if not
dollars and cents). To be a "convict" nowadays is to be a person
"serving time" in a prison cell for the commission of a crime.
Yet the frozen landscape of the criminal justice system, when
glimpsed in the light oflegal history, melts quickly; conceptual continents drift, oceans of doctrine ebb and flow. The wholesale incarceration of criminals is in truth a comparatively recent episode in the
history of Anglo-American jurisprudence. Before the nineteenth
century, offenders faced a variety of sanctions, including the pillory,
the lash, the gallows, and exile. Though not unknown, "the sentence
of confinement" was a rarity.1 Thieves in early Massachusetts served
their victims, not time. 2 The term "convict" applied literally to all
persons found guilty, not to persons under prison sentences.3
This is not to say, of course, that incarceration per se originated
in modem times; prisons have always played a role in Anglo-American jurisprudence.4 But before the American Revolution, prisons
served principally a congeries of nonsanctional functions - some of
which remain familiar, others of which have fled the scene. 5
While the transition from the old forms of criminal sanction to
incarceration was perhaps not, as Jeremy Bentham claimed, "one of
the most signal improvements that have ever yet been made in our
criminal legislation,"6 one does not overstate to call it a signal development in the history of Anglo-American criminal justice - a development, one may add, that still wants adequate examination, much
less explanation.7 This Article attempts to do both for one sample
region: Massachusetts. Though the jurisprudential movement from
pillory to penitentiary took place throughout the new American reI. G. BRADFORD, STATE PRISONS AND TIIE PENITENTIARY SYSTEM VINDICATED 11
(Charlestown 1821) (published anonymously); see notes 34-41, 227-49 infra and accompanying
text
2. See notes 243-48 i'!fra and accompanying text.·
3. J. HOWARD, THE STATE OF TIIE PRISONS 19, 296 (rev. ed. 1929) (first ed. Warrington
1777).
4. The Latin root of the word •~ail" (or "gaol") is "gaviola," which means cage or hole.
This probably indicates the earliest form of this familiar institution. 5 OXFORD ENGLISH DIC•
TIONARY 546 (1961).
5. See notes 13-33 i'!fra and accompanying text. Nor was the prerevolutionary function of
imprisonment static. For an example of a prison function that had expired before the colonial
emigration, sees. Mn.sON, HlsTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TIIE COMMON LAW 359-60 (1969)
(Imprisonment for refusal to plead).
6. J. BENTHAM, A view of the Hard-Labour Bill, in 4 WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 31
(Edinburgh 1843) (1st ed. London 1778).
7. See notes 69-79 i'!fra and accompanying text
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public, as well as much of western Europe, our limited focus presents
a case study, a,nd a jumping-off point for further research. 8
The story of the rise of the penitentiary in Massachusetts has
many facets, and this Article addresses each in tum. Part II sets the
stage by contrasting the penitentiary with an institutional predecessor in the criminal justice system: the colonial gaol. While the gaol
and the penitentiary both held inmates against their will, they shared
few functional or administrative attributes. As Part II shows, the
system of incarceration represented by the gaol differed dramatically
from the system of incarceration represented by the penitentiary.
In order to explain the transition to the penitentiary, one must
first explore its ideological origins, and this exploration is undertaken in Part III. Although the penitentiary arose in the midst of a
revolution in the theory of punishment, Part III asserts that the ideological blueprint upon which the builders relied had actually been
developed at a much earlier date. Intellectual innovation did not
prompt the transition, for Massachusetts had merely dusted off a
venerable ideological construct that might have been implemented at
any time.
Why Massachusetts chose the late eighteenth century to do so is
the problem explored in Part IV. Here, the analysis shifts from criminological theory to social reality, to an examination of the criminal•
sanctions originally adopted in colonial Massachusetts and of the social setting that made those sanctions effective. Part IV concludes
that widespread demographic changes occurring over the course of
the eighteenth century weakened the initial system of crime control,
and created a fear that crime had reached crisis proportions. In
desperation, lawmakers turned to incarceration as ~e most promising means of restoring the status quo. Part V shows that the process
of assimilating the new punishment into the Massachusetts legal system was gradual, and marked by a continuing debate over the efficacy and aims of the penitentiary.
In the course of detailing these results, this Article also responds
to some prior students of incarceration in America. Special attention
is given throughout to David Rothman, whose pioneering scholarship on this problem invites ·admiration - but also skepticism.
II.

INSTITUTIONAL TRANSITION

The penitentiary was not the first facility for physical restraint to
play a part in the process of criminal justice. It was preceded by the
8. This Article is the first installment of a larger study contemplated by the author.
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gaol, an institution· shrouded in antiquity. Still, a comparison of
these two institutions reveals sharp contrasts, and provides an overview of the transition that this Article explores.
A. The Gaol in Early Massachusetts

I. Function
The Puritan colonists who repaired to Massachusetts in the early
seventeenth century set out to build a model society for the edification of mankind. 9 Without forsaking their English heritage, the Puritans hoped to erase those features of English life which affronted
their vision of a godly community. The gaol, an institution of long
standing in England, apparently did not represent such an eyesore.
Although a number of Puritans had languished in prison at the instigation of Bishop Laud, 10 the colonial leaders quickly decided to
build one of their own. 11 Opened in 1635, the Boston gaol served as
Massachusetts' sole prison for eighteen years. But as settlers fanned
out into the wilderness, organizing new townships as they went, local
facilities for incarceration sprang up elsewhere. By 1776 Massachusetts was divided into fourteen counties, and each was required by
law to maintain its own county gaol. 12
Imprisonment played a variety of roles in the legal system of
early Massachusetts, filling both criminal and civil functions.
Among its civil roles, imprisonment for debt was the most notable.
The judgment creditor of a debtor who would not pay had the legal
right to order that debtor's incarceration in the gaol. 13 Similarly, any
9. The Puritan migration and plantation in America has been the subject of exhaustive
inquiry, see generally, E. MORGAN, THE PURITAN DILEMMA (1958). On the legal history of
early Massachusetts, see G. HAsKINS, LAW AND AUTHORITY IN EARLY MASSACHUSElTS
(1960); E. POWERS, CRIME AND PuNISHMENT IN EARLY MAsSACHUSE'ITS, 1620-1692 (1966).
IO. See, e.g., R. LOCKYER, TUDOR AND STUART BRITAIN, 1471-1741, at 255-56 (1964).
Personal experience with imprisonment has often been associated with movements for penal
reform, see, e.g., Schneider, Book Review, 77 MICH. L. REv. 707, 727 (1979) (reviewing D.
ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE AsYLUM (1970)), but it does not appear to have had a
noticeable impact in Massachusetts.
11. 1 RECORDS OF THE GOVERNOR AND COMPANY OF THE MAsSACHUSE'ITS BAY IN NEW
ENGLAND 74 [1630] (N. Shurtleff ed. Boston 1853-1854) (by implication) [hereinafter cited as
COL. RECORDS].
12. 1 ACTS AND REsoLVES OF THE PROVINCE OF THE MAsSACHUSE'ITS BAY 426 [1700]
(1869-1922) [hereinafter cited as PROV. LAWS]. On the early history of prison construction in
Massachusetts Bay, see E. POWERS, supra note 9, at 212-17. Hereinafter, references to "colonial" Massachusetts will indicate the period preceding the second charter, 1630-1691. In the
latter year the "province" of Massachusetts was born, and it lived until the Revolution, when
Massachusetts became a "Commonwealth."
13. Execution upon the debtor's body could only follow unsuccessful execution upon the
debtor's estate, personal and real. See The Body of Liberties of 16;4 l, in THE Co LO NIAL LAws
OF MAsSACHUSETTS § 1, at 41 (W. Whitmore ed. 1890) (reprinted from the edition of 1672)
[hereinafter cited as COL. LAWS]. Imprisonment for debt could also occur on mesne process,
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colonist adjudged delinquent in his obligations to the realm - for
taxes,1 4 fines, 15 or costs of court16 - could incur the same treatment
as "a Debtor to the Publick." 17 Imprisonment for debt may be
sharply distinguished from latter-day notions of criminal punishment. It was, at bottom, an instrument of coercion rather than sanction, intended to pry open the purse rather than to deter or
rehabilitate welchers. This fact is plain from the form of the sentence: Delinquent debtors were imprisoned indefinitely until their
debts were fully paid. Insolvent debtors could avoid imprisonment
altogether by attesting under oath that they had concealed no part of
their estates. 18
In the colonial tradition of institutional austerity, Massachusetts
gaols also served some functions entirely beyond the scope of the
legal system. It was standard procedure, for example, to house prisoners of war in the county gaols, which thereby doubled as military
internment camps. In the seventeenth century, the principal victims
of this policy were Indians, 19 but, as the eighteenth century drew on,
see CoL. LAWS, supra, § 2, at 7. For an example of imprisonment for failure to pay a civil
damages award, see RECORDS OF THE SUFFOLK COUNTY COURT, 1671-1680, at 916 [1678] (Z.
Chaffee ed. 1933) (published as v. 29 & V. 30 of the COLLECTIONS OF THE COLONIAL SOCIETY
OF MAsSACHUSETTS) [hereinafter cited as SUFFOLK COUNTY COURT]. The legal history of
debtor-creditor relations in Massachusetts has yet to be written. To whet the appetite, see G.
HAsKINs, supra note 9, at 215-21.
14. See, e.g., A REPORT OF THE RECORD COMMISSIONERS OF THE CITY OF BOSTON CONTAINING THE BOSTON TOWN RECORDS 1758 to 1769, at 302-03 (1876-1909) [hereinafter cited
as BOSTON TOWN RECORDS]; 4 PLYMOUTH COURT RECORDS, 1686-1859, at 40, 42 [1786] (D.
Konig ed. 1978) [hereinafter cited as PLYMOUTH COUNTY COURT]; A JOURNAL OF THE HONORABLE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF MAssACHUSETTS [1784-1785], at 246 [1785] (Boston
1784).
15. See, e.g., COL. LAWS, supra note 13, § 2, at 51 [1638]; RECORDS OF THE COURT OF
GENERAL SESSIONS OF THE PEACE FOR THE COUNTY OF WORCESTER, MAsSACHUSETTS,
FROM 1731 TO 1737, [1735], reprinted in COLLECTIONS OF THE WORCESTER Socy. OF ANTIQUITY No. 18, at 137, 138, 141 (1882) [hereinafter cited as WORCESTER COUNTY COURT]; 29
JOURNALS OF THE House OF REPRESENTATIVES OF MAsSACHUSETIS 58, 61 [1752] (Mass. Hist.
Socy. ed. 1919-1980) [hereinafter cited as House JOURNAL); 3 PLYMOUTH COUNTY COURT,
supra note 14, at 308 [1771); Resolve of June 23, 1779, ch. 159, 1779-1780 Mass. Acts 85;
Resolve of June 22, 1780, ch. 97, 1779-1780 Mass. Acts. 566.
16. See. e.g., HousE JOURNAL, supra note 15, at 58, 61 [1752]; Boston Gazette, Sept. 7,
1764 at 3; Petition of William Scott, Oct. 20, 1786, Mass. Senate Documents no. 586 (1786)
(unpassed) (unpublished manuscript, Mass. Archives).
17. 12 PROV. LAWS, supra note 12, at 71 [1734].
18. Since creditors were required to levy execution first upon the debtor's estate, see note
13 supra, the only debtors subject to imprisonment were those who refused to take the oath
and those who were denied the oath under suspicion of fraud. See COL. LAws, supra note 13,
§ 2, at 6 [1641); 1 PROV. LAWS, supra note 12, at 330 [1698); 2 PROV. LAWS supra note 12, at
363 [1725), 461 [1727), 831 [1737]; B. Black, The Judicial Power and the General Court in
Early Massachusetts, 1634-1686, at 240-51 (1975) (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Yale
University).
19. See, e.g., Mason, A Brief History of the Pequot War [c. 1656) in HISTORY OF THE
PEQUOT WAR 42 (C. Orr ed. 1897); 3 WINTHROP PAPERS 481 [1637) (Mass. Hist. Socy. ed.
1929-1947).
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French and eventually British soldiers came to join them. 20 In addition, Massachusetts gaols occasionally held political prisoners, much
like the Tower of London in Old England. Indian sachems,
Quakers, Jesuits, and Loyalists all shared this plight at one time or
another. 21 Once again, however, it is critical to distinguish these
gaol services from criminal sanctions. Here, the aim of incarceration
was, at bottom, segregative: it prevented persons from causing physical or moral harm to the community, rather than punishing them
for doing so.22
By far the most pervasive use of the gaol in early Massachusetts,
however, was for pretrial and presentence internment. When indicted on a criminal charge, the defendant who could not raise bail
was routinely imprisoned until the moment of his trial and, if convicted, the execution of sentence. The court or a single magistrate
submitted a mittimus to the sheriff, ordering him to hand the defendant over to the keeper, who in tum was responsible for holding him
securely until further directed by due process of law.23 Likewise,
upon conviction for an offense, the court routinely directed that the
defendant, now a convict, "stand committed till sentence be performed."24 Even after the punishment had been meted out, courts
frequently demanded monetary "sureties" for future "good behavior" as a condition for release. Until the convict scraped the funds
20. See, e.g., 22 HOUSE JOURNAL, supra note 15, at 18, 96 (1745]; 1742-1757 BOSTON
TOWN RECORDS, supra note 14, at 104-05 (1746]; Resolve of Dec. 6, 1775, ch. 416, 1775-1776
Mass. Acts 164; Resolve of July 6, 1776, ch. 201, 1775-1776 Mass. Acts 513; Resolve of Sept.
24, 1777, ch. 329, 1777-1778 Mass. Acts 134.
21. See, e.g., 2 J. WINTHROP, WINTHROP'S JOURNAL "HISTORY OF NEW ENGLAND" 16301649, at 134-35 (J. Hosmer ed. 1908); I PROV. LAWS, supra note 12, at 423 [1700]; Resolve of
June 21, 1776, ch. 72, 1775-1776, Mass. Acts. 457; Resolve of June 29, 1776, ch. 134, 1775-1776
Mass. Acts 485; Resolve of Oct. 18, 1777, ch. 453, 1777-1778 Mass. Acts 177; Resolve of Jan.
29, 1779, ch. 422, 1778-1779 Mass. Acts. 578; E. POWERS, supra note 9, at 214-15, 221-22.
22. See, e.g., an act "against Jesuits and Popish priests," which automatically accounted
any such person "an incendiary and disturber of the publick peace and safety," subject to
banishment or "perpetual imprisonment" if he refused to depart. I PROV. LAws, supra note
12, at 423 (1700]. Likewise, the danger posed by prisoners of war called for "a total & instant
Separation" through confinement. 1770-1777 BOSTON TOWN RECORDS, supra note 14, at 27879 (1777]; 1742-1757 BOSTON TOWN RECORDS, supra note 14, at 104-05 (1746]. q. note 249
infra and accompanying text.
23. SUFFOLK COUNTY COURT, supra note 13, at 724, 753 (1676]; 1 RECORDS OF THE
COURT OF ASSISTANTS OF THE COLONY OF THE MASSACHUSETTS BAY, 1630-1692, at 90 (1677]
(1901-1928) [hereinafter cited as COURT OF ASSISTANTS]; COLONIAL JUSTICE IN WESTERN
MAsSACHUSETTS, 1639-1702: THE PYNCHON COURT RECORD 307 (1684] (J. Smith ed. 1961)
(Diary of Judge Pynchon) [hereinafter cited as PYNCHO?-! COURT RECORD]; I PROV. LAWS,
supra note 12, at 424 (1700].
24. E.g., WORCESTER COUNTY COURT, supra note 15, at 42 (1732], 80 (1733], 143 [1735],
149 (1736], 159 (1736], 184 (1737].
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together, he stayed put.25
Although it was in theory a status pro tempore, 26 pretrial incarceration might in practice go on and on. Not untypical was the procedural history of Commonwealth v. Frye, 27 heard before the
Superior Court shortly after independence. Cato Frye allegedly
committed a theft in April of 1784, for which he was indicted at the
June session of the Court. Frye pleaded not guilty, "and from
thence said Indictment was Continued from Term to Term to this
Term and now the said Cato . . . is Set to the Bar" - on November
1, 1785, some seventeen months later. Frye was convicted that same
day. In 1765, a woman accused of murdering her bastard child lay
in gaol for a full year before she was acquitted-and freed. 28 Yet despite its potential harshness, pretrial incarceration bore no abstract
resemblance to a criminal sanction. Cato Frye might have had difficulty distinguishing such niceties,29 but his lawyer would not. 30 Pretrial incarceration served a custodial31 function: It merely ensured
that the prisoner appeared for his trial and, if convicted, received his
deserts. Under the circumstances, the state was perfectly willing to
hold the accused :financially, instead of physically, hostage. Requests for bail were rarely denied, and only the chronic inability of
criminals to raise funds necessitated resort to a more extreme
safeguard.
The routine application of incarceration to suspects rather than
convicts colored contemporary perceptions of the gaol and spawned
a kind of jurisprudential about-face not unfamiliar to historians. In
25. See, e.g., 1 PLYMOUTH COUNTY COURT, supra note 14, at 267 [1703]; 4 id. at 131
[1795], 149 [1797], 202 [1802].
26. See CoL. LAWS, supra note 13, § 2, at 38 [1641].
27. Sup. Jud. Ct, Nov. 1785, f. 323 (unpublished court records, Suffolk County Court
House).
28. See Boston Gazette, Mar. 25, 1765, at 3, col. 2. See also, e.g., 2 PLYMOUTH COUNTY
COURT, supra note 14, at 31 [1722].
29. The Sheriff of Suffolk County complained of "Cursing and Swearing" by the inmates
confined in his gaol "who regard not the Laws already made in that Case, for they being
Prisoners conclude they cannot be further punished, and so presume to commit that Sin very
Frequently." 17 HousE JOURNAL, supra note 15, at 241 [1739].
30. See, e.g., J. BENTHAM, THE RATIONALE OF PUNISHMENT 101 (London 1830) (1st ed.
Paris 1811, from a manuscript written in 1775). In 1799, a legislative committee urged that
sentencing a convicted criminal to imprisonment in the county gaol would be "unequal, as a
person charged with an offence would suffer before conviction as rigourously as he would after
his guilt had been established by a trial." Report Respecting Convicts, appended to 1802 Resolves ch. 54 (passed) (unpublished manuscript, Mass. Archives).
31. One document used the verb "detain'd" in reference to such prisoners. A REPORT OF
THE RECORD COMMISSIONERS OF THE CITY OF BOSTON, CONTAINING THE RECORDS OF THE
BOSTON SELECTMEN, 1764 to 1768, at 2 [1764] (1884-1909) [hereinafter cited as BOSTON
SELECTMEN RECORDS].
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1902, Edward Jenks stunned constitutional lawyers with his "most
embarrassing discovery" that the writ of Habeas Corpus was originally used "not to get people out of prison, but to put them in it."32
Similarly, modem law enforcement officers would surely grimace to
discover their eighteenth-century counterparts petitioning courts to
expedite the trials of criminals - not so that they could lock the
criminals up, but, on the contrary, so that they could free the
criminals from gaol.33 Then as now, imprisonment was expensive,
and in the eighteenth century prisoners stood to be released after
trial whether convicted or no. Under those circumstances, it made
perfect sense for sheriffs to do everything in their power to accelerate
a criminal's liberation - holding criminals was not what the gaol
was for.
Not often, at least. On occasion, however, gaols did perform a
penal function in pre-Revolutionary Massachusetts, and the sanction
of incarceration arose with increasing frequency in the criminal statutes of the provincial period.34 Still, a large proportion of these
prison sentences were handed down to reprimand various shades of
contempt,35 and once again appear more coercive than sanctional.
Such sentences were always for indefinite terms, "during the Pleasure of the Court."36 Release hinged upon a display of proper deference to the offended authority.37
32. Jenks, The Story efHabeas Corpus, 18 LAW Q. R.Ev. 64, 65 (1902). Jenks' thesis has
recently been challenged by Duker, The English Origins efthe Writ efHabeas Corpus: A Peculiar Path to Fame, 53 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 983 (1978).
33. See 25 HOUSE JOURNAL, supra note 15, at 156 [1748]; 38 HOUSE JOURNAL, supra note
15, at 141 [1761]; 44 Mass. Archives 487-89 [1761] (unpublished manuscript, Mass. Archives).
34. See note 283 infra and accompanying text. Incarceration as a sanction was sufficiently
familiar to be included in the list of punishments expressly permitted by the Massachusetts
Bay charter, 1 CoL. RECORDS, supra note 11, at 17. See id., at 171.
35. Contempt of court: see, e.g., CoL. LAWS, supra note 13, § 2, at 36; 29 SUFFOLK
COUNTY COURT, supra note 13, at 121 [1672], 146 [1672], 232 [1673]; 1 PLYMOUTH COUNTY
COURT, supra note 14, at 210 [1691], 233 [1699], 266 [1703]; 2 PLYMOUTH COUNTY COURT,
supra note 14, at 98 [1729]. Contempt of the magistrate: see, e.g., PYNCHON COURT REcoRD,
supra note 23, at 307 [1684]. Contempt of the constable: see, e.g., SUFFOLK COUNTY COURT,
supra note 13, at 867 [1677]; Co=onwealth v. Allen, Sup. Jud. Ct., Feb. 1785, f. 67. "Con•
temptious Carriages" or "Reproachful speeches" in public: see, e.g., 1 PLYMOUTH COUNTY
COURT, supra note 14, at 192 [1687], 267 [1703]; 7 RECORDS AND FILES OF THE QUARTERLY
COURTS OF EssEX COUNTY, MAssACHUSETTS, 1678-1680, at 406-08 [1680] (G. Dow ed. 19111921) [hereinafter cited as EssEX COUNTY COURT]. More particularly, "indecent reflections
cast on the proceedings of the Governor and Council and the House of Representatives," 13
PROV. LAWS, supra note 12, at 307 [1743].
36. See, e.g., 1 PLYMOUTH COUNTY COURT, supra note 14, at 210 [1691].
37. See, e.g., 1 PLYMOUTH COUNTY COURT, supra note 14, at 266 [1703]; 3 PLYMOUTH
COUNTY COURT, supra note 14, at 308 [1771]; 2 COURT OF ASSISTANTS, supra note 23, at 62-63
[1636], 132 [1643]; E. PowERS, supra note 9, at 235. Occasionally, judges ordered imprisonment ''till the next court," when the prisoner's attitude would presumably be reexamined, see,
e.g., SUFFOLK COUNTY COURT, supra note 13, at 867 [1677].
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Criminal incarceration imposed in a strictly penal sense, for a
definite span of time, was plainly a second choice: It served either as
a substitute for some conventional means of punishment that proved
infeasible38 or as a supplemental penalty, added to buttress the primary sanction.39 In either event, gaol terms rarely exceeded three
months, and often proved as fleeting as twenty-four hours. 40 Before
1750, those few criminal statutes that imposed long-term incarceration fairly shouted their eccentricity. Forgers convicted after 1692,
for example, awaited the loss of an ear and "imprisonment by the
space of one whole year without bail or main prise."41 Bail was allowed, of course, in instances of pretrial incarceration, not by coincidence the most familiar function of the gaol. Colonial judges
apparently granted bail so reflexively that a bail-less form of incarceration required careful elaboration.
In the final decades of the provincial government, social pressures began to nudge criminal justice in Massachusetts toward a critical transition. As a practical matter, however, the function of the
prison had changed little over the first 150 years of the colony's history. In 1646, the county gaol was a "fit place to which . . . malefactors may be committed until the next court."42 In 1765, the gaol
was "not intended as a Punishment, it is only to keep Offenders for
Trial, or after Trial till Sentence is fulfilled." 43
2. Institutional .Design
Not only cijd the colonial gaol perform a set of functions different
from the modem penitentiary, but it was itself a very different institution, both structurally and administratively. Most of the early
gaols were singularly unimpressive buildings, holding up to thirty
38. See, e.g., 1 PROV. LAWS, supra note 12, at 12 [1693].
39. See, e.g., 1 COURT OF ASSISTANTS, supra note 23, at 285 [1685), where the Court readily dispensed with the imprisonment which accompanied a fine. Hardly any prosecutions resulted in incarceration alone, without additional public or monetary sanction. For a rare
example, see 3 PLYMOUTH COUNTY COURT, supra note 14, at 187 [1764] (five days for house
breaking without theft).
40. See, e.g., 1 PLYMOUTH COUNTY COURT, supra note 14, at 267 [1703), WORCESTER
COUNTY COURT, supra note 15, at 153, 154 (1736]. The longest term of incarceration mandated by statute for a criminal act prior to 1749 was one year. I PROV. LAWS, supra note 12, at
51, 54 [1692).
41. 1 PROV. LAWS, supra note 12, at 51, 54 [1692] (emphasis added). The caveat against
bail or mainprize (a variation of bail, now obsolete) appears in various other statutes and court
records as late as 1753. See, e.g., King v. Cook, Super. Ct., Jan. 1753, f. 218 (unpublished court
records, Suffolk County Court House).
42. COL. LAWS, supra note 13, § 2 at 13 [1646).
43. J. QUINCY, REPORTS OF CASES ARGUED AND ADJUDGED IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
JUDICATURE OF THE PROVINCE OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY, BETWEEN 1761 AND 1772, at 110,
112 (1865) (Grand Jury Charge by Hutchinson, C.J., Super. Ct., March Term 1765).
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prisoners or so. Upkeep was haphazard at best, and the thin wooden
planks that stood between the inmate and freedom often rotted
through, permitting easy escape.44
Indeed, the gaol in early Massachusetts was no place to be. If
negligence characterized the gaol's upkeep, then its administration
must be elevated to the plane of recklessness. 45 Not even casual
measures were taken to guard the inmates' physical health, and a
mittimus of incarceration became an invitation to an early grave. 46
Yet, the government was surely aware of the problem. Though few
officials ever toured a colonial gaol (and invariably denounced the
conditions as "shocking [and] loathsome" whenever they did) 47 each
change of season brought the legislature a fresh stack of petitions
from inmates all over the colony alternately begging for a supply of
firewood or access to fresh air. 48 Even more copious, however, were
requests for release, as opposed to relief, and it does seem plausible
that the early gaol's notoriously high rate of escape owed as much to
inmate desperation as to the laxness of security.49
44. See E. POWERS, supra note 9, at 212-16. On the small size of prisons, see 2 PROV,
LAWS, supra note 12, at 119 (1718]. On the high rate of escape, see, eg., 7 HousE JOURNAL,
supra note 15, at 108 (1726). Special precautions were occasionally taken to prevent dangerous
prisoners from escaping - and even these did not always suffice. See 9 PROV. LAWS, supra
note 12, at 33 (1708]; 14 PROV. LAWS, supra note 12, at 318, 324, 317-18 (1748].
45. The description that follows appears to conform with the other gaols of this period.
For a similar picture of imprisonment in New York, see D. GREENBERG, CRIME AND LAW
ENFORCEMENT IN THE COLONY OF NEW YORK, 1691-1776, at 124-27, 168 (1976). For the
early English experience, see M. IGNATIEFF, A JUST MEASURE OF PAIN: THE PENITENTIARY
IN THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION, 1750-1850, at 29-42 (1978); J. Howard,supra note 3, at 1-10,
16.
46. Gaol keepers' petitions for reimbursement of expenses not unco=only included burial fees, see, e.g., II PROV. LAWS, supra note 12, at 33 (1726], 84 (1726). Thomas Hutchinson
made the observation directly, see J. QUINCY, supra note 43, at 11 (Grand Jury Charge by
Hutchinson, C. J., Super. Ct., Mar. Term 1765); Letter from Thomas Hutchinson to Robert
Treat Paine (Nov. 29, 1766), in 1766 Paine Papers (unpublished manuscript, Mass. Hist. Socy.)
(Hutchinson's pardon of one inmate "that he might not be (imprisoned] another winter.").
Disease was one obvious danger (in England, "gaol fever'' was an occupational hazard of the
legal profession, for the inmates brought their afflictions with them to court; at the so-called
"Black Assize" of 1577 almost 400 persons perished; John Howard believed that gaol fever
claimed more lives than the gallows). See J. COCKBURN, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH ASSIZES,
1558-1714, at 53 (1972); J. HOWARD, supra note 3, at 6, 258-59. Massachusetts gaols were also
firetraps, see, eg., 1754-1763 BOSTON SELECTMEN RECORDS, supra note 31, at 150 (1761);
1769-1775 id. at 4 [1769).
47. J. QUINCY, supra note 43, at 111 (Grand Jury Charge by Hutchinson, C.J., Super, Ct.,
March Term 1765); see 3 PLYMOUTH COUNTY COURT, supra note 14, at 308 (1771).
48. See, eg., I HOUSE JOURNAL, supra note 15, at 164 (1716); 2 HOUSE JOURNAL, supra
note 15, at 103 (1718]; 14 PROV. LAWS, supra note 12, at 71-72 [1747], 171 (1748]; 7 ESSEX
COUNTY COURT, supra note 35, at 227 note (1679]; 8 EsssEX COUNTY COURT, supra note 35, at
335 (1682]; Resolve of Apr. 18, 1777, ch. 1064, 1775-1776 Mass. Acts 890 (1777]; Resolve of
Mar. 16, 1780, ch. 811, 1779-1780 Mass. Acts 373 (1780].
49. John Howard, who examined English gaols, drew this conclusion. See J. HOWARD,
supra note 3, at 40 n.l.
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In large measure, the mistreatment of inmates may be traced to
the constitution of prison government. David Rothman has described prison government in the eighteenth century as "familial."50
In Massachusetts, at least, a better term would be "despotic." As in
English practice, Massachusetts gaols were managed by a "gaol
keeper," but in all the years preceding independence, no statute or
regulation ever ventured beyond the most cursory guidelines to delineate the responsibilities of this office. One of the first acts, appearing in 1663 (in response to the keeper's own inquiry), directe4
keepers to record a "true List" of their inmates and to discharge
them from custody only upon judicial warrant. 51 These.provisions
were subsequently reaffirmed by the provincial government. 52 Another line of statutes, originating in 1705, provided for the separation
of debtors from the rest of the inmate population.53 Though the fees
recoverable for inmate "maintenance" were a matter of frequent
provision,54 no authority ever bothered to exp\ain the degree of care
to which inmates were entitled. Inmates could, of course, lodge protests against ill use with the legislature, and they did so oft~n. But in
practice, few strings were attached to the keeper's office: The realm
that he ruled was a small one, but within its walls his word was law.
Given such a license, abuse was inevitable. Keepers alternately
neglected and exploited their charges.55 illustrative of the problem
- and of the legislature's indifference toward it - was the notorious
career of Zechariah Trescott, keeper of the Suffolk County gaol in
Boston from 1727 to 1737. Prisoners began issuing complaints
against Trescott shortly after he was installed in his post. When the
50. See D. ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE AsYLUM 53-56 (1971).
51. COL. LAWS, supra note 13, § 2, at 128 [1663]; id. § 2, at 6 [1662].
52. 1 PROV. LAWS, supra note 12, at 424 [1700].
53. 1 id. at 565 [1705]; 2 id. at 119 [1718] (reaflinned in subsequent statutes). For other
random provisions, see 1 id. at 95 [1692], 330 [1698), 381 [1699].
54. See, e.g., COL. LAWS, supra note 13, § 2, at 128 [1663]; 1 PROV. LAWS, supra note 12; at
88 [1692], 331 [1698], 699 [1712]; 5 id. at 1173 [1780]. As in England, inmates in early Massachusetts gaols were required to pay the charges of their own support (a system that has stirred
renewed interest of late, see, e.g., N.Y. Times, Oct. 1, 1979, § 1, at 26, col. 1).
55. Keepers probably earned more from the sale of liquor to inmates than from their regular fees. See 2 PLYMOUTH COUNTY CoURT,supra note 14, at 145 [1734]; Petition to Governor
Bernard in 44 Mass. Archives 512-13 [c. 1765) (unpublished manuscript, Mass. Archives); 22
HOUSE JOURNAL, supra note 15, at 240,245 [1746); SUFFOLK COUNTY COURT, supra note 13,
at 912 [1678]. At least one keeper made a habit of using his prisoners as personal servants, see
EssEX COUNTY COURT, supra note 35, at 84 [1672). At the same time, the right to exercise was
routinely withheld, see, e.g., 8 id. 335 [1682], and as late as 1833, a House committee visiting
the Springfield gaol on a tour of inspection "found the keeper absent, and the Prison left in
charge of his two sons, one aged 13 and the other 11." REPORT ON GAOLS AND HOUSES OF
CORRECTION 1N THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETfS MADE BY A COMMITTEE APPOINTED BY THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 10 (Boston 1834).
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House ordered an investigation in 1731 it too received a taste of the
Keeper's audacity. Although the legislators amassed enough evidence to vote for Trescott's dismissal, the keeper responded with a
humble prayer to "overlook . . . his Faults and Misdemeanors" and
restore him to office. "[A]fter a considerable Debate" Trescott's
prayer was denied. Yet the keeper managed somehow to worm his
way back into office - as we know by the fresh batch of complaints
of "many grievous hardships and abuses" at his hands which tum up
in the House minutes of the following year.56
·
Upon receipt of these new charges, the House ordered Trescott to
explain himself in person. But when the appointed day arrived, the
keeper was nowhere to be found. Aroused, the legislators ordered
Trescott locked behind his own bars, "there to remain till further
order." Once again, he begged the House's forgiveness, and once
again - incomprehensibly - was restored to favor. 57
Although petitions continued to pour out of Suffolk gaol,58 the ax
did not fall until 1736. In that year, as the inmates were about to be
transferred out of the old "Wooden Prison" into a new stone structure, they rebelled and took over the building. The House was
forced to call up the militia to surround the gaol, ''with their Musquets charged," until the prisoners submitted. 59 Here was an event
too serious to ignore or treat with another tap on the wrist. In January of 1737, after a full investigation, a formal hearing was held in
the House to inquire into the management of the Suffolk gaol. This
time Trescott did appear to answer his accusers (his wife at his side,
in the best tradition of investigative hearings) but to no avail. The
House determined that the keeper had "extorted excessive Fees,"
"unreasonably prevented the Prisoners receiving Victuals and Drink
when sent to them by their Friends," and "kept some of the Prisoners in close Confinement without Water, to their great Suffering." 60
When the hearing concluded, Trescott was stripped of his office
for good. 61 Still, the legislators' response to the keeper's excesses was
shortsighted at best. By merely replacing the bureaucrat instead of
taking steps to de.fine and monitor his duties, the House was clipping
a branch, rather than grubbing up the root of the problem. The predictable sequel: a renewed stream of petitions assailing Trescott's
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

IO HOUSE JOURNAL, supra note 15, at 327, 348, 350, 356 (1731]; 11 id. at 142 (1732].
II id. at 142, 144, 147, 149, 153, 161 (1732].
13 id. at 59 (1735].
14 id. at 176-77 [1736].
14 id. at 177 [1736], 238, 240-41, 243-44 (1737] (emphasis omitted).
14 id. at 244 [1737].
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successor.62
B.

The Rise of the Penitentiary

When we skip forward a few years to 1785, a new picture begins
to emerge. The Commonwealth of Massachusetts has just appointed
Castle Island, a fortress guarding Boston harbor, to be a repository
for convicted criminals - and only convicted criminals - from all
over the state.63 Simultaneously, the criminal code has been revised
to permit judges to impose long-term incarceration as an alternative
to the old sanctions such as whipping and the pillory. 64 Fourteen
years later, Castle Island has been sold to the federal government
and lies abandoned as a prison.65 But by 1805, the Commonwealth
has opened a new prison in Charlestown that presents a sharp contrast with the local gaol. Simultaneously, the criminal code has been
revised anew, not simply to make room for incarceration, but to supplant the old sanctions entirely. 66
Structurally, the State Prison leaves a strong impression.
Designed by one of the foremost architects in the state, its massive
stone frame and looming walls have consumed six years oflabor and
$170,000 in costs. It holds not thirty but three hundred inmates, all
criminal offenders sentenced to solitary confinement and hard labor.
They begin their terms in a dark and solitary cell and then find
themselves transferred to congregate quarters and workshops where
from dawn to dusk they labor at manufacturing shoes and nails or
hammering stone. 67
Equally striking are the changes in institutional administration,
now elaborated as the science of "prison discipline." No longer do
the inmates' basic needs go unattended. A hospital has been constructed on the premises, staffed by a full-time physician. A major
62. 17 id. at 235, 247 [1739]; 18 id. at 51, 98, 129, 146, [1740]; 19 id. at 40, 41, 80, 82, 83, 91,
201 [1741].
63. Act of Mar. 14, 1785, ch. 63, 1784-1785 Mass. Acts 163.
64. See notes 344-46 infra and accompanying text.
65. Act of June 25, 1798, ch. 13, 1798-1799 Mass. Acts 16; Resolve of June 26, 1798, ch. 47,
1798-1799 Mass. Acts 196; Governors' Message, Jan. 11, 1799, 1798-1799 Mass. Acts 636.
66. Act of June 15, 1805, ch. 23, 1804-1805 Mass. Acts 427; see note 355 infra.
67. On the legislative history of construction, see Resolve of Jan. 22, 1800, ch. 68, 17981799 Mass Acts 558; Resolve of Nov. 15, 1800, ch. 64, 1800-1801 Mass. Acts 176; Resolve of
June 23, 1802, ch. 54, 1802-1803 Mass. Acts 380; Resolve of June 22, 1803, ch. 51, 1802-1803
Mass. Acts 861. Additional documents relevant to construction can be found appended to
1802 Resolves ch. 54 (passed) (unpublished manuscripts, Mass. Archives). For a structural
description and a description of early prison industries, see G. BRADFORD, DESCRIPTION AND
HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE MAssACHUSETTS STATE PRISON (Charlestown 1816). On working hours, see LAWS OF THE COMMONWEALTH FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE STATE PRISON
28 (Boston 1839).
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effort has been undertaken to ensure prison hygiene and a proper
diet. And as for our friendly gaol keeper, his responsibilities have
been parceled out to a network of officials, all of whom work under a
·detailed code of regulations. What is more, the government inspects
the State Prison periodically. In combination, these efforts have dramatically reduced prison mortality. 68
In short, the modem penitentiary has come of age. But where
did it come from? The roots of criminal incarceration surely cannot
be found in the old penalties like whipping and the pillory - at least
there appears to be no natural progression from the one to the other.
But neither can its roots be found in the gaol, for beyond the most
superficial coincidences the two institutions were as different as night
and day. To discover the penitentiary's true beginnings, we must
explore, first, the ideology that underlay criminal sanctions in early
Massachusetts and, second, the social realities that governed their
effectiveness.
Ill. THE IDEOLOGY OF CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT
A.

The Rothman Thesis

Any investigation of the rise of criminal incarceration in America
must begin with a tip of the hat to David Rothman. Rothman's
justly acclaimed work, The .Discovery of the Asylum, 69 framed the
questions, if it did not supply all the answers, and his interpretation
of events has since spread throughout the textual and jurisprudential
literature on penology. It seems appropriate, therefore, to review
Rothman's conclusions briefly here, as a backdrop to my own
analysis.
Rothman traces the inauguration of criminal incarceration preeminently to a series of intellectual waves that swept across America
in the wake of the war for independence. During the colonial era,
Rothman asserts, the Calvinist doctrine of orginal sin forestalled efforts to reduce crime by reforming or even deterring the criminal.
Before the Revolution, punishment remained in principle retributive
and expiatory - purposes that simply did not call for incarceration
on a large scale.7 0
68. See notes 382 & 384 infra. For a brief administrative history of the State Prison, see M,
HINDUS, PRISON AND PLANTATION 162-81 (1980).

69. D. ROTHMAN, supra note 50. This work won the Beveridge Award in 1971. For
thoughtful criticisms of the work, see Schneider, supra note 10; Zuckerman, Book Review, 121
U. PA. L. REv. 398 (1972); Muraskin, The Social-Control Theory in American History: A Critique, 9 J. Soc. HIST. 559 (1976).
70. D. ROTHMAN, supra note 50, at 3, 14-15, 17-18, 45-46, 52-53.
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Rothman asserts that independence brought a fresh ideology and
new programs.71 The social optimism of European Enlightenment
thought found a receptive audience in the new American republic,
steeped as it was in revolutionary excitement and activism. Concepts
of human perfectability overpowered the "grim determinism" of
Calvinist thought and inspired in Americans a fresh resolve to eliminate crime. Criminal incarceration was born not of an effort to maintain crime control, but of an intellectually stimulated effort to
enhance it.72
The initial program to accomplish this feat was derived from the
tract of a recently celebrated Italian theorist named Cesare Beccaria.
Beccaria postulated that the proliferation of crime could be traced
directly to the viciousness and thoughtlessness of criminal codes. If
the statutes were carefully redesigned to deter criminals rather than
to take revenge against them, Beccaria taught, then the galling offenses would not occur in the first place.73 Rothman asserts that incarceration was first seized upon as a punishment because it
constituted an eminently variable mechanism of deterrence.74
By the 1820's, Americans had become disillusioned with the deterrent approach.75 Beccaria's vaccine had failed to immunize
American society against crime. At the same time, population
growth, urbanization, and nascent industrialization had provoked a
general fear for the stability of American society. Still, reformers
had lost none of their determination to put an end to crime. The
Jacksonians looked into the problem anew, fueled by both ambition
and anxiety.76
The solution that they lighted upon, Rothman contends, was
both novel and of American origin.77 Taking a hint from the pro71. Rothman is adamant in his appraisal of the Revolution as a watershed: "Even at the
close of the colonial period, there was no reason to think that the prison would soon become
central to criminal punishment." Id. at 56, 59-61. See note 75 infra.
72. D. ROTHMAN, supra note 50, at 57-62.
73. Beccarian ideology is discussed in greater detail at notes 83-92 infra and accompanying
text.
74. D. ROTHMAN, supra note 50, at 59-62, 89. ''To reformers, the advantages of the institutions were external, and they hardly imagined that life inside the prison might rehabilitate the
criminal" Id. at 62.
·
75. Id. at 62, 68. For Rothman, the intellectual eras are quite distinct: "Almost no eighteenth-century assumption about the origins or nature of. . . deviancy survived intact into the
Jacksonian era . . . ." Id. at 3. Furthermore, Jacksonian reformers "now looked to the life of
the criminal, not to the statutes, in attempting to grasp the origins of deviancy. They presented
biographical sketches, not analyses of existing codes. . . . Such questions were for the 1790's,
not the 1820's and '30's." Id. at 68.
76. Id. at 57-59, 62, 69-71, 78.
77. See id. at 89, 94, 108, 330 n.20.
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pounders of human perfectability, the J acksonians determined to rehabilitate the criminal, to treat him and then to return him to the
community a new man. Distressed by social deterioration, they now
identified the root cause of crime to be the social environment, rather
than misconceived criminal codes. To cure the offender, he had to
be pulled out of society and placed in an artificial, corruption-free
environment. Under the Jacksonians, the prison embarked on a new
career as an institutional forum for the rehabilitation of criminals,
and more broadly as a prototype for the rehabilitation of society. 78
Fascinating as it is, Rothman's account of the rise of criminal
incarceration requires significant revision. The analysis is flawed,
perhaps, by a tendency toward idiosyncrasy, but more seriously compromised by a curious compass of research that sweeps in all of the
United States, yet never strays beyond its bounds. By contrast, a
close study of the evidence from Massachusetts, coupled with a survey of European sources, presents a very different picture. Specifically, (1) the core ideology on which Massachusetts relied when it
introduced criminal incarceration derived neither from eighteenthcentury Italy nor from nineteenth-century America, but from sixteenth-century England; (2) the ideology of incarceration did not go
through two distinct stages, the first emphasizing deterrence and the
second rehabilitation; and (3) social forces influenced the initial postrevolutionary development of criminal incarceration, which occurred well before the Jacksonian era. The process of demonstrating
these points, undertaken below, will also reveal that Rothman's
treat~ent telescopes the complexity of the social and intellectual
landscape on which his thesis rests. 79

B. Images of .Deterrence
"One of the most embarrassing circumstances attending the government of the [Massachusetts State] Prison," its Directors observed
in 1823,
is the vacillating and contradictory opinions, which prevail with re-

spect to it. The subject of punishment for crime is one, on which most
people have thought something and very few profoundly. Each man
78. Id. at xviii-xix, 62-78, 84, 107-08. A recent study also traces rehabilitative ideology
expressly in Massachusetts to the Jacksonian era, specifically, to the period following the
prison reforms of 1829 (discussed at notes 409-418 i'!fra and accompanying text). See M.
HINDUS, supra, note 68, at 163.
79. One potential element in the rise of criminal incarceration, namely class conflict and
exploitation, requires separate treatment, and will not be addressed in this Article. For Marxist interpretations of the rise of criminal incarceration in Europe, see M. FOUCAULT, D1sc1PLINE AND PUNISH (1975); M. IGNATIEFF, supra note 45; G. RUSCHE & 0. K!RCHHEIMER,
PUNISHMENT AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE (1939).
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has his own theory, and each successive Committee of the Legislature
its own favorite plan. . . . Opposite and conflicting expectations are
entertained by different individuals, and often by the same
individual. 80
The observation was as cogent as it was timeless. Like most social
problems that stir emotion and defy solution, the "Gordian Knot" 81
of crime control was incessantly debated, but never untangled. It
would take an essay longer than this to rehearse all of the strands of
contemporary ideology connected to the problem. 82 For our purposes, however, broad strokes will suffice.

I. Beccarianism
Rothman traces the first movement toward incarceration in
America to the criminological theories of Cesare Beccap.a. Beccaria's essay, "On Crimes and Punishments," created a sensation on
its publication in 1764, spreading quickly across Europe and onward
to the American colonies. 83 But this work was not penned in a vacuum. It belongs to a larger school of thought known as "rationalism" or "utilitarianism" - an ideology planted at the core of the
European Enlightenment and expounded by such well-known philosophers as Montesquieu and Bentham.
The rational ideology rejected scripture in favor of human logic
and reason as a guide to the construction of social institutions. The
aim of secular government, the rationalists taught, was not to do
God's bidding, but to maximize secular utility (in Beccaria's oft-repeated phrase, to provide "the greatest happiness shared by the
greatest number"). 84 Intellectually, at least, the shift was as drastic
as any that can be imagined, and it obliged the rationalists to recon80. Austin, Phinney & Soley, Remarks on the Massachusetts State Prison, in RULES AND
REGULATIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE MAsSACHUSETTS STATE PRISON 23, 27 (Boston,
1823) [hereinafter cited as Remarks]. For similar statements, see J. BENTHAM Panopticon; or,
The Inspection-House, in 4 WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 121-22 (Edinburgh 1843) (1st ed.
Dublin 1791); J. HANWAY, SOLITUDE IN IMPRISONMENT 4 {London 1776); REPORT [ON THE
STATE PRISON] 5, 7 (1822) (legislative document, Harvard Law Library) (also printed in 18171822 Mass. Legislative Documents no. 52, at 1 (1822) (State Library Annex)); Tudor, Book
Review, N. AM. R.Ev. 417 (1821) (reviewing G. BRADFORD, supra note 1).
81. This is Bentham's analogy. See BENTHAM, supra note 80, at 39.
82. The standard treatment of criminological theory in Hanoverian England is 1 L. RADZINOWICZ, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ADMINISTRATION FROM 1750
(1948). For a useful survey and anthology, see J. HEATH, EIGHTEENTH CENTURY PeNAL THEORY (1963).
83. C. BecCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PuNisHMENT (H. Paolucci ed. 1963) (1st ed. Leghorn
1764). On the work's notoriety, see id at ix-xi; 1 L. RADZINOWICZ, supra note 82, at 277 n.38,
283 n.60; note 94 i'!fra and accompanying text. For a biography of Beccaria, see M. MAESTRO,
CESARE BECCARIA AND THE ORIGINS OF PeNAL REFORM (1973).
84. The phrase is often attributed incorrectly to Bentham. See C. BECCARIA, supra note
83, at 8 & n.10.
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sider a vast constellation of the most venerable dogmas. They
plunged into the task gleefully.
In the realm of criminal law, rational philosophers argued that
what made an action a "crime" was the harm it did to other members of society. "Sins" that were not also socially harmful had to be
answered for at a different tribunal. 85 Furthermore, once a crime
was committed, the only rational purpose of punishment was theprevention of future harm; retribution had no place in a theory of secular utility, for "what is done can never be undone." 86 Viewed in the
cold light of reason, punishment thus became "an evil to which the
magistrate resorts only from its being necessary to prevention of a
greater."87 Any gratuitous severity, (or "prodigality") of punishment
constituted "abuse and not justice."88
Rational philosophers who grappled with the problem of how
crime could be prevented devoted much attention to deterrence: that
is, setting penalties such that a potential offender would be held in
check by the fear of a painful sequel to his action. 89 Just what
scheme of penalties would best accomplish this intimidation was, to
put it mildly, a matter on which the criminologists differed. The ideology of rationalism was sufficiently :flexible to bear both reformist
and apologetical glosses.90
For his part, Beccaria postulated that the certainty of punishment
contributed more to deterrence than its severity. Were apprehension,
conviction, and sentencing all rapid and infallible, the punishments
established for crimes could be quite moderate, for it was pre-eminently that reed of optimism, "the hope of impunity," that sustained
85. E.g., Montesquieu: "In things that prejudice the tranquillity or security of the state,
secret actions are subject to human jurisdiction. But in those which offend the Deity, where
there is no public action, there can J?e no criminal matter; the whole passes betwixt man and
God, who knows the measure and time of his vengeance. • . . [W]e must honor the Deity,
and leave him to avenge his own cause." C. MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 263-64
(2d ed. London 1752) (1st ed. Geneva 1748); see C. BECCARIA, supra note 83, at 20-21.
86. See, e.g., W. EDEN, PRINCIPLES OF PENAL LAW 6-7 (2d ed. London 1771) (1st ed.
London 1771). ("The prevention of crime should be the great object of the Lawgiver•••• It
is from an abuse of language, that we apply the word 'Punishment' to human institutions:
Venegeance belongeth not to man.")
87. w. PALEY, THE PRINCIPLES OF MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 527 (London
1785) (an edition was printed in Boston by S. Etheridge for J. White in 1795). See J. BENTHAM, supra note 30, at 20-21.
88. C. BECCARIA, Sllpra note 83, at 13, 14, 45, 63.
89. See, e.g., J. BENTHAM, S11pra note 30, at 19-20. The standard modem text on the concept of deterrence is F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, DETERRENCE (1973).
90. For example, Paley and Madan, both defenders of the "bloody code" (Great Britain's
accumulation of over 200 capital statutes during the eighteenth century), adhered to the basic
premises of rationalism enunciated above, though their thoughts on the matter of capital punishment were the antithesis of Beccaria's. See generally 1 L. RADZINOWICZ, Sllpra note 82, at
239-59, 277-86. On the bloody code, see id at 3-227.
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an offender in his moment of temptation. Beccaria in particular denounced capital punishment for its superfluous rigor and capricious
enforcement.91 And on a structural plane, he insisted that judges
should exercise no discretion over sanctions. The legislature should
specifically prescribe the penalty for each crime, both as a matter of
constitutional theory, and to inhibit expectations of lenient treatment.92 In mapping out its code, Beccaria added, the legislature
should carefully proportion punishments to the magnitude of crimes.
The more heinous the offense, the more severe the penalty needed to
deter it; but uniformly severe penalties would necessarily entail
"prodigality'' and destroy moral distinctions among various offenses.
Here, then, was one program for the control of crime. But how
significant was it to the coincident rise of criminal incarceration in
Massachusetts?
2. Massachusetts Legislation
The extent to which Beccarian ideology influenced developments
in Massachusetts is problematic. To be sure, this current of thought
did flow vigorously through the province in the late eighteenth century. By 1765, public documents paraphrased rationalist tracts by
styling prevention the "great end" of punishment,93 and Beccaria's
specific suggestions for law reform received widespread notoriety
and praise. Nathan Dane, codrafter of Massachusetts' criminal code
of 1805, offered passages from the Italian theorist's writings in his
celebrated Abridgments .94 Still, the broad principles that made up
Beccarian ideology were older than Beccaria's essay, and its specific
suggestions were largely disregarded when the time came to translate
exhortations into enactments. Moreover, Beccaria's program,
though compatible with criminal incarceration, issued no call for it.
91. See C. BECCARIA, supra note 83, at 13-17, 42-52, 55-59, 62-64. In England, only a
fraction of the capital offenders were actually executed. See generally I L. RADzINOWICZ,
supra note 82, at 83-164.
92. "Flexibility'' of sentence and "certainty'' of punishment were cognate concepts, in that
flexibility approaches uncertainty as the range of discretion approaches a minimum of zero (no
penalty, hence impunity).
93. 44 Mass. Archives 538-39 [1765} (unpublished manuscript, Mass. Archives); see, e.g.,
G. BRADFORD, supra note 1, at 6-7, 10-11; Answer of the House of Representatives [n.d.] in
May, 1818 Mass. Resolves 594. q. C. BECCARIA, supra note 83, at 93 ("ultimate end"); W.
EDEN, supra note 86, at 6 ("great object"); M. MADAN, THOUGHTS ON EXECUTIVE JUSTICE
WITH REsPECT TO OUR CRIMINAL LAWS 11 (London 1785) ("great end").
94. See N. DANE, A GENERAL ABRIDGMENT AND DIGEST OF AMERICAN LAW 625, 630-32
(Boston 1824). Another student of Beccaria was John Adams, who quoted the theorist's writings at the Boston Massacre trial and on other occasions. See I DIARY AND AUTOBIOGRAPHY
OF JOHN ADAMS 352, 353 n.2 (L. Butterfield ed. 1961); 2 id at 440, 442.
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Even if the rhetoric had been faithfully observed, the rise of the penitentiary would not thereby be explained.
On the surface, at least, the early Puritan settlers of Massachusetts held sacred everything that Beccaria disavowed. For the Puritans, crimes and sins were one and the same: They were affronts to
God, and their punishment by secular authority constituted an expiatory obligation to His government. 95 But whatever the ministers
might have thundered from their pulpits, no historian today will
question the pragmatic nature of early Massachusetts law. For all
their avowed Biblical literalism, the Puritans regularly interpreted
scripture to accommodate secular utilities, and they made only selective use of the Pentateuch in drafting their criminal laws. 96 Such
general rationalist objectives as deterrence and carefully tailored
criminal statutes would not have struck Puritan law-makers as blinding flashes of insight.97
Beccaria's stand against capital punishment won many adherents
in post-Revolutionary Massachusetts. 98 Yet once again, the ideology
merely tapped an ancient cultural vein. From the beginning, the Pu95. The Puritan theory of punishment derived from the theology of the national covenant:
if the nation endeavored to minimize sin and punished all incidents of it as dictated by scripture, then God would bless the nation with prosperity; if, however, the nation allowed sin to
flourish and go unpunished (thereby violating the covenant), God would make His displeasure
felt by visiting the nation with disaster. Thus, an offender is admonished in 1681 "that he do
no more So offend, and become an occasion of bringing down Gods Judgmente upon the
Land." PYNCHON COURT RECORD, supra note 23, at 122-23; see generally P. MILLER, THE
NEW ENGLAND MIND: THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 463-91 (1939).
96. See G. HAsKJNS, supra note 9, at 141-62. For one Puritan's efforts to justify theologically the dilution of biblical literalism, see Perkins, EPIEKEIA, or a Treatise of Christian Equity
and Moderation, excerpted in PURITAN POLITICAL IDEAS, 1558-1794, at 60, 63, 69-70 (E. Morgan ed. 1965).
97. For early recognition of the importance of a thoughtful and detailed corpus of criminal
law, see, e.g., 2 COL. RECORDS, supra note 11, at 39 (1643], 96 (1644], 168-69 [1646]; G. HASKINS, supra note 9, at 119-35. Haskins has termed the "Laws and Liberties" of 1648 "one of
the crowning achievements of the 13ay colony." Id. at 136. Though Rothman asserts that
interest in the structure of criminal codes flagged in the Jacksonian era, see note 75 supra, this
never occurred in Massachusetts. In 1834, for example, the criminal code was subjected to a
major overhaul into which "great . . . time, labor and money" were invested, culminating in a
debate in a special session of the legislature, see Resolve of Feb. 24, 1832, ch. 30, 1832-1834
Mass. Resolves 103; Governor's Address, Jan. 8, 1833, 1832-1834 Mass. Resolves 272; Governor's Message, March 6, 1834, ch. 32, 1832-1834 Mass. Resolves 623-24; Resolve of Apr. 1,
1834, ch. 85, 1832-1834 Mass. Resolves 663-64; Lieutenant Governor's Address, Sept. 1835,
1835-1838 Mass. Resolves 207-08; Resolve of Nov. 3, 1835, ch. 117, 1835-1838 Mass. Resolves
232; Lieutentant Governor's Message, Nov. 4, 1835, ch. 118, id. at 240-41. Rationalism or no
rationalism, concern over the statutory framework of criminal punishment is discernible in
Massachusetts from the very beginning, and has continued unabated to the present day.
98. See, e.g., Governor's message, Jan. 15, 1801, 1800-1801 Mass. Acts 584; The Independent Chronicle, Feb. 7, 1793, at 1, continued, id., Feb. 14, 1793, at 1-2; Mass Centinel, Jan. 5,
1785, at 3; Answer of the Legislature, Feb. 15, 1793, 1792-1793 Mass. Acts 242; Report of
Committee, Jan. 26, 1802, appended to 1802 Resolves, ch. 54 (passed) (unpublished manuscript, Mass. Archives).

May 1982]

Pillory to Penitentiary

1199

ritan· settlers demonstrated an extreme reluctance to execute offenders, and they restricted the capital list in the colony to the most
serious crimes. 99 In 1805, when the State Prison was opened and a
new code of laws inaugurated, the drafters decided "after an anxious
revision" to reject Beccaria's extreme position and "retain the punishment of death" to a limited extent. 100 But even if Massachusetts
had gone ahead and dismantled the gallows, only a handful of
sentences would have been affected. Criminal incarceration on a
large scale could not have resulted from such a move. 101
Another pillar of Beccarian ideology, inflexible punishments,
called for a more drastic change in Massachu~etts tradition. This
issue had in fact simmered in the colony from its earliest days, when
the permitted ambit of sentencing discretion was at bottom less a
matter of ideology than of parochial politics. The magistrates sat as
judges in colonial Massachusetts, and they resisted repeated efforts
by the deputies to curtail their powers in that capacity. The dispute
over sentencing discretion constituted one front in this broader
99. Twenty-five capital statutes were passed between 1632 and 1692, but only nine of those
were ever invoked to order sentences of death. Adultery was added to the capital list in 1650,
for example, but until its repeal in 1694, juries invariably returned convictions for "libidinous
Actions" or "acts leading to Adultery" or the like, never for adultery itself, see E. POWERS,
Sllpra note 9, at 252-303; G. HAsKINs, Sllpra note 9, at 211-12; COL. LAWS, supra note 13, § 2 at
15 (1650]; 1 PROV. LAWS, supra note 12, at 17 (1694]. In 1705, the provincial code contained
only ten capital statutes: for murder (including the killing of bastard children and killing in a
duel), sodomy (and bestiality), polygamy, rape, Jesuits at large, arson, piracy, treason, and
third convictions for burglary and robbery, 1 PROV. LAWS, supra note 12, at 52, 55-56 (1692],
171 [1694], 423 [1700]; E. POWERS, supra note 9, at 152, 303-08.
100. The drafters suggested that if the State Prison were successful, additional modification
of the capital list might be considered. N. Dane & S. Sewall, Report of the Comm[ittee]
app[ointed] to revise penal laws and on the subject of the state prison, Feb. 16, 1805, Senate
Document no. 3232 (1805) (unpassed) (unpublished manuscript, Mass. Archives) (also printed
in 1798-1809 Mass. Legislative Documents no. 3, State Library Annex). Over the course of the
eighteenth century, additional capital statutes had passed, ultimately for a first conviction for
burglary (the definition of which was expanded), a first conviction for robbery, a second conviction for theft, and certain types of counterfeiting, but these proved as difficult to enforce as
prior capital laws against less serious crimes, see notes 285-97 iefra and accompanying text. In
1805, the death penalty was retained for five crimes: murder, first conviction for burglary,
arson, rape, and treason. The two prior capital statutes against piracy and Jesuits disappeared
because these categories of crimes were eliminated entirely from the code. Two other capital
statutes against robbery and counterfeiting were downgraded to lesser penalties, but the capital
statutes in these instances represented recent provincial upgradings (and the capital statute
against robbery was in fact restored in 1819). Only two long-time capital offenses were downgraded in 1805: sodomy and polygamy, see note 355 iefra; Act of Feb. 19, 1819, ch. 124, 18181822 Mass. Acts 201.
101. See also note 114 iefra and accompanying text. Rothman's generalized examination
of capital punishment in the colonies vastly overestimated its use in Massachusetts, see D.
ROTHMAN, S11pra note 50, at 50-52. But anti-capital punishment ideology may have had a
more important impact in England and on the European continent, where the gallows were
more extensively utilized. See 1 L. RAnzINoWicz, supra note 82, at 3-227; cf. Langbein, The
Historical Origins of the Sanction of Imprisonment far Serious Crime, 5 J. LEGAL STUD. 35
(1976).
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contest. 102
In response to the deputies' charge that the magistrates were
"seeking to have the government arbitrary," John Winthrop and
others in 1641 fashioned a defense of sentencing discretion heavily
laden with Biblical exegesis. But Winthrop also identified the principal oversight, and upshot, of Beccaria's plan, over a century before
the Italian theorist began to ponder the problem of crime: namely,
the more inflexibly a punishment is mandated, the smaller the likelihood that its enforcement will be just. "Offenses [vary] s9 much in
their merit by occasion of circumstances," Winthrop commented,
that "it would be unjust to inflict the same punishment upon the
least as upon the greatest . . . . It is against reason that some men
[legislators] should better judge of the merit of a cause in the bare
theory thereof, than others (as wise and godly) should be able to
discern it pro re nata. " 103 Under the criminal statutes of Massachusetts, judges continued to eajoy wide sentencing discretion throughout the colonial and provincial periods. Indeed, even where
discretion was not provided for by statute, the judges presumed to
arrogate it. 104
Against this background, the adoption of Beccaria's method of
inflexible sentencing would have been a radical departure indeed.
But in its initial burst of post-Revolutionary legislation, in 1785, the
House fairly thumbed its nose at Beccaria, installing by far the most
discretionary code in the state's history. Most of the noncaRital statutes previously in force had mandated a maximum term to a single
public punishment (often with an alternative fine); now the statutes
were revised to permit a variety of alternative punishments (including incarceration), and they often failed to set any quantitative limitations whatsoever. 105 In a speech before a joint session of the
102. The term "magistrates" refers to the governor, deputy-governor, and assistants elected
by the colony as a whole, who sat on the Court of Assistants and made up the "upper house"
(so to speak) of the General Court; the deputies were elected to represent loca1 districts in the
"lower house" of the General Court. On the dispute over judicial discretion, see Lee, JJiscretionary Justice in Early Massachusetts, 112 EssEX INST. HisT. COLLECTIONS 120 (1~76). On
the broader contest between the magistrates_ and deputies, see G. HASKINS, supra note 9, at 2547.
103. 2 J. WINTHROP, supra note 21, at 50-51; see 4 WINTHROP PAPERS, supra note 19, at
468-88; 2 CoL. REcoRDs, supra note 11, at 93-94. Winthrop's thoughts on judicial discretion
may have been influenced by the English Puritan theologian William Perkins, who also remarked the injustice of inflexible sentencing. Perkins, supra note 96, at 59-73
104. E. PoWERS,supra note 9, at446-51. See id. at273-86; Lee,supra note fo2. Forex14µples of judicial disregard of statutory prescription in the provincial period, see note 297 iefra,
Notice also the justification for magisterial violation of statutory prescription offered in Perkins, supra note 96, at 71-72.
105. See notes 344-46 iefra and accompanying text. For a description of the public punishments, see text at notes 233-36, iefra.
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legislature in 1793, Governor Hancock called on the representatives
to abandon this system and impose Beccaria's method, 106 but the
House failed to comply. Tlie redrafted code of 1805 did limit the
number of alternative punishments, but most of the new noncapital
statutes continued to set maximum penalties only. 107 A legislative
committee tliat reviewed the code in 1814 declined to alter this policy.108 Twelve years later, another committee reconsidered the question of judicial discretion and laid the matter to rest with words that
might as easily have flowed from John Winthrop's pen:
crinies of the same denomination admit of such a variety of palliating
and aggravating circumstances, that discretionary power in punishing
them, should . . . exist somewhere; and when confided to the court, it
is fair to presume, it will be discreetly exercised. 109

The timeless wisdom of John Winthrop foiled Beccarianism. 110
A related matter was the role of the pardon in criminal law. In
keeping with its policy of sentencing discretion, Massachusetts had
long granted a power to pardon convicted offenders in the General
Court. m The Beccarian principle of certainty, however, called the
practice into question. 112 Yet once again, a prescription that grated
on ancient tradition was simply ignored. The Massachusetts Consti106, "I recommend these ideas to your wise deliberations, that such punishments may be
provided as, if administered with certainty and inflexibility, may be sufficient to check the
progress of crime." Governor's Message, Jan. 31, 1793, 1792-1793 Mass. Acts 694; see Governor's Message, June 6, 1792, 1792-1793 Mass. Acts 682.
107. By failing to set minimum penalties in many instances, the code of 1805 violated both
the principle of inflexibility and certainty. See note 355 infra.
108. ''The result of their attention to the subject has been a decided opinion on their part,
that the Statutes enacted . . . [have) left very little occasion for additions or improvements to
be attempted at this time." Committee Report, Jan. 22, 1814, 1813-1816 Mass. Legislative
Documents no. 10, at 1 (1814) (State Library Annex). (This conclusion may have been influenced by the fact that two of the three committee members were the original 1805 drafters.).
109. Resolve of Mar. 3, 1826, ch. 93, 1824-1828 Mass. Resolves 307; REPORT [ON THE
STATE PRISON] 16 (1827) (legislative document, Harvard Law Library) (also printed in 18261827 Mass. Legislative Documents no. 23, at 67 (1827) (State Library Annex)); see Resolve of
Nov. 17, 1786, ch. 134, 1786-1787 Mass. Acts. 413. Other European rationalists shared variations of these views, see BENTHAM, supra note 30, at 411-13; HEATH, supra note 82, at 14-15,
164, 200; Radzinowicz & Hood, Judicial .Discretion and Sentencing Standards: Victorian Attempts to Solve a Perennial Problem, 127 U. PA. L. _REv. 1288 (1979).
110. The issue, indeed, remains as timeless as the wisdom. For a recent contribution to the
debate on judicial discretion, see Note, .Daring the Courts: Trial and Bargaining Consequences
of Minimum Penalties, 90 YALE L.J. 597 (1981).
111. COL. LAWS, supra note 13, § 2 at 34-35 [1641]; see, e.g., 2 J. WINTHROP, supra note·21,
at 61.
112. "[l]f the power of pardon is frequently exercised, the utility of the Penitentiary
ceases," one legislative committee warned, "for . . . those who have the benefit of pardon
escape with impunity . . . . There appears to be great force in the sentiments of Beccaria,
connected with this subject." Committee Report, n.d., 1817-1822 Mass. Legislative Documents
no. 1, at 4-5 (1817) (State Library Annex); Committee Report, Jan. 20, 1818, id no. 2, at 3
(1818).
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tution of 1780 invested the Governor with the pardoning power, and
courts soon claimed their own analogue in the guise of the sus_pended sentence. 113
The story of Massachusetts' bout with Beccarian inflexibility and
certainty is an interesting sidelight, but has little connection with the
rise of criminal incarceration. Incarceration was, after all, no more
intrinsically inflexible and certain than any other mild punishment;
"uncertain" death penalties could have been repealed without resort
to anything new. 114
The final principle of statutory structure offered by Beccaria,
"proportionality" between crimes and punishments, again struck an
ancient chord and appears to be reflected in the systematic splintering oflegal categories in 1805.m Still, incarceration does not facilitate such splintering in a way that older, noncapital penalties could
not. One could spend "so many years" in prison, or suffer "so many
lashes" at the whipping post.II 6 No commentator in Massachusetts
cited variability as a merit unique to incarceration. Indeed, the Boston Discipline Society drew the opposite conclusion: Because men
reacted so differently to the experience of solitary confinement, a
whipping (as punishment for breaches of prison regulations) "can be
more easily proportioned to the offense."II 7
Overall, Beccarian ideology may have had a significant impact
on perceptions of punishment and deterrence in Massachusetts. 118
113. MAss. CoNsT. of 1780, pt. Il, ch. 2, § I, art. 8; Act of Mar. 6, 1804, ch. 117, 1802-1803
Mass. Acts 703; Co=onwealth v. Chase, in REPORTS OF CRIMINAL CASES TRIED IN THE
MUNICIPAL COURT OF THE CITY OF BOSTON BEFORE PETER OXENBRIDGE THACKER 267-68
[1831) (Boston 1845). On at least one occasion, the legislature also claimed this power, Resolve
of Nov. 17, 1786, ch. 134, 1786-1787 Mass. Acts. 413. Arguments in favor of the pardoning
power mirrored Winthrop's reasoning. See Governor's Message, Jan. 13, 1804, 1802-1803
Mass. Acts 981.
114. Thus, in advocating a retreat from the gallows, rationalist William Eden urged that
"corporal pains might certainly with good effect be substituted, in some cases, in the room of
capital judgments." W. EDEN, supra note 86, at 63. On the "uncertainty" of capital punishment, see notes 91 & 99-100 supra and notes 294-98 i'!fra and accompanying text.
115. Compare 1 PROV. LAWS, supra note 12, at 577-78 [1705), with Act of Mar. 16, 1805, ch.
131, 1804-1805 Mass. Acts 202; 2 PROV. LAWS, supra note 12, at 5 [1715), and Act of Mar. 13,
1806, ch. IOI, 1804-1805 Mass. Acts 522. For an early reference to the importance of proportionality, see, e.g., 2 CoL. REcoRDs, supra note 11, at 93-94 [1644).
116. See, e.g., id.; J. BENTHAM, supra note 30, at 83, 113.
117. FIRST ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BOARD OF MANAGERS OF THE PRISON DISCIPLINE
SOCIETY 26 (Boston 1826) [hereinafter cited as PRISON DISCIPLINE SOCIETY]; see J. BENTHAM,
supra note 30, at 111-13, 81-84.
118. One Jacksonian rationalist (mistakenly) remarked that the early Massachusetts criminal law ''was deduced almost literally from the Books of Moses." This, he added, had "given
rise to no little ridicule, and however creditable to their piety it may have seemed to some in
former times, it has certainly not tended to give the world in general, at the present day, a very
exalted idea of their legislative wisdom." F. GRAY, REMARKS ON THE EARLY LAWS OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY 3 (Boston 1843).
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As a practical matter its contributions were less marked, but Beccarianism probably did help to bring about the differentiation of grades
of crimes, as well as to hasten the retreat of "moral" offenses. 119 But
Beccarian concepts of deterrence did not drive Massachusetts to
criminal incarceration. The Italian theorist was captivated by statutory structure more than substance, and his structural suggestions
demanded no novel sanctions. His allusions to the staple punishments of whipping and the pillory accepted them as a given, and his
chapter on "imprisonment" addressed the subject in its classical, custodial context. 120
We must look beyond ideological reformulations of deterrence to
find the origins of criminal incarceration. And, as already noted,
Cesare Beccaria did not write in a vacuum. His was but one strand
in the tangle of eighteenth-century thought on crime.
C. Images of Rehabilitation
Beccaria and others sought to prevent crime via the threat of
punishment. Rothman asserts, however, that the Jacksonians placed
their hopes in a different and novel mechanism: rehabilitation. Jacksonian punishment sought not to awe criminals but to change them,
to cure their tendency toward criminal behavior.
The first thing to notice about the concept of rehabilitation is its
plasticity. Rehabilitation has meant different things to different
men. To understand a given theory of rehabilitation, one must ask
of its author (1) What causes persons to commit crime, and (2) What
particular treatment will counteract that cause. These questions have
been pondered at least since Plato. 121 In English criminology, answers involving incarceration (which we shall call "carceral rehabilitation") stretch back to Elizabethan times. 122
119. See W. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW 37-39, 110-11, 117-18
(1975).
120. See C, BECCARIA, supra note 83, at 19-20, 54-55, 68, 71, 74. In several places, Beccaria also refers to penal servitude. See id. at 47-50, 74-76.
121. M. MACKENZIE, PLATO ON PuNISHMENT 179-224 (1981). ·
122. While the ideal of rehabilitation does not per se require incarceration (we shall encounter several forms ofnoncarceral rehabilitation in Massachusetts, see notes 228-36, 243-48
infra and accompanying text), the one did suggest the other. The signal feature of incarceration is that it offers an unparalleled measure of control over the deviant, and rehabilitation has
often been deemed a process which demands such physical control in order to succeed. Thus
Jeremy Bentham, speaking from the standpoint of Lockian psychology (see notes 160-62 infra
and accompanying text), described criminals as "a particular class of human beings, that, to
keep them out of harm's way, require for a continued length of time that sort of sharp looking
after, that sort of peculiarly close inspection, which all human beings, without exception, stand
in need of, up to a certain age." Other sorts of punishment, less comprehensive than incarceration, were "radically incapable of administering that corrective aid which, in the case in question, is so perfectly indispensable." J. BENTHAM, Panopticon versus New South Wales, in 4
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1. The Workhouse
In the sixteenth century, when criminology in England remained
an avocation of magistrates and pamphleteers, the common wisdom
attributed the realm's abundance of property crime to idleness.
"[T]heir sinews . . . benumbed and stiff through idleness," some
Englishmen had abandoned all thought of earning a living, and so
"of necessity live[d] by spoil" while drifting aimlessly about the
countryside. 123 Since the Statutes of Laborers in 1349 and 1351,
English law had sought to discourage able-bodied idleness by making it a status crime. Persons convicted of leading a "Rogishe or
Vagabonds Trade ofLyef' were subject to an array of criminal sanctions that by 1530 included whipping, mutilation, and even capital
punishment for a subsequent "o~ense." 124
With vagrancy on the rise in the sixteenth century, the municipal
government of London decided to hazard a new approach to the
problem. In 1557, after four years of planning, the city opened an
old royal palace at Bridewell as a repository for all vagrants convicted in the municipality. Incarcerated vagrants were to be "chastened and compelled to labour, to the overthrow of the vicious life of
idleness" to which they had all ostensibly succumbed. 125 In the following decades, "houses of correction" or ''workhouses," as the institutions came to be known, 126 sprouted up in other major towns, and
WoRKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 174-75 (London 1843) (letter to Lord Pelham, Dec. 17, 1802);
see J. BENTHAM, supra note 6, at 7; E. LIVINGSTON, Introductory Report lo the Code ofReform
and Prison JJiscipline, in I THE COMPLETE WORKS OF EDWARD LIVINGSTON ON CRIMINAL
JURISPRUDENCE 550, 556 (1873).
123. Letter from Edward Hext to the Lord Treasurer (1596), reprinted in 4 J. STRYPE,
.ANNALS OF THE REFORMATION AND EsTABLISHMENT OF RELIGION 404-05 (rev. ed. Oxford
1824) (1st ed. London 1709) [hereinafter cited as ''Hext to Lord Treasurer"]; Harman,A Caveat
or Wamingfor Common Cursilors, Vulgarly Called Vagabonds, [1566] in THE ELIZABETHAN
UNDERWORLD (A. Judges ed. 1930); CRIME IN ENGLAND, 1500-1800, at 62-64, 98-99, 135 (J.
Cockburn ed. 1977); 3 J. STEPHEN, A HlsTORY OF CRIMINAL LAW IN ENGLAND 267-72 (1833).
The equation of vagrancy with crime probably had ancient roots. See, e.g., the 1383 statute 7
Rich. 2, c.5 ("to restrain the malice of diverse people • • • wandering from place to place"),
124. On the development of early English vagrancy law, see 2 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HisTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 459-64 (rev. ed. 1923); 4 id. at 387-402; 3 J. STEPHEN, supra note 123,
at 266-75.
125. Van der Slice, Elizabethan Houses of Correction, 21 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 50 (1936). On the history of Bridewell, see A. COPELAND, BRIDEWELL ROYAL HOSPITAL (1888); E. O'DONAGHUE, BRIDEWELL HOSPITAL, PALACE, PRISON, SCHOOLS (vol. I, 1923;
vol. 2, 1929). Documents on the founding of Bridewell, emphasizing its rehabilitative aims,
can be found in 19 PARL. PAPERS 393-645 (pt. 1) (1840). See E. COKE, THE SECOND PART OF .
THE INsTirUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 734 (London 1817).
126. The terms "workhouse," ''bridewell," and "house of correction" had no generally accepted definitions; while some contemporaries used these phrases to refer to different institutions, many used them synonymously. (From the last we have perhaps derived the modem
term "correctional facility.") Hereinafter, I shall generally use the term "workhouse," even
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in 1576127 every county in the realm was enjoined to build one. The
workhouse remained a fixture in England throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and Puritan settlers carried the idea
with them to Massachusetts. 128
The inventors of the workhouse operated under the assumption
that idleness was a vice or ''habit" that could be broken only through
a regimen of enforced abstinence. The challenge of rehabilitation
lay in de,stroying a ''habit of idleness" and replacing it with a ''habit
of industry'' more conducive to an honest livelihood. The therapy,
at once depriving the deviant of old habits and instilling the new,
was hard labor. Every house of correction was to obtain stocks of
raw materials and the tools of trade necessary to· set its inmates to
work on such practical crafts as weaving, nail-making and wheat
• ding. 129
gnn
The workhouse embodied one paradigm of carceral rehabilitation, a paradigm that we shall call "rehabituation." Rehabituation
was an inherently superficial form of rehabilitation: it addressed the
inmate's outward routines and abilities rather than his inner moral
standards. Once released, the rehabilitated inmate would no longer
need to "live by spoil," but curing that compulsion marked the limit
of the treatment. Rehabituation was also inherently coercive, acting
quite against the deviant's will. As Lord Coke noted, some of his
contemporaries were "of opinion, that in particular townes a discrete
and expert workman may set the young and idle people as voluntaries on work." But he concluded that the derelicts were so wedded
to their vices "as they will be never brought to worke, unless they be
thereunto compelled." 130 Incarceration served to facilitate this
coercion.
when another name appears in the contemporary reference (though not when directly quoting)
for the sake of consistency.
127. 18 Eliz. I, C. 3.
128. Van der Slice, supra note 125, at 52-57. In the seventeenth century, institutions similar to the workhouse also developed on the European continent, in the Netherlands, France,
and Germany; the extent to which they were influenced by English practice remains a matter
of some controversy. See T. SELLIN, PIONEERING IN PENOLOGY 9-22, 27, 102-10 (1944);
Langbein, supra note 101, at 48-51. While historians have traditionally assumed that the English workhouse fell into decline in the eighteenth century, see, e.g., S. WEBB &·B. WEBB, ENGLISH PRISONS UNDER LOCAL GOVERNMENT 14-17 (1922), research in progress by Joanne
Innes at Cambridge University indicates that they continued to flourish. In any event, there is
no question that the theory remained vital throughout this period, see M. IGNATIEFF, supra
note 45, at 11-14. On the workhouse in Massachusetts, see notes ·190-91, 240-42 iefra and
accompanying text.
129. M. GRUNHUT, PENAL REFORM: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 15-16 (1948); S. WEBB & B.
WEBB, supra note 128, at 12-14; Van der Slice, supra note 125, at 50-52, 60-65.
130. E. CoKE, supra note 125, at 734, 728 (emphasis added); see, e.g., J. HowARD, supra
note 3, at 42; J. BENTHAM, supra note 30, at 155.
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As they developed a theory of carceral rehabilitation, the builders of the workhouse also wrestled with the host of problems that
have forever surrounded its implementation. One perennial concern
of prison advocates was to reconcile rehabilitation with deterrence.
A rehabilitative regime with too small a deterrent component might
fail to prevent cf4ne in the first instance or, worse, encourage persons to commit offenses for the very purpose of gaining admission. 131
By the same token, a rehabilitative regime with too large a deterrent
component might occasion such "rankling enmity" against the authority inflicting it that any concurrent hope of rehabilitation would
be dashed. 132
Advocates of the workhouse believed that they had avoided this
Scylla and Charybdis by making hard labor the institution's hallmark. According to the prevailing doctrine, hard labor could rehabilitate idlers, but it could also deter them because idlers were
supposedly scared to death of work, and ''will rather hazard their
lives" than submit to it. 133 Indeed, the beauty of hard labor was its
capacity to serve simultaneously as threat and therapy. If it did not
succeed as one, it might still as the other. 134
A second, more practical, stumbling block lay in designing a system of institutional administration suitable to the new facility. Local
gaols in England (as in Massachusetts) had been left to rot, precisely
because their function extended no further than to mere custody
over inmates. But the moment those inmates were to receive special
treatment within walls, conscientious management of the facility became essential. In order to ensure the integrity of the workhouse's
rehabilitative routine, authorities provided codes of regulation for its
131. Some persons imagined that the poor might find carceral facilities "more comfortable
places of residence than their own houses." J. HowARD, supra note 3, at 44; J. HANWAY, supra
note 80, at 30. This fear was later elaborated into the infamous doctrine of "less eligibility,"
which held that a prisoner's lot must be made worse than that of the lowest paid honest laborer. See, e.g., J. BENTHAM, supra note 80, at 122-23. Cf. note 391 i'!fra and accompanying
text
132. I PRISON DISCIPLINE SOCIETY, supra note 117, at 26 (1826).
133. Hext to Lord Treasure, supra note 123, at 291. This assumption continued in England
into the eighteenth century. See, e.g., J. HOWARD, supra note 3, at 44. But it was left to later
reformers to address the second half of the problem, that is, the possibility that hard labor
would prove so hard that the element of deterrence swamped the element of reformation. In
this vein, Bentham urged moderation of the convict labor routine: "a man [should] be taught
to love labour, instead of being taught to loath it .•••" J. BENTHAM, supra note 80, at 144.
134. The point was later presented crisply: "The privation of personal liberty and social
intercourse, and the subjection to strict discipline and to hard labor, form indeed a severe
punishment But they would be equally necessary, if the Prison were not designed in the
slightest degree for punishment [ie., deterrence], but solely for the reformation and permanent
good of the Convicts." REPORT [ON THE STATE PRISON] 9-10 (May 1830) (legislative document, Harvard Law Library) (Also printed in 1830-1831 Mass. Legislative Documents 67
(1830) (State Library Annex)).
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orderly government, supervised by the local justice of the peace.
And in order to ensure that the rehabilitative routine was not
threatened by disease, authorities mandated the first rudimentary
hygienic precautions against the afflictions endemic to prior carceral
facilities. 135
Last, but far from least, there remained the problem of funding
the new establishment. Institutional treatment has never come
cheap, and the builders of the workhouse hoped that proceeds from
the inmates' own labor would suffice to foot the bill. 136 Hard labor
thus took on still another role: as threat, as therapy, and as a fountain of support for both.
2. Solitary C01ifinement

A second stream of thought on carceral rehabilitation can be
traced to the eighteenth century and another group of English reformers. These were the "humanitarians," 137 a melange of clergymen and lay pietists of various denominations who sought to
alleviate the harsher features of English criminal law - not so much
for reasons of secular expediency as for the sake of Christian charity.138 And of all the features of eighteenth-century criminal justice
that cried out for amelioration, gaol conditions cried the loudest. 139
Humanitarian reformers initially focused on curing the destruc135. 19 PARL. PAPERS 398-407 (pt. I) (1840); Van der Slice, S11pra note 125, at 60-65; S.
WEBB & B. WEBB, S11pra note 128, at 12..
136. See S. WEBB & B. WEBB, Sllpra note 128, at 14 n.3. John Howard knew better. See J.
HOWARD, Sllj]TO note 3, at 41-42.
137. Also referred to in the literature as the "philanthropists," or the "evangelicals."
138. As described by Gamaliel Bradford, ''the heart of the benevolent man and philanthropist is full of compassion and sympathy for the suffering of his fellow being . . . [even]
where interest is opposed to the feeling." G. BRADFORD, Sllpra note I, at 32. Among the most
notable English humanitarian prison reformers were Thomas Bray, John Bellers, Jonas
Hanway, and ''the great Philanthropist" John Howard. Humanitarian concerns also spanned
many fields outside the legal hemisphere, such as education and poor relief. For discussions of
the movement as it related to prison reform, see M. GRUNHUT, Sllpra note 129, at 23-42; W.
LEWIS, FROM NEWGATE TO DANNEMORA 19-28 (1975); Schneider, Sllpra note 10, at 716-26.
The standard treatment of the movement as a whole is D. OWEN, ENGLISH Pliu.ANTHROPY,
1660-1960, at 11-88 (1964). Cf. M. IGNATIEFF, Sllj]TO note 45, at 44-65, 76, 143-53, 164-67, 211,
who discerns a complex of motivations behind the English humanitarian movement, most significantly a desire to utilize philanthropy to legitimate and perpetuate control.
139. See note 45 S11pra. Humanitarian concern for prison conditions, characteristically,
was not restricted to gaols for criminals; debtors' prisons were included. See D. OWEN, Sllpra
note 138, at 61-65. But the concern was not strictly benevolent: prison hygiene was a boon to
everyone who participated in the criminal justice system. John Howard insisted that efforts to
ameliorate prison morality must accompany hygienic reform for "it is obvious that if [morals]
be neglected, besides the evil consequences that must result from such a source of wickedness,
a suspicion will arise, that what has been already done has proceeded, chiefly, from the selfish
motive of avoiding the danger to our own health, in attending courts of judicature." J. HowARD, Sllpra note 3, at 268; see note 46 supra.
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tive aspects of pretrial incarceration, rather than on attempting to
use the prison for rehabilitation. John Howard, the most famous
and influential representative of humanitarianism, devoted his life to
the study of prison conditions and wrote movingly about the inmates' torments. Most of the suggestions offered by humanitarians
in the areas of hygiene and administration either borrowed from or
built on prior workhouse practice. 140 But humanitarians cared about
more than just the inmates' physical ordeal; they also stressed the
moral degradation inherent in pretrial imprisonment. In this regard,
humanitarians sought increased attention to inmates' spiritual needs
and an end to the random commingling of prisoners that resulted in
"Old criminals corrupting new comers." 141
Once they had set out to maintain an inmate's condition during
confinement, humanitarians slid easily toward proposals to improve
that condition. By the mid-eighteenth century, some spoke of reforming gaol inmates awaiting trial. 142 With the appearance of Jonas Hanway's Solitude in Imprisonment in 1776, humanitarian
literature began to focus on post-conviction rehabilitation of
criminals.143
The humanitarians thus came upon carceral rehabilitation by
way of institutional benevolence rather than sanctional effectiveness
- both roads had led to the same destination. Or had they? The
humanitarians urged carceral rehabilitation, to be sure, but theirs
was a novel brand, quite distinct from the workhouse model.
Humanitarians viewed crime as an outgrowth of the offender's
estrangement from God. Once such a break had occurred, no punishment inflicted by men could deter the offender from sinning. 144
The challenge of rehabilitation lay in restoring the criminal's faith
140. See, e.g., Bray, An .&say Towards Tlze Reformation of Newgale and Other Prisons In
andAbout London [1102],reprmled in H. DIXON, JOHN HOWARD AND THE PRISON-WORLD OF
EUROPE 33-41 (1850) (in the first edition only); Bellers, Essay, reprinted In A. FRY, JOHN BELLERS, 1654-1722, 22, 77 (1937); J. liANwAY, supra note 80, at 29-36, 111-24. Howard derived
many of bis suggestions for reform from the practices of continental workhouses, see, e.g., J.
HowARD, supra note 3, at 30-31, with which Hanway was also familiar, see J. HANWAY, supra
note 80, at 117.
141. See, e.g., 1. HANwAY,supra note 80, at 13, 24, 104; J. HowARD,supra note 3, at 6, 8,
10, 37-38; Bray, supra note 140, at 34, 38.
142. See 1. BUTLER,A Sennon Preached Before the Rig/ti Hon. the Lord May., the Court of
Alderman, the Sheriffs, and the Govemors oftlte Several Hospitals ofthe City ofLondon, (1740],
in FIFTEEN SERMONS 365-67, 345-71 (4th ed. London 1749).
143. Though Hanway focused on post-conviction rehabilitation, he did not in the process
forget preconviction rehabilitation, which he noted might in particular cases negate the need
for a formal sanction entirely. See 1. liANwAY, supra note 80, at I IO.
144. ''When only the fear of temporal punishments makes an impression, the world can
never be governed; the power cannot be wrested out of the hands of the great ruler and
supreme Legislator of the world." Id at 5, 26, 72-73, 105, 117.
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in, and fear of, his Maker, and thereby "qualify [him] for happiness
in both worlds." 145 One humanitarian went so far as to equate the
function of a rehabilitative prison with that of a church. 146
Though they did not speak with one voice, many humanitarians
endorsed a radical antidote to the criminal's affliction: "Solitude,"
Jonas Hanway proclaimed, "[is] the most humane and effectual
means of bringing malefactors . . . to a right sense of their condition."147 Since 1740, humanitarians had touted solitary confinement,
not only to isolate prison inmates from moral contagion, but also to
precipitate their spiritual recovery. 148 As John Brewster remarked,
"It has been recommended, both by the practice and precept of holy
men, in all ages, sometimes to retire from scenes of public concourse,
for the purpose of communing with our own hearts, and meditating
on heaven." 149 Cloistered from the buzz of social interaction, forced
to converse only with his own guilty conscience, the solitary inmate
would rediscover God, tearfully repent his sins, and pledge himself
to an honest ,and godly life. A Bible and a minister's proselytizing
could smooth the process, but the operative agent was not to be
found in this world. As Hanway concluded, "Let us pursue a consistent plan, and leave the event to Heaven!" 150
The humanitarian paradigm of carceral rehabilitation, which we
shall call "reclamation," envisioned a deeper change in the offender's psyche than that intended by rehabituation. 151 Equipping
the criminal for work was not enough; secular habits and abilities
would make no difference unless the offender wanted to live rightly,
unless his own spirit (under threat of divine sanction) demanded
moral rectitude. Given this premise, reclamation, unlike rehabituation, was inherently noncoercive, for ''to compel people to be virtu145. Id at 4, 18, 72-73, 98-99, 109, and passim. See J. HowARD, supra note 3, at-261;
Bellers, supra note 140, at 77.
146. He added that under his program "the repentence and amendment, the sollow for the
past, and the resolution with regard to the future part of life, will be more sincere in the prison,
than it usually is in the church," J. lIANwAY, supra note 80, at 98-99 (emphasis in original).
147. Id at 4; see w. DODD, THOUGHTS IN PRlSON (1777).
148. See note 142 supra.
149. Brewster, The Use ofSolitude in Prisons, in A COMPANION FOR THE PRlSONBR 16 (f.
Bowen 5th ed. London 1828).
150. J. HANwAY, supra note 80, at 31.
151. Contemporaries who compared the two programs were perfectly aware of this difference. Han.way: "solitude will thus accomplish the work, not in a vague,farmal, and unmeaning
manner, but by creating a real change in the heart, to raise them that are fallen." Id at 44
(emphasis in original). Bentham: "This kind of discipline [hard labor] does not indeed, like
the other [solitary confinement], pluck up corruption by the roots: it tends however to check
the growth ofit, and render the propensity to ii less powerful." J. BENTHAM, supra note 30, at
164; see note 418 infra.
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ous, is a contradiction in terms." 152 Incarceration served only to
induce the criminal to listen to his conscience. In the end, reclaimed
prisoners were expected to work "gladly," and the humanitarians
also hoped, under the dubious assumption that too much of a bad
thing would do some good, that the relentless idleness of solitary
confinement would itself produce a craving for employment. 153
Humanitarians also addressed the timeless obstacles to carceral
rehabilitation that the builders of the workhouse had already faced.
In reconciling reclamation with deterrence, humanitarian reformers
emphasized that the fate of solitary subjection to one's guilty con•
science was a painful sanction indeed, and that the ascetic existence
of a solitary cell would never tempt persons to seek entree. 154 At the
same time, humanitarians promised that solitary confinement would
not be so unbearable as to harden the inmates' attitudes. In this re•
gard, many advocates stressed the importance of convincing prison•
ers that the punishment meted out to them was just and for their own
benefit, both as part of the process of instilling remorse and as a
means of preventing any "seeds of malice or ill·will" from infecting
the rehabilitative process.1ss
The problem of financing solitary confinement left the humani•
tarians in a bind. Unlike advocates of hard labor, the humanitarian
reformers could not blithely assign prison costs to the inmates them•
selves. They sought instead to finesse the problem by belittling it,
reciting the Kingdom's ample resources for such a project, as well as
underscoring its nobility and practical value. 156 The propaganda
succeeded: Local facilities for the solitary confinement of criminals
appeared in Gloucestershire, Sussex, and Berkshire by the l 790s. 157
3. Rationalism
At this point rational ideology, already considered in the context
152. J. HANWAY, supra note 80, at 37. Like ''volunteering" in the army, however, submission to the Lord was assumed to be virtually unavoidable. Hanway noted by analogy: "The
arts practiced to seduce women are often successful: in this case gentle treatment and Tenderness alone will prevail • • • it does not change its name, when employed in the cause of virtue." Id. at 37-38; see J. BENTHAM, supra note 122, at 176.
153. See J. HANWAY, supra note 80, at 34; W. PALEY, supra note 87, at 292.
154. See J. BENTHAM, supra note 30, at 118-20; J. HANWAY, supra note 80, at 30-31, 103;
W. PALEY, supra note 87, at 291.
155. J. BENTHAM, supra note 30, at 119; J. BREWSTER, SERMONS FOR PRISONERS 15 (Stockton 1790); J. HANWAY, supra note 80, at 104-05.
156. J. HANWAY, supra note 80, at 25, 35-36, 71-72. It was this issue that prompted Bentham to reconsider, and ultimately abandon, his ideological commitment to the principle of
solitary confinement, when he drew his blueprints for the Panopticon in 1791. See J. BENTHAM, supra note 80, at 71-76, 137-41 (esp. 138n).
157. See M. loNATIEFF, supra note 45, at 96-109.
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of deterrence, 158 reenters the stage. While Beccaria himself focused
exclusively on deterrence, other rationalists did not share his :fixation. Having declared war on crime, rationalists hoped to mount the
assault from a variety of directions, and rehabilitation was often central to their strategies. 159
The rational theory of criminal motivation rested largely on the
"sensational psychology" first propounded by John Locke late in the
seventeenth century. 160 Locke maintained that human conduct was
a product of social environment, not innate propensities or moral
principles stamped upon the soul. The human mind began life as a
tabula rasa and formed a code of behavior by reference to continual
hedonistic calculation. Beccaria had argued that because all "sensible beings" steered their conduct toward maximum pleasure and
minimum pain, a properly graded scheme of punishments could prevent criminal acts by draining them of utility. What Beccaria qua
rationalist neglected to consider was that some persons would not
react "sensibly'' to the threat of sanction. While sensational psychology assumed that a properly socialized individual would always act
in his own best interest, it also recognized that some environments
could impair an individual's ability to make such calculations, and
thereby lead him into "senseless" behavior, such as choosing the
short-term gratification of crime without heed to the long-term misery of punishment. 161
For the offender thus deranged, sensational psychology held out
hope. If environmental influences had crippled him, then a different
environment could cure him. For rationalists, the challenge of rehabilitation lay in restoring the offender's ability to appreciate the inex158. See notes 89-92 supra and accompanying text.
159. Bentham spelled it out lest there be misunderstanding: "It is an excellent quality in a
punishment that it is calculated to conduce to the reformation ofthe delinquent. I do not mean
merely through fear of undergoing punishment a second time, but by reason of a change in his
character and habits." 2 J. BENTHAM, THEORY OF LEGISLATION [c. 1788] at 146-47 (1914)
(emphasis in original). On the eclecticism of the Rationalists' approach to crime, see id. at 174273; H. FIELDING, AN ENQUIRY INTO THE LATE INCREASE OF ROBBERS, ETC. WITH SOME
PROPOSALS FOR REMEDYING THIS GROWING EVIL (London 1751); M. MADAN, supra note 93,
at 78.
160. See J. LocKE, AN EsSAY qoNCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING (1690).
161. Actually, the rationalists' "environmental" outlook on crime (though now developed
into a complex theory) was not far removed from the thought of earlier criminologists, who
also often attributed idleness and vice, in turn, to improper upbringing and evil companionship. Humanitarian theorists also rang the changes on this theme. See, e.g., J. BREWSTER,
supra note 155, at 66-90; Remarks, supra note 80, at 10n; note 141 supra and accompanying
text. The theme, indeed, has biblical roots: "Be not deceived: evil Communications corrupts
good Manners," 1 Cor. 15:33. For early Massachusetts, see notes 223-24 iefra and accompanying text. q: D. ROTHMAN, supra note 50, at 82-83 (tracing environmentalism to the
Jacksonians).
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pedience of crime. 162 As in workhouse ideology, the depth of the
change envisioned by rationalism was shallow: While the first
sought to remove the inmate's need to steal, the second sought to
grant him the good sense not to. Incarceration was the key to rationalist rehabilitation because it provided a controlled environment directed to criminals' psychological renewal.
But what sort of controlled environment would accomplish the
job? Given the novelty of the rationalist perspective on criminal behavior, it is rather surprising to find that the enlightened philosophers had few new programmatic suggestions to offer. Imagination
had carried the rationalists far, but here it seems to have failed them.
Instead of inventing their own therapeutic design, the rationalists
simply pirated those produced by their predecessors. A few rational
reformers, notably Jeremy Bentham, initially joined the call for solitary confinement, notwithstanding the spiritual imagery in which the
humanitarians had steeped it. 163 Bentham simply translated the humanitarian program of solitary reclamation into a secular version,
based on sensational psychology. 164 Most rationalists remained
skeptical of the therapeutic value of solitary confinement, however,
and instead took up the banner of congregate hard labor, in the mold
of the workhouse. 165 The hope was that rehabituation would itself
restore the offender's sensibility by correcting his hedonistic response
to work, and thus his response to crime. 166
162. M. IGNATlEFF, supra note 45, at 66-68.
163. This led to the curious spectacle of a rational reformer endorsing the humanitarians'
platform, even as he heaped scorn upon its ideological foundation. J. BENTHAM, supra note
30, at 114-20 (Bentham, an agnostic, does speak of religion in this section, but in distinctly
pragmatic terms); W. PALEY, supra note 87, at 291-92. Bentham later altered his views on this
subject. See note 156 supra. Though his thoughts at this time were unoriginal, Bentham ultimately deserves credit for one of the few programmatic innovations in rational penal theory:
the "inspection principle" that inspired Bentham's Panopticon plan. See J. BENTHAM, supra
note 80, at 40, 44-46; J. BENTHAM, supra note 122, at 175.
164. For Bentham's animus against ''your sentimental orators," see J. BENTHAM, supra
note 30, at 73-75. Predictably, the humanitarians returned the favor, though they remained
willing to participate in a wary marriage of convenience. Thus, in the pages of his journal The
Philanthropist, Quaker William Allen praised Bentham's early writings after determining that
they contained "nothing at variance with my religious feelings . . . ." Quoted in IGNATIEFF,
supra note 45, at 146-47.
165. See Henriques, The Rise and .Decline of the Separate System of Prison .Discipline, 54
PAST & PRESENT 61 (1972); see, e.g., s. ROMILLY, OBSERVATIONS ON A LATE PUBLICATION,
INTITLED THOUGHTS ON EXECUTIVE JUSTICE 54-61 (London 1786). A few humanitarians,
notably John Howard, also favored hard labor, and he in tum collaborated with rationalists
William Eden and Judge Blackstone to compose the "Hard Labor Bill" of 1779. See note 204
i'!fra.
166. See M. IGNATIEFF, supra note 45, at 67.
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4. Massachusetts Legislation Revisited

Though the legislative record is scant, evidence drawn from it
and other sources indicates that the government of Massachusetts
did have rehabilitation in mind when criminal incarceration was introduced in 1785. The rehabilitative ideology advanced in that year,
moreover, was not a new one at all - it was the venerable English
rehabituative construct, known to the settlers of Massachusetts even
before their arrival in the New World. 167
The ancient equation of idleness and crime certainly remained
alive and well in eighteenth-century Massachusetts. Old Light minister Charles Chauncy could easily have traded scripts with an Elizabethan magistrate when in 1752 he queried: ''Who are so much
noted for the moral Disorder of Lying and Stealing, as those who
have settled into the Habits of Laziness? Their Laziness," Chauncy
predicted, "reduces them to Straits and Difficulties; and th~se, as the
readiest and easiest Way to supply their wants put them upon . . .
robbing [persons] of their Money, and their Goods." 168 The 1785
Act establishing the prison at Castle Island followed hard on the
heels of a string of newspaper columns petitioning the legislature to
impose hard labor on property criminals. One author, who signed
himself "A Friend of Industry," favored collaboration with New
Hampshire on building a "nailing house" for convicted thieves. "As
theft generally proceeds from idleness, labor will be the severest and
most effectual punishment," the Friend promised. "A house established on this plan would I believe turn out many an industrious
member with an occupation, who was taken in, an idle thief without
one." The change envisioned remained a superficial one: ''To eradicate bad habits, and teach the vicious that 'HONESTY IS THE
BEST POLICY' " - an aphorism that itself emphasized the sort of
compliance to law that sprang from calculation rather than conscience. 169 Other commentators shared in these sentiments, and one
even specified Castle Island as a suitable site. 170
While the Castle Island Act does not explicitly refer to the goal of
rehabituation, that goal is implicit throughout the document. Most
telling is the statutory requirement that imprisoned convicts perform
167. See notes 240-42 infta and accompanying text.
168. C. CHAUNCY, THE IDLE-POOR SECLUDED FROM THE BREADS OF CHARITY BY THE
CHRISTIAN LAW 13, 16 (Boston 1752). John Hancock agreed: "Laws [prohibiting idleness] are
important in Government, because they prevent a disposition to those crimes which are dangerous to society ••••" Governor's Message, Jan. 31, 1793, 1792-1793 Mass. Acts 692-93; see
1758-1769 BOSTON TOWN RECORDS, supra note 14, at 274-75 [1769).
169. Mass. Centinel, Sept. 22, 1784, at 1 (emphasis in original).
170. See Mass. Centinel, Oct. 16, 1784, at l; Mass. Centinel, Oct. 20, 1784, at 1.
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"hard labour," the sine qua non of the rehabituative program. 171
That such treatment was distinguished from the pretrial carceral regime is further indicated by the statutory restriction of Castle Island
to convicted offenders. 172 Other statutes and a gust of speeches
spelled out the rhetoric more concretely, indeed, monotonously. An
act in 1785: "Whereas idleness is often the-parent of fraud and cheating, . . . confinement to hard labour may be a means of reclaiming
such offenders . . . ." 173 Governor Hancock in 1793: "[C]rimes
have generally idleness for their source, and where offences are not
prevented by education, a sentence to hard labour will perhaps have
a more salutary effect . . . ." 174 Governor Strong in 1801: "A great
proportion of crimes are the effects of idleness, and it seems peculiarly proper therefore to punish them by confinement to hard labour; that offenders . . . may be compelled to acquire new habits
and contribute something to the good of society . . . ." 175 Et
cetera. 176
To bolster his contention that pre-Jacksonian prisons did not focus on rehabilitation, Rothman points to the continued crudity and
disarray of their internal administrations. In this crucial respect, he
argues, post-Revolutionary facilities resembled the colonial gaol
more than the Jacksonian penitentiary. 177 Whether or not Rothman's finding is sustainable elsewhere, 178 the evidence does not sup171. The preamble to the statute alludes to the presumed idleness of offenders: "Whereas
it has become necessary to the safety of the industrious inhabitants of the Commonwealth...•" Act of Mar. 14, 1785, ch. 63, 1784-1785 Mass. Acts 163.
172. Act of Mar. 14, 1785, ch. 63, 1784-1785 Mass. Acts 163.
173. Act of Nov. I, 1785, ch. 21, 1784-1785 Mass. Acts 472.
174. Governor's Message, Jan. 30 1793, 1792-1793 Mass. Acts 694.
175. Governor's Message, Jan. 15, 1802, 1800-1801 Mass. Acts 583.
176. See also, e.g., Answer of the Legislature, Feb. 15, 1793, 1792-1793 Mass. Acts 242;
Report Respecting Convicts, supra note 30; Governor's Message, Jan. 11, 1799, 1798-1799
Mass. Acts. 636; note 348 i'!fra and accompanying text.
177. "In the 1790's reformers anticipating the benefits of statutory revisions had devoted
little energy to internal prison arrangements. Since laws, and not blueprints, captured their
attention, the prisons erected at the end of the eighteenth century usually made only minor or
confused departures from colonial arrangements . • • ." D. ROTHMAN, supra note 50, at 62,
89-93.
178. A preliminary survey of criminological literature in other states indicates that Massachusetts writers were hardly alone in espousing rehabilitative treatment of criminals at this
date. New York: see T. EDDY, AN ACCOUNT OF THE STATE PRISON OR PENITENTIARY HOUSE,
IN THE CITY OF NEW YoRK 20, 21-32, 35, 50, 53 (New York 1801); Pennsylvania: see Act of
Sept. 15, 1786, ch. 1241, in 12 STATUTES AT LARGE OF PENNSYLVANIA FROM 1682 TO 1801, at
280 (J. Mitchell & H. Flanders eds. 1906); LETTERS OF BENJAMIN RUSH 443,512,526, 874-75
(L. Butterfield ed. 1951); Lownes, An Account of the Alteration and Present Stale ofthe Penal
Laws ofPennsylvania, in W. BRADFORD, AN ENQUIRY How FAR THE PuNISHMENT OF DEATH
IS NECESSARY IN PENNSYLVANIA 89, 100-01, Ill (London, 1795) (1st ed. Philadelphia 1793);
South Carolina: see R. TuRNBULL, A VISIT To THE PHILADELPHIA PRISON, 7, 13, 14, 22, 32,
34, 35, 71, 86 (London, 1797) (first published in the Charlestown Gazette); Virginia: see 2 THE
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port it in Massachusetts. Convicts confined to Castle Island served
under the military discipline of the garrison "as if under voluntary
enlistment," rather than under a keeper's whim. 179 The convicts' dietary and sanitary well-being were provided for, and a full-time physician and chaplain were appointed to the Castle Island staff - all
unprecedented measures for a gaol. 180 Equally extraordinary were
the measures taken to ensure the physical security of the facility. 181
Finally, the legislature carefully monitored the affairs of Castle Island by dispatching committees to inspect it periodically. 182
To be sure, Castle Island failed to function in practice as a wellregulated facility. During its thirteen-year history, some forty-five
inmates, or six.teen percent of the total prison population, managed
to swim to freedom; 183 and in 1792, smallpox broke out on the Island.184 Evidence of such failure appears to have led Rothman to his
conclusions. 185 But what a person (or institution) is doing is quite a
different matter from what he is trying to do. Elsewhere in his book,
Rothman addresses the trying, not the doing; there is little evidence
that the Jacksonians whom he champions ever succeeded in rehabilitating anyone. At Castle Island, there was no shortage of concern.
What the reformers lacked was practical experience in large-scale
prison administration, and that was something that they could only
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 493 (J. Boyd ed. 1950). Administrative precautions taken in
the 1790's at the Walnut Street prison in Pennsylvania and at Newgate prison in New York
were comparable to those essayed in Massachusetts, see Lownes, supra; EDDY, supra.
179. See note 171 supra; Resolve of Mar. 11, 1791, ch. 170, 1790-1791 Mass. Acts 244-45.
Rothman dates military discipline in prison to the Jacksonian period. D. ROTHMAN, supra
note SO, at 82-83, 106.
·
180. Resolve of Feb. 16, 1789, ch. 113, 1788-1789 Mass. Acts 357; Resolve of June 24, 1790,
ch. 81, 1790-1791 Mass. Acts 136; Resolve of Mar. 11, 1791, ch. 170, id. at 244; Resolve of Mar.
22, 1786, ch. 166, 1784-1785 Mass. Acts 928; Senate Documents nos. 2219 & 2219.2 (1797)
(unpassed) {unpublished manuscripts, Mass. Archives); note 171 supra.
181. One innovation was the introduction of convict uniforms "made half of cloth of one
color, and the other half a cloth of a distinct different color'' - a precursor of prison stripes to aid detection of escapees. In the same vein, ''lamps" were ordered installed around Castle
Island- a precursor of the modem search light. See note 171 supra; Resolve of June 30, 1792,
ch. 76, 1792-1793 Mass. Acts 183;seealso Governor's Message, Nov. S, 1785, ch. 39, 1784-1785
Mass. Acts 755-56; Resolve of Mar. 22, 1786, ch. 166, id. 927-29; Resolve of July 8, 1786, ch.
123, 1786-1787 Mass. Acts 338; Resolve of Nov. 17, 1786, ch. 126, id. 405-06; Resolve of Nov.
22, 1788, ch. 73, 1788-1789 Mass. Acts 270 (halting the practice of staffing the garrison-guard
with invalids). See also note 422 infra.
182. See, e.g., Resolve of March 22, 1786, ch. 166, 1784-1785 Mass. Acts 927-29; Senate
Documents nos. 2219 & 2219.2 (1797) (unpassed) {unpublished manuscripts, Mass. Archives).
For a rare description of confinement on Castle Island, confirming the implementation of hard
labor, military discipline, divine worship, and government inspection, but denying the presence of a resident physician, see s. BURROUGHS, MEMOIRS OF THE NOTORIOUS STEPHEN BURROUGHS OF NEW liAMPsHIRE 136-38, 151-53, 159, 167-68, 170-71 (1924) (1st ed. 1798).
183. E. POWERS, supra note 9, at 241-42.
184. Governor's Message, Nov. 9, 1792, 1792-1793 Mass. Acts 688-89.
185. See D. ROTHMAN, supra note 50, at 89-90.
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acquire the hard way. 1s6
In short, the program applied to Castle Island parroted the program of the ancient workhouse. The one coincided with the other in
therapeutic design, 8<lroinistrative precautions, and even institutional nomenclature. 187 One early legislative report actually referred
to the proposed facility as "a Provincial [ie., province-wide] Workhouse or House of Correction." 188 Under the circumstances, contemporaries harbored few illusions about the intrinsic novelty of the
program they had implemented. 189 Workhouses had dotted Massachusetts since the seventeenth century, having "been found very
Beneficial in other countrys." 190 In the eighteenth century, one massive workhouse constructed in Boston almost rivaled later penitentiaries in scale. 191
186. See note 401 infra.
187. See note 135 supra and note 242 i'!fra and accompanying text. Provincial workhouses
operated under detailed ameliorative regulations and regular inspection. See 1 PROV. LAWS,
supra note 12, at 378-80 [1699], 674 [1711]; 3 id at 108-11 [1743]; 1729-1742 BOSTON TOWN
REcoRDs,supra note 14, at 104, 230-31, 234-40, 251-52; 1742-1757 id at 150-51. On the coincidence of terminology, notice the term "overseer" in 3 PROV. LAws, supra note 12, at 108
[1743] and Act of Mar. 14, 1785, ch. 63, 1784-1785 Mass. Acts 165 (a term still current in the
1820s and 1830s, Rules and Orders of 1823, inRemarks,supra note 80, at 53-54; LAWS OFTIIB
COMMONWEALTH FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE STATE PRISON 38-40 (Boston 1839)).
Though often structurally connected, the workhouse and the gaol were under separate government. 1729-1742 BOSTON TOWN RECORDS, supra note 14, at 230-31; 1700-1728 Id at 93; 5
COL. RECORDS, supra note 11, at 237 [1679].
188. 44 Mass. Archives 526, 526a, 538-39 [1765] (unpublished manuscript, Mass.
Archives); 41 HousE JOURNAL, supra note 15, at 186, 230 [1765]. The 1765 report called for
criminal incarceration, but was independent of the subsequent move to open Castle Island. By
statute in 1785, all crimes triable by the Supreme Judical Court, and previously punishable by
hard labor in a workhouse, see note 212, i'!fra, were thenceforth punishable by "hard labour
generally" in a workhouse or on Castle Island, at the justices' discretion. See note 173 supra
(slightly ambiguous provision). On the workhouse analogy, see 2 A. BRADFORD, HISTORY OF
MAssACHUSETIS 251-52 (Boston 1822-1829). The analogy was also made in England, where
similar legislation was floated in the eighteenth century. See J. BENTHAM, supra note 6, at 7; J.
HANwAY,supra note 80, at 117; J. HowARD,supra note 3, at 262,263, 265n; Berkeley, Querlsl,
quoted in L. RADZINOWICZ, supra note 82, at 263 n.11.
189. See REPoRT [ON TIIB STATE PRisoN] 1-2 (1822) (legislative document, Harvard Law
Library).
190. 1729-1742 BOSTON TOWN RECORDS, supra note 14, at 180 [1737].
191. The Boston workhouse completed in 1739 took fully two years to build; some 55 inmates were housed there by 1741; in a 19-month period between 1739 and 1741 the facility
produced some £1,620 worth of merchandise for sale. Id at 273,251. By comparison, Castle
Island held an average of about SO and a maximum of 91 prisoners during its 14-year history,
1785-1798. Opinion or Notes ••• Relative to the Situation and Plan of the State Prison, appended to 1802 Resolves, ch. 54 (passed) (unpublished manuscript, Mass. Archives) (this portion of the document is crossed out). The State Prison opened in 1805 was larger, containing
on average some 300 inmates. G. BRADFORD, supra note 67, at 6. Apart from administrative
similarities to later penitentiaries, see note 187 supra, the Boston workhouse was also subject to
the careful construction planning, cost overruns, and financial legerdemain that later became a
penitentiary trademark. See 1729-1742 BOSTON TOWN REcoRDS, supra note 14, at 104-05,
114, 116, 152, 156, 159-62, 165-67, 172, 175-76, 188,230, 248; 1742-1757 /d at 198. Cf. note 67
supra and note 393 infra and accompanying text. Without question, the workhouse regime was
in 1010 far superior to that of the common gaol In 1764 we find one Mary Robinson, in gaol
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Castle Island did differ from earlier workhouses in one respect:
It applied the rehabituative formula to convicted criminals instead of
idle vagrants. Yet even this step was neither intellectually momentous nor institutionally unprecedented. In the ancient equation, idleness and criminality had always been closely linked. 192 To extend
rehabituative therapy from idlers to active criminals was roughly
analogous to prescribing curative surgery along with preventive
medication.
The idea of widening the scope of hard labor had been in the air
in England, almost from the day the workhouse was founded. As an
administrative matter, such an extension presented no hurdle. Since
the Statutes of Laborers, idleness had constituted a crime, so from
the beginning a sentence to the workhouse was strictly speaking a
criminal punishment. 193 Nor did the need for effective deterrence
militate against the extension. When Edward Hext, an influential
Somersetshire justice of the peace, submitted in 1596 that idle vagrants ''will rather hazard their lives than work," he illustrated the
point with a startling anecdote: "And this I know to be true: for at
such time as our houses of correction were put up . . . I sent divers
wandering suspicious persons to the house of correction; and all in
general would beseech me with bitter tears to send them rather to the
gaol. And denying it [to] them, some confessed felony unto me, by
which they hazarded their lives, to the end that they should not be
sent to the house of correction where they should be forced to
work." 194 The moral of the story fairly leapt from the page: The
workhouse, for "mere" idlers, was more terrifying unto felons than
the traditional criminal law. Subsequent English criminologists
were likewise quick to point out the potential deterrent value of hard
labor for serious o.ffenses.19s
Edward Hext was perhaps the first criminologist to formally recommend an expanded role for the workhouse. His critique in 1596
on suspicion of theft and near the term of her pregnancy, ordered removed to the workhouse
until she had given birth, and when "in a fit condition to be removed back again to the said
Gaol" 1764-1768 BOSTON SELECTMEN RECORDS, supra note 31, at 2 [1764].
192. Bentham considered the difference between ''the inferior degrees of dishonesty" and
"Idleness as yet untainted with dishonesty" to be "microscopic." J. BENTHAM, supra note 80, at
59 (emphasis in original).
193. See note 124 supra.
194. Hext to Lord Treasurer, supra note 123, at 291.
195. See, e.g., Berkeley, (luerist, tJUOled In L. RADZINOWICZ, supra note 82, at 263 n.11.
The "fate worse than death" was a frequently cited theme in the writings of deterrent-minded
criminologists. See, e.g., HANGING NOT PuNlsHMENT ENOUGH (London 1701) (author unknown). The theme reappears later in Massachusetts to justify criminal incarceration. See
Mass. Centinel, Oct. 16, 1784, at 1; REPoRT [ON THE STATE PrusoN] 9 (1822) (legislative document, Harvard Law Library).
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urged that convicted petty offenders be sentenced to hard labor in
addition to traditional punishments. 196 In the seventeenth century,
English workhouses increasingly served as repositories for petty
criminals. While many of these institutions had been founded on
former hospital sites, emphasizing their role in the system of poor
relief, they subsequently gravitated toward the local gaols, often
forming an annex to those facilities. 197
From the far end of the criminal spectrum, other criminologists
offered hard labor as an alternative to transportation and the death
penalty. Following the English Civil War, a procession of Commonwealth law reformers sought such measures. 198 George Berkeley repeated the call in his Querist articles early in the eighteenth
century. 199 In fact, from 1576 onward, judges had held statutory authority to commit clergied felons to the workhouse for up to one
year, though they declined to exercise it. 200 The eighteenth century
witnessed further legislative initiatives in this area: Under a 1707
statute inspired by Sir Robert Clayton,201 incarceration of clergied
felons became a common practice; this program continued until
1717, when the new Whig government decided to reemphasize transportation.202 In 1750, the Fielding Committee introduced legislation
to impose hard labor in the royal dockyards as punishment for felony. It passed in the Commons but was rejected by the House of
Lords. In 1776, an act of Parliament temporarily re-routed prospective transportees to the Thames river, where they were to be reformed as they dredged the riverbed in aid of navigation.203 Finally,
the Hard Labor Act of 1779, drafted by Howard, Eden and Blackstone, provided once again for therapeutic incarceration in lieu of
196. Hext to Lord Treasurer, supra note 123, at 293; see Bray, supra note 140, at 39
(ambiguous).
197. S. WEBB & B. WEBB, supra note 128, at 14-17; Langbein, supra note 128, at 50 n.107.
198. D. VEALL, THE POPULAR MOVEMENT FOR LAW REFORM, 1640-1660, at 128-36
(1970).
199. Berkeley, Querist, quoted in L. RADZINOWICZ, supra note 82, at 263 n.11.
200. 18 Eliz. c.7 (1576). Benefit of Clergy, when granted, permitted a convicted felon to
escape the gallows. It was rarely allowed in provincial Massachusetts, however, and was formally abolished in 1785. E. POWERS, supra note 9, at 607 n.151. See generally 1 J. STEPHEN,
supra note 123, at 457-73.
201. 5 Anne c.6 (1707). As a matter of law, the statute merely increased the permissible
length of imprisonment in the workhouse to two years; it served in practice, however, as a
stimulus to the program.
202. 4 Geo. 1 c.11 (1717). This episode is treated in a doctoral dissertation in progress by
Joanne Innes at Cambridge University.
203. L. RADZINOWICZ, supra note 82, at 415-23. The infamous ''prison hulks" which resulted from the Act of 1776 were intended as a temporary alternative to transportation to the
American colonies, which had become impossible upon the onset of the American Revolution.
16 Geo. 3 c. 43 (1776); W. BRANCH-JOHNSON, THE ENGLISH PRISON HULI{S (1957).
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transportation. The act passed through both Houses, but due to a
series of ill coincidences the prisons it mandated were never
constructed.204
Hard labor as a criminal sanction took firmer root in other
places. From the mid-seventeenth century, persons convicted of serious crimes in many of the German states had been subject to hard
labor in work-gangs and a specialized institution called the
Zuchthaus .205 These facilities operated into the eighteenth century
and were known in both England and Massachusetts.206 The Massachusetts colonists were probably also aware of Pennsylvania's brief .
experiment with criminal incarceration. Promulgated in 1682, the
Great Law of Pennsylvania prescribed hard labor in the workhouse
as a penalty for most crimes. The penalty was effectively abolished
in 1718, but was reimposed soon after independence.207
Finally, Massachusetts had itself imposed hard labor in a workhouse on the occasional criminal from the earliest days of the colony.
The categories of activities punishable by commitment208 to the
workhouse, first established by statute in 1656, already betrayed
some blending of "status" crimes with the lower grades of active offenses. The list included idleness, drunkenness, pilfering, night
walking, eloping from indentured service, and ''uncleanness in
speeches or action." 209 The provincial legislature subsequently added begging, vagabondage, juggling, brawling, harassment of wo204. 19 Geo. 3 c.74 (1779) (also known as the Penitentiary Act); M. IONATIEFF, supra note
45, at 93-96.
205. Convict labor in this context expressly served both exploitative and rehabilitative
ends. See M. GRUNHUT, supra note 129, at 25-27; Langbein, supra note 101, at 51-53.
206. J. BENTHAM, supra note 30, at 158-59; Berkeley, Querist, quoted in L. RADZINOWICZ,
supra note 82, at 263 n.11; Mass. Centinel, Jan. 5, 1785, at 3; id, Oct. 16, 1784, at 1.
207. A call for the reimposition of criminal incarceration appears in the Pennsylvania
Constitution of 1776, though the operative statute was not passed until a decade later. Act of
Dec. 7, 1682, in CHARTER TO WILLIAM PENN AND LAWS OF THE PROVINCE OF PENNSYLVANIA, 1682-1700 at 107 (J. Linne ed. 1879); PA. CONST. OF 1776 ch. 2, §§ 38 & 39; Act of
Sepl 15, 1786, in 12 STATUTES AT LAROE, supra note 178, at 280; H. BARNES, THE EVOLUTION
OF PENOLOGY IN PENNSYLVANIA 31-39 (1927).
208. Commitment was by a single justice, two justices IJtlOrum unus, or by the criminal
court of general sessions. CoL. LAWS supra note 13, § 2, at 127 [1672]; 1 PRov. LAWS, supra
note 12, at 378-81 [1699); see, e.g., 2 PLYMOUTH COUNTY CoURT, supra note 14, at 13, 173;
SUFFOLK COUNTY CoURT,supra note 13, at 89, 125,185,231,336,411; 17 PRov. LAWS,supra
note 12, at 584 [1765).
209. 4 pt.I CoL. RECORDS, supra note 11, at 257; CoL. LAWS, supra note 13, § 2, at 127
[1672); see 4 pt.2 COL. RECORDS, supra note 11, at 394-95; CoL. LAWS, supra note 13, § 2, at
236 [1672). Another statute refers to the list as encompassing ''misdemeanors and evil practices." 4 pt. 1 CoL. REcoRDs, supra note 11, at 222; see COL. LAWS, supra note 13, § 2, at 208
[1672); B. PoWERS, supra note 9, at 225-27. The criminal orientation of the workhouse in
Massachusetts, as in England, was often emphasized by its physical proximity or attachment to
the gaoL See Id at 224-25; WORCESTER COUNTY COURT, supra note 15, at 58; 1 PLYMOUTH
CoUNTY CoURT, supra note 14, at 199; note 173 supra.
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men, and fortune telling.210 In the seventeenth century, a number of
persons convicted of serious crimes were also sentenced to the workhouse on an ad hoc basis.211 In 1749 and 1750, statutory prescriptions to the workhouse were passed for extortion and
counterfeiting.212 And as will be shown, noncarcera/ forms of
rehabituation were common punishments for major offenders
throughout the colonial and provincial periods.213
In sum, not only was the concept of rehabituation well known to
the builders of Castle Island in 1785, but the prospect of applying it
to active criminals was equally familiar to them. No great conceptual leaps attended the facility's inauguration. An establishment like
Castle Island might easily have been conceived at a much earlier
date.

N.

SANCTIONAL TRANSITION

If we accept that the intellectual foundation of criminal incarceration in Massachuse~ts was ancient, then an important question immediately suggests itself: Why did the government of Massachusetts
choose thisparticular moment to implement in depth a venerable ideological motif? While the ideology was a prerequisite to the transition, it is not alone sufficient to explain it. For some reason, criminal
incarceration became in 1785 an idea whose time had come.
To understand more fully the rise of the penitentiary in Massachusetts, we must move beyond ideology to the reality of criminal
sanction in that region. My conclusion is that social change in the
eighteenth century caused the gradual breakdown of the criminal
210. 1 PRov. LAWS, supra note 12, at 67 [1692], 378-81 [1699].
21 I. I COL. RECORDS, supra note 11, at 177, 193; 2 COURT OF AsSISTANTS, supra note 23,
at 118, 126.
212. 3 PRov. LAws, supra note 12, at 479 [1749] (this statute's striking severity probably
owed to the fact that the governor and his councilmen were the complaining victims. See IS
HousE JOURNAL, supra note IS, at 10, 18 [1737], 25 id. at 244 [1749], 26 id. at 8 [1749]); 3
PRov. LAWS, supra note 12, at 498-99 [17SOJ. These acts resulted in actual criminal sentences
to hard labor. See 19 id. at 86; King v. How, Super. Ct., Jan. 1762, ff. 28S-86 (unpublished
court records, Suffolk County Court House); King v. Wheeler, Super. Ct., Sept. 1763, f. 172;
Commonwealth v. Gubtail, Sup. Jud. Ct., June 1784, f. 197; Commonwealth v. Burroughs,
Sup. Jud. Ct., Sept. 178S, ff. 180-81; Commonwealth v. Wheeler, Sup. Jud. Ct., Sept. 178S, f.
184; Commonwealth v. Burrell, Sup. Jud. Ct., Oct. 178S, ff. 253-S4. A third act, combining 1020 years hard labor in a workhouse with whipping, pillory, and mutilation for burglary was
passed by the house but rejected by the council in 1762. A fourth act mandating whipping and
seven years hard labor in a workhouse for assault with intent to commit robbery was approved
by both the house and council in 176S, but Governor Bernard declined to sign it. 47 Mass.
Archives 498-99, S03-04 (unpublished manuscripts, Mass. Archives.) Hindus erroneously
traces the first "authorization" of criminal incarceration at hard labor to 1767, HINDUS, supra
note 68, at 163.
213. See notes 244-48 i,!fra and accompanying text.
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justice system that had functioned adequately in the seventeenth
century, thus driving the colonists to seek new ways of dealing with
crime. Criminal incarceration was born of a struggle to restore crime
control, not a resolution to enhance it.
A. Punishment in Early Massachusetts
l. Puritanism

Judicial authorities in early Massachusetts used a wide array of
sanctions to punish crime. While the express purpose of such punishments was expiation in fulfillment of the terms of the national
covenant, its literal, biblical terms often bowed before (or, more precisely, were construed to coincide with) secular political and social
needs.214 Before turning to those punishments and needs, we must
dispose of one last assumption about the Puritan viewpoint. Rothman and others have inferred that the vision of John Calvin, as reflected in Puritanism, precluded both the deterrent and the
rehabilitative approaches to criminality in colonial Massachusetts.215
This conclusion is unequivocally false, and rests upon a reductio ad
absurdum of the Puritan creed.
Calvin taught that every human person since Adam's fall suffered from a "natural depravity'' of the soul and deserved damnation. This innate depravity inevitably led persons to sin, and
"prepared [them] for the commission of atrocious and innumerable
crimes."216 The Puritans adhered to Calvin's vision; indeed, it was
their determination to do so that led the Puritans to Massachusetts.217 Still, on close inspection, one finds that while Puritan theologians professed faith in Calvinist principles, they nonetheless
filtered out of those principles some of their more pessimistic and
deterministic implications.
As ever brilliantly, Perry Miller identifies one screen to determinism in the Puritan theory of the social covenant.218 Although the national covenant with God offered Puritans one perspective on sin,
the social covenant provided an alternative framework, based on the
214. See note 96 supra.
215. See D. ROTHMAN, supra note 50, at 53 (conclusion generalized to all the colonies); K.
ERIKSON, WAYWARD PuRrrANS 196-98 (1966).
216. 1 J. CALVIN, INSTITUTES OF nm CHRISTIAN REUGION 263 (J. Allen trans. 6th Am.
ed. 1932).
217. See note 9 supra.
218. The social covenant, in contrast to the national covenant discussed at note 95 supra,
bound the people not to God, but to each other: once the people had agreed to obey the will of
God, a further joint compact granted government the authority to enforce that will.
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secular instjtution of government. From the latter vantage point, sin
assumed the form of a secular compact broken, an affirmative act of
will, rather than "a disease contained in the protoplasm" of mankind. The social covenant tended to "externalize" sin, Miller concludes, for "[b]y reducing original sin to legal imputations and by
turning redemption into a rational transaction, the doctrine was
bound to enhance the value of natural capacities . . . [and vitiate]
literal application of the dogma of innate depravity."219 What is
more, even when Puritan theologians spoke of sin in its unadulterated Calvinist sense, they remained equally adamant in admonishing
their listeners to t,y to overcome it - an encouragement whose
hopeful phrases carried Puritanism time and again to the brink of
Arminianism.220
In addition to softening the concept of innate and inevitable depravity, Puritan theologians concurrently developed a theory of rehabilitation designed to overcome it. Theologians posited that the
soul of every human person, though corrupted by original sin, possessed a "natural conscience". that could in the ideal distinguish right
from wron_g. Original sin clouded the conscience, but theologians
maintained that secular instruction, in combination with saving
grace, could restore it to near perfect clarity. Once afforded a ''True
Sight of Sin," the offender would sin again only by overt act of will,
"against his conscience."221 Notions of rehabituation, which were
too shallow to reach the conscience, must have been even easier to
reconcile with Calvinism.222
The end result was a practical approach to crime, stressing the
reformability of offenders, but only up to a point. Criminal tendencies were frequently equated with an infectious and progressive disease. If discovered before the criminals had slid too far and become
"harden[ed] ... in their evil courses," there was hope for them.
But if the infection could not be arrested, as demonstrated by repeated offenses, a criminal would be deemed "incorrigible" and
219. P. MILLER, supra note 95, at 400, 411. See generally id at ch. 14.
220. G. HAsKINs, supra note 9, at 210; E. MORGAN, supra note 9, at 136-37. The Arminian
heresy held that salvation could be achieved by dint of human effort, contrary to the Calvinist
dogma of divine omnipotence and human helplessness.
221. G. HAsKINs, supra note 9, at 204-06.
222. In accordance with his presentation of Calvinist doctrine, Rothman describes "En•
lightenment ideas" as a "challenge" to them, as if the two were mutually exclusive. See D.
RoTHMAN, supra note 50, at 57. As a general matter, it is well known that Calvinist and
Enlightenment principles merged readily in the minds of the American revolutionary thinkers.
See, e.g., note 372 infra. In particular, Lockian psychology and natural depravity were both
accepted and reconciled in the writings of American intellectuals such as Jonathan Edwards.
See generally P. MILLER, JONATHAN EDWARDS (1949).
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dealt with accordingly. 223 Youths were singled out as both particularly vulnerable to, and particularly salvable from, the disorder.224
In sum, Puritan theology did not compel the people of Massachusetts to view punishment as an exercise in futility. They could, and
did, try to use punishment to control crime. But theology was, in
any event, merely one variable in the calculus of sanction; there were
others of equal, if not greater, weight.
2. Communitarianism
From the time of its foundation until the grant of the Second
Charter, Massachusetts remained a conglomerate of small, tightly
knit communities. The first generation of Puritans had settled into a
string of embryonic townships. After the initial migration, the exodus from England tapered off rapidly, and even within the colony,
intermigration between settlements became uncommon. Massachusetts communities grew slowly but steadily over the course of the
seventeenth century, but almost entirely as a result of natural increase. The demographic history of Dedham was typical. Following
its initial settlement in 1636, Dedham grew to contain some 400 inhabitants in 1648; by 1700, the total had climbed to 750. Over these
years, migration into and out of town stood at less than one percent
per annum, and the total number of family names actually declined.
Kenneth Lockridge has described Dedham as "a self-contained social unit, almost hermetically sealed off from the rest of the world."
As late as 1690, no town in Massachusetts, save Boston and Salem,
held more than 2,000 persons.225
Criminal justice in Massachusetts reflected the social intimacy of
its communities. Since the communities experienced little turnover
in population, most criminal offenders were life-long residents, well
known to everyone, rather than transient "outsiders." The first impulse of all concerned was to heal the wounds as best they could.
The preferred sanctions sought to draw the resident offender back
223. See, e.g., 2 Col Records, supra note 11, at 241 (quote); COL. LAWS, supra note 13, § 2,
at 13 [1642), 59-60 [1651); 1 CoURT OF AssISTANTS, supra note 23, at 189 [1680); 2 id. 60 [1635).
224. See, e.g., 4 pl 1 COL RECORDS, supra note 11, at 59-60; 4 pl 2 id at '449; 4 WINTHROP PAPERS, supra note 19, at 474; Resolve of Nov. 17, 1786, ch. 134, 1786-1787 Mass. Acts
413; E. MORGAN, THE PURITAN FAMILY 66-78, 87-108, 139, 148, 169-73 (rev. ed. 1966). For
an English Puritan theologian's accordant view, see Perkins, supra note 96, at 63.
225. E. GREENE & V. HARRINGTON, .AMERICAN POPULATION BEFORE THE FEDERAL CENSUS OF 1790, at 19-21 (1932); K. LocKRIDGE, A NEW ENGLAND ToWN 63-66 (1970) (quote at
64); D. RUTMAN, WJNTHRop's BOSTON 178-80 (1965); Lockridge, Tlte Population ofDedltam,
Massachusetts, 1636-1736, 2 ser. 19 EcoN. HIST. REv. 318 (1966). The story of Andover, Mass.
is similar. See P. GREVEN, FOUR GENERATIONS: POPULATION, LAND AND FAMILY IN COLONIAL ANDOVER, MAsSACHUSETIS 22-28, 39-40, 268-71 ~1970).
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into the community, through rehabilitation, deterrence, and an expression of community forgiveness. Sanctions of the last resort,
designed to expel the offender, were reserved for nonresidents or residents who had tried the community's patience once too often.226
Monetary sanctions, common throughout the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries, relied entirely on deterrence to keep potential
offenders in line. One such sanction was the fine for petty offenses.
Closely akin to the fine, though less familiar today, was the bond for
good behavior. Under the latter scheme, offenders were required to
post a sum of money with the authorities, which would be forfeited
upon any future infraction. Absent such infraction, the sum would
be returned after a space of time set by the court. Thus, in colonial
days, an offender might pay his debt to society in the form of an
outright forfeiture or a :financial contingency, as the court saw fit. 227
More serious crimes required more serious punishment. One
form of rehabilitative sanction common in the seventeenth century
was the admonition. Faced with a community member who had
committed a serious offense, the magistrates or clergymen would lecture him privately to elicit his repentence and a resolution to reform.
The offender would then be brought into open court for a formal
admonition by the magistrate, a public confession of wrongdoing,
and a pronouncement of sentence, wholly or partially suspended to
symbolize the community's forgiveness. 22s
John Winthrop provides a rare glimpse of the process in action in
his Journal narrative of a 1639 case.229 Nathaniel Eaton, the first
president of Harvard College, was presented before the General
Court for an assault on one of his students. Eaton was found guilty
in open court, Winthrop reported, ''yet [he] continued to justify himself." Thereupon proceedings were suspended till the morning,
while in the interim, "for divers hours," the elder ministers "[took]
pains with lilin, to convince him of his faults . . . [and] in the end,
226. See note 223 supra.
227. In another variation, many early 17th-century fines were remitted, subject to good
behavior - a procedure functionally equivalent to the later bond, except that in the first instance the offender held the stake. See Zanger, Crime and Punishment in Early Massacltusells,
3 ser. 22 WM. & MARY Q. 472-73 (1965).
228. G. HAsKINs, supra note 9, at 206-10. Zagarri, Public Confession in Seventeenth Century Massachusetts (1978) (unpublished paper, Yale University, on file with the author). I
have relied heavily on Zagarri's scholarship for my analysis of public confession, here and
throughout.
229. References in the court records are generally cryptic. See, e.g., I EssEX COUNTY
COURT, supra note 35, at 174; PYNCHON COURT RECORD, supra note 23, at 207; I PLYMOUTH
COUNTY CoURT, supra note 14, at 189, 258; 2 COURT OF AsSISTANTS, supra note 23, at 65, 68,
91, 92, 94, 104, 109, 116, 117, 118, 131, 139. For legislative references, see Co1.. LAWS, supra
note 13, § 2, at 13 [1652], 26 [1642], 59 [1646].
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he was convinced, and had freely and fully acknowledged his sin,
and that with tears; so as they did hope he had truly repented, and
therefore desired of the court that he might be pardoned." The justices then heard Eaton's confession, were satisfied of its sincerity,
and sentenced the defendant to pay a fine, which the court remitted
in part.230
Though built upon different premises, the Puritans' noncarceral
process of admonition displayed striking similarities to the subsequent humanitarians' carceral process of reclamation: Both sought
to make a deep impression oh the offender's sense of right and
wrong; both were voluntary processes, seeking to elicit tears, shame,
confession, and a promise of reform. The Puritans' version depended on their own peculiar belief that a conscience clouded by
original sin could be clarified through secular persuasion.231 But it
also depended on the communitarian nature of society for its success. The Puritans considered it critical to judge the sincerity of a
repentence, and this was feasible only if the offender was well known
to his examiners.232
Kindred to the admonition was a whole family of humiliatory
punishments, performed "openly'' or on lecture days before the assembled community.233 Sentences to the pillory, to the stocks, to
lashes at the whipping-post, and to hours on the gallows with a rope
around the neck were all variations on this theme. Like the admonition, humiliatory punishments sought to elicit feelings of shame,
though through manifest, collective disapproval rather than private
instruction.234 Humiliatory punishments also sought to deter both
offenders and onlookers by administering physical - and psychic pain. The sting of the lash and the contortions of the stocks were
230. 1 J. WINTHROP, supra note 21, at 310-14.
231. Cf. note 150 supra and accompanying text.
232. Zagarri, supra note 228, at 12-13; see D. FLAHERTY, PRIVACY IN COLONIAL NEW
ENGLAND 158-59 (1967). Cotton Mather also emphasized the role of neighbors in reinforcing
the reformatory process (in the analogous context of Church discipline): ''When a Person has
thus received an Admonition for a Scandal, the private Christians who dwell near him, reckon it
their Duty, by Visiting of him, and by discoursing with him, to prosecute the good Ejfects
thereof upon him." C. MATHER, RATIO DISCIPLINAE FRATRUM Nov-ANGLORUM. A FAITHFUL ACCOUNT OF THE DISCIPLINE PROFESSED AND PRACTICED IN THE CHURCHES OF NEW
ENGLAND 148 (1726).
233. See, e.g., CoL. LAWS, supra note 13, at 54 (1646], 59 [1651), 91 (1645] (all second
section).
234. Unfortunately, the early Puritans did not discourse at length upon (what must have
been for them) the obvious effects and utility of public humiliation. See generally G. HAsKINs,
supra note 9, at 210; E. POWERS, supra note 9, at 518; D. RoTHMAN, supra note 50, at 49-50;
Friedman, Tlte Devil Is Not Dead: Exploring the History ef Criminal Justice, 11 GA. L. REv.
260-62 (1977). For a later English appraisal, see W. EDEN, supra note 86, at 56-59. But if. J.
BENTHAM, supra note 30, at 84-85.
·
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surely no balm, but even worse were the piercing stares of lifelong
neighbors who witnessed the offender's disgrace, and with whom he
would continue to live and work. Esteem has always meant much in
intimate communities, and in the world-view of the visible saints it
had spiritual as well as secular implications.235 Under the circumstances, the authorities often dispensed with the punishment's physical component entirely: Many humiliated offenders were required
simply to stand in public with signs cataloguing their offenses, a punishment that relied solely on mental anguish for its rehabilitative and
deterrent effect.236
Still another battery of punishments evoked the English
rehabituative equation, which was already close to a century old
when the colonists left the mother country. The Puritans, of course,
had their own reasons for frowning upon idleness. As a matter of
theology, idleness clashed directly with the Calvinist work ethic,
which enjoined every person to labor assiduously at his calling.237
As a matter of economics, the scarcity of labor in early Massachusetts made it all but essential that every settler do his share. And as a
matter of social tradition, the easy availability of employment in
early Massachusetts deprived able-bodied idlers of their customary
defense, to wit, the inability to find a job. Those who neglected work
in spite of its abundance could not expect an outpouring of sympathy. 238 To be sure, idleness (except among troublesome monarchs)
had never been a virtue in Old England either, but in New England
its offe~iveness stood significantly enhanced.239
In 1629, the Massachusetts Bay Company ordered the vanguard
of the settlement, recently arrived at Salem, to erect a workhouse
"for the better governing and ordering of our people, espetially such
as shalbe negligent and remiss in performance of their dutyes, or
23S. Being disgraced might literally indicate a lack of saving grace.
236. See, e.g., 2 COURTS OF AssISTANTS, supra note 23, at 62, 89, 90; E. POWERS, supra
note 9, at 198-201. On the other hand, a public audience was essential to the effectiveness of
humiliatory punishment; whence this delightful entry: ''fo sit in the stocks one hour next
lecture day, if the weather be moderate." I EssEX COUNTY COURT, supra note 3S, at 138
[1647).
231. See, e.g., CoL. LAWS, supra note 13, § 2, at 236 [167S], which labels idleness "a Sin of
Sodom." On the theory of the work ethic, and its centrality to Puritanism, see, e.g., M.
WALZER, THE REVOLUTION OF nm SAINTS, 210-19 (1974).
238. English statutes often distinguished idlers from unemployed persons who sought
work; no such distinction was necessary in Massachussetts. . See, e.g., 4 W. HoLDSWORTII,
supra note 124, at 392; Answer of the House, n. d., May 1818 Mass. Resolves S93.
239. For a discussion of Old English attitudes toward labor and labor practices, see E.
MORGAN, AMERICAN SLAVERY, AMERICAN FREEDOM 61-70 (1975).
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otherwise exorbitant."240 In 1655, the General Court instructed each
county in the colony to construct its own local workhouse and to
gather a stock of raw materials to occupy its inmates at their "dayly
stint."241 Once again, the ostensible purpose of the regime was to
bring delinquents ''to some meet order."242
Though the workhouse was generally reserved for status
criminals and other petty offenders,243 a sentence to hard labor for
serious crimes could also result, though in a more roundabout fashion. By statute, persons convicted of theft in Massachusetts were liable to pay treble damages to the aggrieved as restitution.244
Offenders unable to pay this sum could be pressed into service for a
term of years (either to the aggrieved himself or to a third party) to
work off the judgment. Persons unable to pay fines o~ prison fees
·might be treated in the same way.245 While the expedient of service
was doubtless contrived in part to guarantee effective compensation,246 it also served as a means of rehabituation, conducted under
240. 1 COL. RECORDS, supra note 11, at 401. A workhouse was ordered built in Boston
once the main body of the settlers arrived. 1 id at 100.
241. 3 id at 399-400; 4 pt.1 id at 222, 256-57, 305; COL. LAWS, supra note 13, § 2, at 127
(1646).
242. Cm.. LAws, supra note 13, § 2, at 127 [1646]. Another statute refers to the institution
as a ''House for Correction and Reformation," id. § 2, at 66 [1668], and the Boston workhouse
built in 1739 operated under the slogan: "Labor improhus omnia vincit" [hard labor conquers
all], 1729-1742 BosTON ToWN REcoRDs, supra note 14, at 234. See note 187 supra. Persons
could be committed to Massachusetts workhouses under indeterminate sentences, again emphasizing their rehabilitative function over their deterrent function: freedom would follow
upon "reasonable caution or assurance to the satisfaction of the justice or court, that [the inmate] will reform." See COL. LAWS, supra note 13, § 2, at 127 [1646]; 1 CoL. RECORDS, supra
note 11, at 401; 1 PRov. LAWS, supra note 13, at 67 [1692], 538-39 [1703), 655 [1710); 2 id at
183 [1720), 580 [1730); 2 PLYMOUTH COUNTY COURT, supra note 14, at 6; Act of Mar. 26, 1788,
ch. 54, 1786-1787 Mass. Acts 625-26. Other records indicate attention to the revenue and separation elements of workhouse incarceration. See 4 pt.1 CoL RECORDS, supra note 11, at 257;
1 id. at 193.
243. See notes 208-11 supra and accompanying text.
244. The first statute of this kind, passed in 1646, applied only to thefts from a garden or
orchard, though this restriction was often ignored in practice. After 1692, all thefts were liable
to treble damages. CoL LAWS, supra note 13, § 2, at 13; 1 PRov. LAWS, supra note 13, at 52.
See, e.g., 1 COURT OF AsSISTANTS, supra note 23, at 145, 189, 200, 284; 2 id. at 32, 66, 70, 79,
90, 94, 97, 99, 118, 131, 134; SUFFOLK CO'QNTY CoURT, supra note 13, at 521.
245. COL LAWS, supra note 13, § 2, at 51 [1638); 3 PRov. LAws, supra note 13, at 711-12
{1754); SUFFOLK CoUNTY COURT, supra note 13, at 916, 1063; 1 PLYMOUTH COUNTY COURT,
supra note 14, at 194. See generally R. MORRIS, GOVERNMENT AND LABOR IN EARLY
AMERICA 345-54 (1946); Towner, A Good Master Well Served· A Social History ofServitude in
Massachusetts, 1620-1750, at 118-27, 397-409 (1954) (unpublished doctoral dissertation,
Northwestern University).
246. The treble damages award for theft had biblical, as well as English statutory, origins
and was probably rationalized as liquidated damages. If the aggrieved recov:ered any portion
of the goods stolen, the award was mitigated accordingly. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Lisk,
Sup. Jud. Ct., Feb. 1785, ff. 72-73 (two indictments) (Suffolk Counf.Y Court House); Towner,
supra note 245, at 397-409. On the roots of the restitution sentence, see G. HAsKINs, supra
note 9, at 153-54, 178.
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the auspices of private masters rather than a carceral facility. 247
That the two were considered functionally equivalent is indicated by
the authorities' willingness to substitute a term of indenture for commitment to the workhouse, even where there was no judgment to
pay.24s
There remained one last set of punishments designed, not to reintegrate the offender into the community, but to cast him out of it
once and for all. Banishment served as the ordinary mechanism
whereby Massachusetts communities rid themselves of undesirables.
Less common, but equally effective, were branding and mutilation,
punishments that fixed upon the offender an indelible "mark of infamy," to warn community members to keep their distance. Recourse to the gallows also took the offender out of the community,
though this most final of all punishments was applied only in extraordinary cases.249 While all of these exclusionary sanctions were
aimed in part at general deterrence, their specific motive was to disable the offender from ever harming the community again.
B. The Breakdown of Crime Control

1.

Change

The initial repertoire of punishments in Massachusetts proved
adequate to contain crime in the seventeenth century- at least there
is no surviving record of dissatisfaction with it. But during the eighteenth-century, Massachusetts was buffeted by demographic and social changes that distorted old patterns of criminal activity. Having
previously sustained moderate but steady population gr9wth, eighteenth century Massachusetts entered upon a period of rapid growth.
By 1765, some thirty towns contained more than 2,000 residents
apiece, and almost half of all towns within the province had swelled
beyond the 1,000 person mark. 250 What is more, the mobility of
241. Cf. W. NELSON, supra note 119, at 40; Towner, supra note 245, at 118-19.
248. 2 COURT OF AsSISTANTS, supra note 23, at 126; SUFFOLK COUNTY COURT, supra note
13, at 89, 125, 185. This policy persisted into the provincial period. See 3 PROV, LAWS, supra
note 12, at 926-28 [1756]. Cf. Act of Mar. 16, 1784, ch. 53, 1782-1783 Mass. Acts 633. In
England, Bentham noted the reformative potential of enforced servitude to a ''private master,"
but considered institutional hard labor superior, because then the reformative objective would
be "express." J. BENTHAM, supra note 6, at 7.
249. On the separatory conception of the death penalty in English legal theory, see W.
EDEN,supra note 86, at 25; in Massachusetts,see, e.g., Resolve of Nov. 17, 1786, ch. 134, 17861787 Mass. Acts 413 ("necessary for the safety of the Community"). Banishment was often
ordered "on pain of death" if the outcast were ever to return: the two punishments were closely
linked. E.g., 2 COURT OF AssISTANTS, supra note 23, at 35; 3 id. 68-69.
250. See E. GREENE & V. HARRINGTON, supra note 225, at 21-30. For figures from a
typical community, see P. GREVEN supra note 225, at 103-24, 175-79. Modem estimates of the
overall population of early Massachusetts have relied on literary evidence, not the statistical
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Massachusetts' population increased significantly over the same period. More than half the sons born in eighteenth century Andover,
for example, moved out of town at some point in their lives. After
1765, more than ten percent of the residents of Boston had lived in
town for five years or less.251
To some extent the flood of migration emanated from outside the
province. A small but growing proportion of Boston's immigrants
arrived from foreign ports. The remainder, Massachusetts-born,
streamed out of agricultural communities whose limited supplies of
arable land could no longer support the burgeoning population.252
The result was not merely motion but perpetual motion, the emergence by mid-century of "a small, but significant, floating population
of men and women at the bottom of society who moved from seaport
to seaport and town to town in search of work." These luckless vagrants had not only broken the bonds with their native communities,
but had failed to tie themselves to new ones.253
As these demographic changes gathered momentum, so did distortions in the configuration of crime. Both impressionistic evidence
and statistical studies indicate that the rate of property crime theft, robbery, and related offenses - climbed fairly steadily after
1700, and most dramatically after the 1750s.254 And along with this
increase went a growing perception that responsibility for property
methodology that has been applied to individual townships, and are therefore extremely
rough. The U.S. Census Bureau estimates that Massachusetts contained 56,000 inhabitants in
1700 and 188,000 inhabitants in 1750; according to the first federal census taken in 1790 the
state then contained some 379,000 inhabitants. These figures indicate that the population of
the province was doubling every 30-40 years. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, HlsTORICAL
STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES, COLONIAL TIMES TO 1970, at 29, 1153, 1168. Cf. E.
GREENE & V. HARRINGTON, supra note 225, at 14-19.
251. E. GREEN & V. HAfuuNGTON, supra note 225, at 123, 211-14; K. LocKRIDGE, supra
note 225, at 139-40 & n.2, 146-47; Kulikoff, The Progress ofInetJUOlity in Revolutionary Boston,
3 ser. 28 WM. & MARY Q. 399 (1971).
252. See K. LocKRIDGE, supra note 225, at 400-01; Cook, Social Behavior and Changing
Values in Dedltam, Massachusells, 17()().1775, 3 ser. 27 WM. & MARY Q. 565-73 (1970); Jones,
The Strolling Poor: Transiency in Eighteenth Centwy Massachusells, 8 J. Soc. HlsT. 39-41
(Spring 1975); Lockridge, The Evolution ofNew England Society, 1630-1790, 39 PAST & PREsENT 62-80 (1968).
253. Jones, supra note 252, at 28-54; Kulikoff, supra note 251, at 403 (quote); Lockridge,
supra note 252, at 73. See generally Henretta, Economic Development and Social Structure in
Colonial Boston, 3 ser. 22 WM. & MARY Q. 75-92 (1965); 1700-1728 BOSTON TOWN RECORDS,
supra note 14, at 93, 97; 1716-1736 BOSTON SELECTMENT RECORDS, supra note 31, at 66, 108,
275; 4 PRov. LAWS, supra note 12, at 911 [1767].
254. For impressionistic statements of the growth of crime, see 1 PRov. LAWS, supra note
12, at 673-74 [1711]; 2 id. at 5 [1715], 838 [1736]; 4 id. at 488-89 [1761]; 5 id. at 43 [1770]; 47
Mass. Archives 555 [1773] (unpublished document, Mass. Archives); 46 HousE JOURNAL,
supra note 15, at 108 [1770]; Grand Jury Charge by Hutchinson, C.J., Super. Ct., Mar., 1786,
in J. QUINCY, supra note 43, at 260-61; notes 278, 340 infra. See generally E. POWERS, supra
note 9, at 186-87. On crime in Boston, see C. BRIDENBAUGH, CITIES IN THE WILDERNESS 68-
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crime rested in large measure on persons unattached to the communities they afflicted. Chief Justice Thomas Hutchinson believed that
"bad People frequently come into this Province from other Governments ... merely for the sake of committing [larceny] here." Justice Nathaniel Sargeant referred to the recipients of punishment as
"vicious persons . . . roving about the ~untry disturbing peoples
rest and preying upon their property." Evolving patterns of crime
were matched by an evolving composite of the average criminal.255
While the imputation of criminal acts to outsiders must have
stemmed from the rising geographic mobility of Massachusetts society, the causes of the overall increase in property crime are more
complex and difficult to trace. Growth in the absolute numbers of
inhabitants surely contributed to the trend, and it seems likely that
commercial wealth, urbanization, and employment patterns all
73 (1938); C. BRIDENBAUGH, CITIES IN REVOLT II0-12, 299-302 (1955) (notes available only
in the Oxford Univ. Press ed. 1971).
Impressionistic statements of increasing crime do, however, have an eternal ring, and examples in earlier times could doubtless be found. But in one respect, the provincial protestations are more than just air- they are backed up by a palpable, long-tenn trend of legislative
response. See notes 285-90 i'!fra and accompanying text. Statistical evidence compiled by
Linda Kealey, David Flaherty, and William E. Nelson tracks the growth of property crime
prosecutions and convictions in the Superior Court, and thereby provides a rough barometer
of change in the overall crime rate. (Notice, however, that prosecution and conviction rates
are affected by many variables extraneous to the crime rate, e.g., popular sensitivity to property crime.) Kealey's conviction statistics for the years 1750-1794 appear below:
1750-54.. . . . . . • • . . . . • • . . . • • • • . . .
14 Super. Ct. convictions for property crime
1755-59.........................
15
1760-64.........................
35
1765-69.........................
38
1770-74.........................
58
1775-79.........................
16 [wartime]
1780-84.........................
84
1785-89 . . . . . . • . . . . . • • . . . . . • . . . . .
259
1790-94.........................
217
Kealy, The Punishment of Criminal Offenders in Eighteenth-Century Massachusetts 329 (unpublished chapter of a dissertation in progress, University of Toronto, on file with the author).
See Flaherty, Crime and Social Control in Provincial Massachusetts, 24 HIST. J. 357-60 (1981);
Nelson, Emerging Notions of Modem Criminal Law in the Revolutionary Era: An Historical
Perspective, 42 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 458-59 (1967). These data indicate dramatic proportional
growth, but a low absolute number of prosecutions and convictions. In the face of literary
protestations of daily offenses, the low absolute numbers suggest an additional ~cumstance,
likely contributing to popular anxiety: ineffective law enforcement. See notes 279 & 310 /'!fro
and accompanying text.
255. 46 HousE JOURNAL, supra note 15, at 108 (1770]; Sargeant, "Court Minutes" [n.d.]
(unpublished manuscript, Essex Institute), tjtlOted in Kealey, supra note 254, at 306-07. See,
e.g., Report Respecting Convicts, supra note 30; 1700-1728 BOSTON TOWN RECORDS, supra
note 14, at 93, 97; 1701-1715 BOSTON SELECTMEN RECORDS, supra note 31, at 178; Governor's
'Message, June l, 1819, May 1819 Mass. Resolves 29; Answer of the House, Jan. 19, 1802, 18001801 Mass. Acts 479-80 (''that miserable class of the people, who are principally the object of
public punishment"). The accuracy of these literary perceptions still awaits comprehensive
statistical testing. See Kealey, supra note 254, at 333; Kulikoff, supra note 251, at 403; Ne~n,
supra note 254, at 459 & nn.59 & 60.
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raised the incentives to crime - at least, contemporaries thought
that they did.256 But the evidence also points to a decline in the effectiveness of traditional sanctions. As emerging social forces
strengthened propensities to crime, they also weakened the impediments to crime. As a result, crime soared.257
One traditional sanction that seems to have broken down was the
sale into servitude. Throughout the provincial period, thieves unable to raise treble damages had routinely been bound out to a term
of rehabituative service; the proceeds passed to the aggrieved to
compensate him for his loss. 258 This practice depended on the availability of a willing buyer, however, and finding one may never have
been a simple matter. As early as 1702, Massachusetts legislators
were compelled to make provisions for unsalable convict~. "Inasmuch as it often happens, that persons convicted of theft, and sentenced to make restitution to the party injured . . . are held long in
prison" for want of buyers, the legislators ordered the convicts' release if not disposed of within thirty days. 259 By the late eighteenth
century, the market appears to have folded up altogether. "If
[thieves] are not able to pay damages, they must be sold for a term of
time sufficient to discharge costs," wrote a commentator in 1784.
"But where are the purchasers? It is as difficult to find such persons,
as for a thief to become an honest man." 260
Just what caused the ultimate collapse of the convict-servant
market remains unclear; the employers do not tell us. Economic
trends do not appear to have been pivotal, for demand did not revive
in the 1790s, when the Commonwealth enjoyed booming prosperity.261 One possible explanation is that the Massachusetts antislavery movement spilled over to this not very different form of enforced
256. Report Respecting Convicts, supra note 30; Governor's Message, Jan. 15, 1802, 18001801 Mass. Acts 583; Answer of the House, Jan. 19, 1802, id. at 479; Governor's Message, June
1, 1819, May 1819, Mass. Resolves 29; J. QUINCY, A MUNICIPAL HlsTORY OF THE TOWN AND
CITY OF BOSTON 102, 153 (Boston 1852). See C. BRIDENBAUGH, Crrms IN REVOLT, .fllpra
note 254, at 110; Nelson, supra note 254, at 458-59.
257. For a very different interpretation of the effectiveness of crime control in provincial
· Massachusetts, see Flaherty, supra note 254, at 339-60. .
258. See notes 244-45 supra.
~
259. 1 PR.av. LAWS, .fllpra note 12, at 504. Similar provisions occasionally appear in court·
records dating back to the seventeenth century. See l COURT OF AssISTANTS, .fllpra note 23, at 189 [1680). Cf. Nelson, supra note 254, at 460.
260. Mass. Centinel, Oct. 16, 1784, at 1. See 46 HOUSE JOURNAL, .fllpra note 15, at 108
[1770) (Gov. Hutchinson's message to the House enumerating the larcenist's "Risque" as a fine
or whipping, without mention of treble damages or service.)
261. See, e.g., Governor's Message, June 13, 1799, 1798-1799 Mass. Acts 639.
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servitude.262 But it is also likely that demand slackened over the
years because the status of the convicts had changed. It was one
thing for a community member to admit into his household a wayward individual whom he had known, or known of, since birth; it
was quite another to take charge of a transient pauper whose sole
connection to the town was born of misconduct.263 Lawrence Towner suggests that changes in the composition of the servant population
rendered the family increasingly unfit to perform its traditional function "as a socializing agency" in eighteenth-century Massachusetts.
One manifestation was a growing storm of disputation between
master and servant,264 and another may have been reluctance to
purchase bonded servants in the first place. With the decline of community intimacy, rehabilitation at the private level probably became
impractical.
Another punishment that proved particularly vulnerable to social
change was the admonition. The process of admonition had never
been used when the- offender was a newcomer or a stranger, for in
such cases the sincerity of the offender's repentance could not be
gauged. As crime became increasingly the province of strangers, the
utility of the admonition diminished accordingly. In addition, there
appears to have been a growing reluctance, even among longstanding community members, to bare the soul before admonishers and
before the public in the subsequent confession. Increasingly anonymous town life spawned a commensurate appreciation of, and insistence on, personal privacy.265
Other humiliatory punishments were similarly impeded by social
change. A sentence to whipping or the pillory had worked primarily
through the media of psychic pain and shame. Growing social anonymity diluted both elemeij.ts of the punishment. Surely, the penalty
of a session on the pillory must have appeared far less daunting
when performed before persons with whom the offender was unacquainted, and with whom he need have no further contact whatsoever. "Could your Honours but be spectators of the ease, the
negligence, and unconcernedness, with which these people are led to
-

262. On the antislavery movement in Massachusetts, see, e.g., A. ZILVERSMIT, THB FIRST
(1967).
263. It is suggestive that the .first expression of doubt about the salability of convicts in the
records of the Court of Assistants involved a pair of "Incorrigible Theeves" who had allegedly
threatened "if loose to burne the Towne." 1 COURT OF AssISTANTS, supra note 23, at 189
[1680).
264. Towner,•~ Fondnessfar Freedom'!· Servant Protest in Puritan Sociel)', 3 ser. 19 WM,
& MARY Q. 201-19 (1962).
265. Zagarri, supra note 228, at 17-18. See note 232 supra.
EMANCIPATION
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the whipping post," a commentator lectured the legislators in 1784,
"your blood would chill in your veins, at the depravity of human
nature." 266
As for the rehabilitative element of humiliatory punishments,
this appears not merely to have dwindled but to have positively
backfued.267 Expressions of rebuke, whether individual or collective, will strike home only when delivered by a person whom the
wrongdoer respects. The same rebuke, when delivered by a rival or
a stranger, will more likely arouse resentment or hatred. By the late
eighteenth century, humiliation before anonymous onlookers appears to have engendered in offenders not heightened regard for the
community but heightened indignation against it. "[T]he punishment [whipping] they have received has destroyed the fear of shame,
and produces a desire of revenge, which serves to stimulate· their vicious inclination," another commentator noted in 1784. ''They improve the next opportunity to repeat the crime, and by practice make
themselves masters of the trade."268 The process was indeed a vicious circle, the first author agreed: "A man shall be tried, sentenced, whipped and set at liberty; his character, if tolerable before,
is now ruined; nothing is to be done but for him to go to the old
trade of stealing, when he is again taken and goes through the same
process, which instead of answering the least good p~ose, serves
only to harden him the more; and so he goes on stealing and being
whipped, until death rids the community of him."269 Such a description of public humiliation surely would have bewildered Puritan colonists of the first generation.
In his early essay "Some Thoughts Concerning Education," a
prescient John Locke warned that ''the shame of the whipping, and
not the Pain, should be the greatest part of the Punishment . . . .
The Smart of the Rod, if Shame accompanies it not, soon ceases, and
is forgotten, and will quickly, by use, lose its Terrour."270 Locke's
insight, furnished from the context of family government in England, proved all too cogent from the perspective of community gov.ernment in provincial Massachusetts. As the aura of shame and
psychic trauma surrounding the penaltyv evaporated, there was left
266. Mass. Centinel, Oct. 16, 1784, at 1. See Mass. Centinel, Sept. 22, 1784, at 1.
267. For another example of Massachusetts social change causing a reversal in the impact
of law (in an historian's view), see W. NELSON, supra note 119, at 6.
268. Mass. Centinel, Sept. 22, 1784, at 1 (emphasis added).
.
269. Mass. Centinel, Oct. 16, 1784, at 1. See G. BRADFORD, supra note 1, at 11-12; 18171822 Mass. Legislative Documents no. 1, at 11 (1817) (State Library Annex); Govemor's
Message of Jan. 30, 1793, 1792-1793 Mass. Acts 694.
270. Tm! EDUCATIONAL WRITINGS OF JOHN LocKE 152-54, 177 (J. Axtell ed. 1968).
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behind only a small core of physical pain quite insufficient to prevent offenses. By the late eighteenth century, the lash had evolved
into a "slight corporal Punishment."271
Still other traditional penalties grew increasingly unworkable as
the eighteenth century progressed. At a glance, the fine would seem
to be the most timeless of all sanctions - a blow to the pocketbook
will be painful, no matter how many onlookers witness the event.
Yet, there remains one instance in which a fine imposes no pain namely, when the offender's pocketbook is already empty. One of
the few freedoms that indigents have always enjoyed is the freedom
from fear of large fines or judgments. The culprits responsible for
the upsurge of property crime in provincial Massachusetts were primarily vagrants and transients and belonged to this judgment-proof
class: threatening to fine them would have been tantamount to suggesting that they eat cake.272
Even punishments that sought to exclude criminals from the
community were weakened by social change. In the seventeenth
century, banishment had effectively incapacitated offenders because
they were well known and could not return;273 likewise, indigent
strangers were instantly recognizable and could be ''warned out," in
the contemporary phrase, before they had a chance to commit
crimes.274 But as commuajties swelled, recognition of strangers and
persons under sentence of banishment became increasingly difficult.275 Even branding might not be a sufficient stigma in some
quarters. Capital punishment remained the only sure way to hand
offenders a one-way ticket out of town - and, as it happened, even
that punishment was not quite so reliable as it might seem.276
2. Reaction
The people277 of Massachusetts were well aware that they had a
271. 46 HousE JOURNAL, supra note 15, at 108 (1770].
272. See 1 P&ov. LAWS, supra note 12, at 122 (1693], 287 (1695]; 3 id 711-12 [1754],
213. See, e.g., 2 COURT OF AssISTANTS, supra note 23, at 59.
274. See generally J. BENTON, WARNING OUT IN NEW ENGLAND (1911). Given the demographic trends of the eighteenth century, the incidence of warning out initially rose sharply. C.
BRIDENBAUGH, CITIES IN nm WILDERNESS, supra note 254, at 231; Cook, supra note 252, at
569; Kulikoff, supra note 251, at 399-400; Lockridge, supra note 252, at 72-73.
275. 1700-1728 BOSTON TOWN RECORDS, supra note 14, at 93, 97; C. BRIDENBAUGH, CITIES IN nm WILDERNESS, supra note 254, at 231; R. Km.so, THE HlsTORY OF PUBLIC POOR
RELIEF IN MAsSACHUSETTS, 1620-1920, at 54-55 (1922).
276. See notes 292-300 infra and accompanying text.
277. By ''the people" I mean those people who favored crime control and who registered
their opinions in the literature of the day. Whether such ''people'' included, or spoke for, the
honest poor is a splendid question which I shall not attempt to answer here. On the relationship between crime control and class control, cf. Muraskin, supra note ~9; Ignatieff, Stale, CM/
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problem on their hands, arid they quickly drew the connection between escalating crime rates and the failure of tr~ditional sanctions.
"It must give every man of foaling the most sensible pain, when he
observes how insufficient our penal laws are to answer the end they
were designed to," wrote one critic. "Scarce a morning arrives, but
we hear of some house or store having been broke open the past
night." 278 Crime waves have always triggered anxiety over the manner of criminal justice, and the prospect must have been especially
frightening in societies, like provincial Massachusetts, that lacked a
professional police force; for little stood between the criminal and his
victim but effective social discipline. 279 Under popular pressure, the
landscape of criminal justice in Massachusetts began to change.
Some time-worn punishments simply disappeared. One of the
first to go was public confession, which quietly bowed out of the
records after 1700.280 Banishment and ''warning out" hung on a
while longer, expiring shortly after independence.281
Other punishments remained in effect, but took on different functions. The lash and other humiliatory punishments had initially
served to instill shame and to reintegrate offenders into the community. But when offenders failed to reform, or were outsiders to begin
with, the sanctions' purpose shifted from reintegration to expulsion:
Public punishment ceremonies alerted townspeople to the offenders'
infamy. It thus became common as the century progressed to hold
the public punishment of a single offender on multiple occasions, so
that all the more citizens could take careful notice of him. 282
Still other punishments which remained viable were extended to
cover a broader range of crimes. A growing number of provincial
statutes prescribed short-term imprisonment in the common gaol as
a deterrent, though this sanction's utility was limited by the infeasibility of longer sentences.283 More promising were the first few
Society, and Total Institutions: A Critique ofRecent Social Histories ofPunishment, 3 CRIME &
JusT. ANN. REv. REsE.ARCH 153 (1981). For works analyzing the rise of the penitentiary in
Europe from the standpoint of class, see note 79 supra.
278. Mass. Centinel, Oct. 16, 1784, at 1. See note 254 supra.
219. See note 254supra and note 310i,!fra. For an early example of anxiety over crime in
Massachusetts, see w. BRADFORD, OF PLYMOUTH PLANTATION, 1620-1647, at 316-20 (S.E.
Morrison ed. 1970).
280. Zagarri, supra note 228, at 18.
281. R. KELSO, supra note 275, at 53-60.
282. The practice was codified in the last Massachusetts code incorporating public punishments. 1784-1785 Mass. Acts 134, 157, 169-70, 175; 1786-1787 id. at 89.
283. See E. POWERS, supra note 9, at 239-40. Imprisonment was also used to facilitate the
process of multiple public punishments, serving as a way-station between such punishments.
See note 282.rupra.
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statutes mandating long-term hard labor in the workhouse, which
appeared on the statute books by mid-century.284
The most notable legislative response, however, was a wider recourse to capital punishment for the major types of property offenses. In 1692, when the new provincial government passed its first
set of criminal laws, the only property crimes punishable by death
were third offenses of burglary and robbery. 285 But in 1711, citing
the growing insecurity of the highways, the House prescribed the
death penalty for second-time robbery offenders.286 Four years later,
again pointing to the rising frequency of crime, the House added
first-time burglaries to the capital list.287 In 1736, the gallows was
mandated for theft, if it was a second offense - the first time that
category of crime had ever been punishable by death in Massachusetts.288 In 1761, the robbery statute was revised yet again to send
first offenders to the gallows.289 Finally, in 1770, once again finding
the old provisions "ineffectual," the House expanded the definition
of burglary (which was subject to capital punishment) to include entry into a dwelling in the day or night, with or without a breaking, as
long as the offender broke out at night. 290
In retrospect, the legislators' reaction seems to have been perfectly natural. As criminal penalties prove increasingly ineffective,
the reflexive response is surely to move along the prevailing spectrum of sanctions to more severe altematives.291 But the flaw in this
solution quickly became apparent. The people of Massachusetts had
never had much stomach for the gallows, even when the victims
were outsiders, and the thought of expanding the penalty into the
range of common property crimes was more than most jurymen
could swallow. So they set about thwarting the new capital statutes,
just as earlier generations of Puritans had thwarted previous ones.292
And in a contest between jurymen and the rule of law in Massachu284. See note 212 supra and accompanying text.
285. 1 PROV. LAWS, supra note 12, at 52. This provision traces back to 1642. CoL. LAWS,
supra note 13, § 2, at 12-13.
286. 1 PROV. LAWS, supra note 12, at 673-74.
287. 2 id. at 5.
288. 2 id. at 838.
289. 4 id. at 488-89.
290. 5 id. at 43. Several sorts of counterfeiting were also made capital. See E. POWERS,
supra note 9, at 307-08.
291. A recent example of this reflex may be the New York drug law of 1973. For the
analogous background of that legislation, see Note, .Drug Abuse, Law Abuse, and the Eighth
Amendment: New York's 1973 .Drug Legislation and the Prohibition Against Cruel and Unusual
Punishment, 60 CORNELL L. REv. 638-40 (1975).
292. See note 99 supra.
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setts, law had rarely stood a chance.293
Juries frustrated the new capital statutes in several ways. At the
indictment stage, grand juries often refused to charge persons with
capital crimes. The indictments were simply downgraded to noncapital charges of the jurymens' invention: thus, burglary was often
transmuted into "theft in the night time." 294 Even when an indictment for burglary was sealed, its harsh consequences could still be
avoided by the petit jury. Of course, the jurymen could always acquit the defendant outright, but on many occasions they chose instead to convict him of a lesser crime.295 (This version of jury
nullification, known in England as "pious perjury," had also been
used in the mother country to avoid the rigors of the bloody code.)296
Finally, even if the box did nothing to mitigate the penalty, the
bench often did so, in blatant disregard of statutory sentencing prescriptions.297 This last datum indicates that laymen had no monopoly on moral aversion to the gallows in provincial Massachusetts.
In the face of such determined resistance, the gallows could not
replace other failing sanctions. The legislators recognized that the
capital law against burglary "is so severe that many offenders escape
293. On jury power in colonial America see generally Nelson, The Eighteenth-Century
Background efJohn Marshall's Constitutional Jurisprudence, 76 MICH. L. REv. 904-17 (1978).
294. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Cook, Sup. Jud. Ct., Sept. 1785, f. 180; Commonwealth v.
Baker, Sup. Jud. Ct., Feb. 1786, f. 75 (Suffolk County Court House). It remains possible,
however, that factual matters distinguished such cases.
295. E.g., King v. Robinson, Super. Ct., Aug. 1765, ff. 126-27; Commonwealth v. Mount,
Sup. Jud. Ct., Aug. 1785, ff. 81-83; Commonwealth v. Coldbroth, Sup. Jud. Ct., Aug. 1797, f.
240. Again, factual distinctions may have been made: on other occasions, the death penalty
war meted out for property crime, e.g., Commonwealth v. Grout, Sup. Jud., Ct., Aug. 1784, f.
230; Commonwealth v. Covin, Sup. Jud. Ct., Aug. 1784, f. 232; Commonwealth v. Dixon, Sup.
Jud. Ct., Oct. 1784; f. 316; Commonwealth v. Campbell, Sup. Jud. Ct., Feb. 1785, ff. 70-71
(Suffolk County Court House).
296. See generally J. BENTHAM, supra note 30, at 196-97, 325; 4
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *238-39; M. MADAN, supra note 93, at 13-14, 68, 87; L. RADZINOWICZ, supra note
82, at ,ll3-97. The ''bloody code" was Great Britains's accumulation of over 200 capital statutes
during the eighteenth century.
297. See King v. Brown, Super. Ct., June 1763, ff. 67-68 and King v. Grosman, Super. Ct.,
Oct. 1763, ff. 193-94, for examples of second theft convictions being punished as if they were
first convictions under the 1736 theft act. See note 288 supra. Likewise, see Commonwealth v.
Powers, Sup. Jud. Ct., Apr. 1785, ff. 177-78, and Commonwealth v. Titcom, Sup. Jud. Ct., Aug.
1785, f. 80, for examples of burglary convictions punished according to the provisions of the
overriden 1692 act, instead of the 1715 and 1770 acts. Cf. notes 285,287, 290supra. Another
string of burglary cases also reach this outcome, though they appear to have involved a sort of
incipient plea bargaining: defendants pleaded innocent, and subsequently entered amended
guilty pleas. In any event, the sentences pronounced in these cases had no statutory mandate.
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Joyce, Sup. Jud. Ct., Aug. 1784, f. 231; Commonwealth v. Smith,
Sup. Jud. Ct., Sept. 1784, ff. 263-64; Commonwealth v. Fanueil, Sup. Jud. Ct., Feb., 1785, ff.
75-76; Commonwealth v. Daken, Sup. Jud. Ct., Feb. 1785, ff. 67-68 (Suffolk County Court
House).
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Punishment,"298 and they balked at lengthening the capital list further.299 Here, then, were the horns of a dilemma: While "[a]t present, our laws are no more a check to simple robbery [than] they are
to getting money honestly," the alternative of ''tak[ing] a man's life
for every trifling theft, as is done in England, is a disgrace to a civilized nation; humanity recoils from the idea."300 Only after the slide
toward harsher traditional sanctions, the path of least resistance,
proved to be a cul de sac did Massachusetts lawmakers tum "sideways" to explore new solutions to the problem of crime.
The penitentiary was not the only remedy suggested by reformers. Another proposal, which retained a following as late as the
1820s, was transportation of criminals, on the English model. Since
banishment by way of escort to the town limits could no longer guarantee an offender's permanent removal, transportation advocates
hoped that a more distant exile would effectively prevent his return.
The idea was always rejected because of both its cost and the suspicion that no expanse of ocean would keep unreformed offenders
away.301
Hard labor, on the other hand, offered several enticing attractions to Massachusetts lawmakers.302 The problem that they faced
298. 47 Mass. Archives 498-99 (1762] (emphasis added) (unpublished manuscript, Mass.
Archives). See Answer of the Senate, n.d., May 1819 Mass. Resolves 33.
299. REPORT [ON THE STATE PRlsoN] 1-2 (1822) (Harvard Law Library); 47 Mass.
Archives 498-99 (1762], 507-08 (1766], 555-58 (1773] (unpublished documents, Mass,
Archives); Tudor, supra note 80, at 430.
300. Mass. Centinel, Oct. 16, 1784, at I. Practical difficulties of enforcement were buttressed by theoretical opposition (per rationalist ideology) to an expanded capital list. See,
e.g., The Independent Chronicle, Feb. 7, 1793, at I, continued Feb. 14, 1793, at 1-2; Mass.
Centinel, Oct. 20, 1784, at I (statutes violate the principle of proportionality discussed at note
92 supra and accompanying text). And the famous anecdote about pickpockets who did their
briskest business at the hangings of their comrades - which made such a mockery of the
practical deterrent value of the capital sanction - was already current. The Independent
Chronicle, Feb. 14, 1793, at 2. The story is still repeated. See L.CARNEY, CORRECTION AND
THE COMMUNITY 26 (1977).
301. Boston Gazette, Nov. 29, 1784, at 3 (possibly facetious); G. BRADFORD, supra note I,
at 61-63; 1817-1822 Mass. Legislative Documents no. I, at 21-22 & n (1817) (State Library
Annex); REPORT [ON THE STATE PRISON] 15 (May 1830); REPORT [ON THE STATE PRISON) 5,
14-15 (1822) (Harvard Law Library). This idea blended easily with the "back to Africa" solution for freed slaves. See id For an English criticism of transportation making many of the
same points, see J. BENTHAM, supra note 122, at 173.
302. Apart from the attractiveness of carceral punishment, one may speculate about its
feasibility at alternative dates. James Stephen has argued that "in the days of Coke it would
have been impossible practically to set up convict establishments" in England, even if they had
been deemed advisable, for want of economic resources and managerial expertise. 2 J. STE·
PHEN, supra note 123, at 92. Criminal incarceration thus might have appeared in the late
eighteenth century, not because it was at last prudent, but because it was at last possible. But
this argument will not stand up to analysis. Though the financial resources of Massachusetts
grew substantially in the eighteenth century, the fact remains that funds sufficient to build and
run carceral institutions had always been found; gaols and workhouses were constructed from
the earliest days of the colony. See notes 11-12, 240-41 supra and accompanying text. And
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was not crime in general, but property crime, committed in the main
by an identifiable class of vagrants. Because ''the idle and poor
[have] much increased among [us]," Boston had already built a new
workhouse in 1739, and the legislature had encouraged other towns
to follow suit.303 Active criminals from the same class would also
benefit singularly from this treatment,304 and since it was believed to
be "a sentence more dreadful to the Lazy [and] the dissolute than
almost any which could be inflicted," it would constitute an effective
deterrent as well.3°5 Advocates also observed that if all else failed,
incarceration did at least incapacitate the criminal offender. Public
punishments, which had relied on rehabilitation, deterrence, and notoriety, set the offender immediately at liberty, and the frequent repetition of offenses impressed upon advocates the importance of
physical restraint as an additional bulwark against crime.306 By the
late eighteenth century, incarceration constituted a more reliable
means of incapacitation than either banishment or (when filtered
through the jury process) capital punishment.307 Finally, some advocates promised that the pris_oners' labor would pay the expenses of
the otherwise costly punishment.308 These arguments were persuaaccording to the prevailing theory of rehabituation, the process of hard labor would at least
contribute to, if not support, the facility in which it was carried on. See note 136 supra and
note 308 iefra and accompanying text. Furthermore, the managerial expertise of pre-nineteenth-century penologists has been underestimated. At least several large-scale workhouses
were constructed in England in the eighteenth century, and Massachusetts itself undertook an
ambitious workhouse project in Boston as early as 1737 without fear of administrative impracticality. See M. IGNATIEFF, supra note 45, at 13-14; notes 128 & 191 supra. Finally, legal
historians of Massachusetts have emphasized that criminal incarceration remained infeasible
as long as the population of the colony was too low to bear reductions in the labor pool. See
G. HAsKINs, supra note 9, at 116; Zanger, supra note 227, at 474-75. On the contrary, the
theoretical motive for rehabituative incarceration was the promotion of industry in persons
otherwise idle. A labor-scarce society had a greater incentive to introduce such therapy. And
again, institutional construction (for other purposes) upon the colonists' arrival in Massachusetts belies suggestions of impracticality.
303. 2 PROV. LAWS, supra note 12, at 756 [1735); 3 id. at 108 [1743). See note 191 supra.
304. See notes 169-70 supra and accompanying text. It is no coincidence that the first active criminal offenses to be made punishable by service and incarceration in the workhouse
were all property related. See notes 209-13, 243-48 supra and accompanying text. Ideologically, hard labor had never been a panacea, and it would not have been prompted by an
epidemic of moral offenses, for example. Notice that the first movement toward institutional
hard labor had also occurred during a period of mounting vagrancy, see text at note 125 supra.
305. Report Respecting Convicts, supra note 30. See Governor's Message, Jan. 11, 1799,
1798-1799 Mass. Acts. 636; Mass. Centinel, Oct. 16, 1784, at 1; G. BRADFORD, supra note 1, at
14-15; Salem Mercury, Dec. 30, 1788, quoted in Kealey, supra note 254, at 306.
306. See Mass. Centinel, Sept. 22, 1784, at 1; id., Oct. 16, 1784, at 1; Governor's Message,
Jan. 15, 1802, 1800-1801 Mass. Acts 583-84; Answer of the House, Jan. 19, 1802, id. at 479-80;
Sargeant, "Court Minutes," [n.d.] (unpublished manuscript, Essex Institute), quoted in Kealey,
supra note 254, at 306-07.
307. See notes 275, 281, 294-98 supra and accompanying text.
308. See G. BRADFORD, supra note 67, at 10; notes 392-93 iefra.
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sive,309 and in 1785 the Castle Island prison was inaugurated.
With the rise of criminal incarceration in Massachusetts, old concepts of crime control befitting small, intimate communities finally
gave way to new ones, more appropriate to the large, anonymous
communities that were spreading across the state. In the seventeenth
century, the criminal was generally looked upon as a person who
had wandered astray, but whose basic loyalties still ran to the community he had injured. By the end of the eighteenth century, the
criminal was more commonly viewed as a member of an antagonistic subculture, whose allegiances disposed him to villainy from the
outset. One by-product of this changing outlook was the institution
of a professional police force in post-revolutionary Boston. Once
criminals were perceived as out-and-out adversaries, physical enforcement became a crucial vehicle for the prevention of crime.310
The prison fit snugly into the new social framework. Whereas
early rehabilitative punishments had sought to draw the offender
back into the community to which he already belonged, criminal incarceration sought a dual objective: to wrench the offender out of
the community he had afflicted, and only later to return him to it,
shorn of his prior hostility.
Equally appropriate was the transfer of the situs of punishment
from town centers to a pocket of the legal system hidden from public
view. Some students of incarceration in Europe have interpreted this
movement as a ploy by the ruling elite to wrest political control of
punishment away from the popular mobs that had clustered around
the old public ceremonies.311 But in Massachusetts, at least, the demise of public punishment seems explicable on strictly practical
grounds. Once criminal offenders ceased to be persons who
respected or cared about the community, punishment in the community's presence could no longer have a salutary effect on them.
The old punishments were also intended to weigh upon the public, as opposed to the offender, by providing general, as opposed to
309. See notes 169-70 supra and accompanying text. There is no evidence that the 1785
initiative in Massachusetts was directly stimulated by reformist undertakings outside the state;
still, that possibility cannot be denied. Several American mandates for criminal incarceration
shortly preceded the Castle Island statute, see notes 207 supra & 338 infra. On the other hand,
Castle Island was the first operational facility for criminal incarceration in America during this
period,see note 351 infra. Cf. text at notes 360-62infra. Given post-revolutionary antagonism
for England, the influence of the British Hard Labor Act of 1779 on Massachusetts is ambiguous, see note 327 infra and accompanying text.
310. See generally R. LANE, POLICING THE CITY 3-13 (esp. 6-7) (1967).
311. M. FOUCAULT, supra note 79, at 57-65, 126-31; M. IGNATIEFF, supra note 45, at 21-24,
88-90, !OS.
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specific, deterrence.312 In the ancient, community-oriented model,
general deterrence was believed to arise from the spectacle of punishment. As Cotton Mather once put it, "notorious Sinners were put
to open penance in this World, that their Souls might be saved ...
and that others admonished by their Example, might be more afraid
to offend."313 Later rationalist literature continued to reiterate this
theme; Bentham referred to it as the "exemplarity" of
punishment.314
From the standpoint of exemplarity, incarceration could well appear to be defective. As English rationalist William Eden warned, a
prison sentence "can[not] communicate the benefit of example, being
in its nature secluded from the eye of the people."315 Yet, in sprawling and bustling cities, spectacles intended to edify the community
were increasingly futile and out of place. "[S]uch exhibitions," Massachusetts reformer Gamaliel Bradford commented in 1821, "are
very limited in their extent. If a person is to be hanged, not one in a
thousand in the community sees the tragedy performed."316
Rather than make this point directly, early advocates of incarceration in Massachusetts found a way to steal the exemplarists' thunder. In perhaps their most artful stroke, the advocates identified
exemplarity as yet another virtue of incarceration. "When a thing is
out of sight, it is soon out of mind," one commentator noted; the
spectacles of the old public punishments had always been palliated
by the brevity of their duration. Long-term incarceration, on the
other hand, would expose offenders "to con[stant] public view."
"[S]uch living examples of justice," another writer agreed, ''would
have a better tendency than the sight of an execution, which is transitory."317 Prison advocates thus disarmed their critics by stressing
the longevity, rather than the drama, of the spectacle of incarceration. Subsequent theorists in Massachusetts did take the final step
and deny the value of spectacle entirely.318 But it is likely that the
striking architecture of the Massachusetts State Prison was inspired
312. See the terminology in J. BENTHAM, supra note 30, at 19-20.
313. C. MATHER, supra note 232, at 141 (emphasis omitted). See id at 148; E .. POWERS,
supra note 9, at 199.
314. J. BENTHAM, supra note 30, at 45-46.
315. W. EDEN, supra note 86, at 50. See J. BENTHAM, supra note 30, at 113.
316. G. BRADFORD, supra note 1, at 7. Cf. J. QUINCY, supra note 256, at 29.
317. The Independent Chronicle, Feb. 14, 1793, at 2; Mass. Centinel, Oct. 20, 1784, at 1.
The root idea probably derived from Beccaria. See C. BECCARIA, supra note 83, at 47-50.
318. G. BRADFORD, supra note 1, at 8-9, 46; J. QUINCY, REMARKS ON SOME OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE LAWS OF MAsSACHUSEITS .AFFECTING POVERTY, VICE, AND CRIME 26-28
(Cambridge 1822); Senate 1831 Mass. Legislative Documents 527-29 (State Library Annex).
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precisely by this conception; it was not a herald of the new, as some
have supposed,319 but a last intellectual vestige of the old. 320
In sum, the penitentiary closed the books on community involvement in punishment because such involvement no longer seemed
constructive: Neither humiliation nor terror could be instilled
through the old media of public participation. Still, public punishment did not completely disappear with the tum to incarceration.
Most ironically, it lived on for a short time within the walls of the
State Prison itself. By statute, violations of prison discipline were
punishable by up to thirty lashes, and a platform was constructed in
the prison yard on which offending prisoners were forced to stand,
holding signs or wearing dunce caps.321 Even as public sanctions
were discarded by society at large, they were retained by the very
institution that was to serve as a substitute. Of course! The penitentiary was one "community'' in Massachusetts still intimate enough
for the old formulas to remain effective.
3. Independence
Rothman argues that the American Revolution was central to the
emergence of the penitentiary. Independence, he asserts, brought
Americans a repugnance for old English institutions, a political freedom to replace them, and most of all an activist spirit that renounced
Calvinist complacency in favor of a belief in man's boundless potential for improvement.322 Rothman's Revolution-as-watershed hypothesis once again assumes that incarceration was un-English and a
product of intellectual innovation. Neither of these assumptions is
valid.
Given the English origins of the rehabituative program,323 it is
hardly plain that the Home Government would have rejected colonial legislation creating a penitentiary. One cannot assume that the
319. See D. ROTHMAN, supra note 50, at 79, 83-84, 89-90.
320. The spectacular value of prison design was stressed in England by Bentham, who
urged construction in or near populous cities, and who favored open admission of the public to
prison grounds, all to further "the exemplarity of imprisonment." Bentham added: "However,
if the prisoners are not seen, the prison is visible. The appearance of this habitation of penitence may strike the imagination and awaken salutary terror. Buildings employed for this purpose ought therefore to have a character of seclusion and restraint, which should take away all
hope of escape, and should say, 'This is the dwelling place of crime.' " J. BENTHAM, supra note
30, at 113, 353-54; J. BENTHAM, supra note 122, at 174; J. BENTHAM, supra note 6, at 32.
321. G. HAYNES, AN HlsTORICAL SKETCH OF THE MASSACHUSETTS STATE PRISON 24-2S,
37 (1870); Act of Mar. 14, 1806, ch. 113, 1804-1805 Mass. Acts 549. Humiliatory punishments
had also been authorized within the Boston workhouse. 1729-1742 BOSTON TOWN RECORDS,
supra note 14, at 239.
322. D. ROTHMAN, supra note 50, at 57-61.
323. See text at notes 123-36 supra.
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Revolution permitted Massachusetts a freedom that had previously
been denied. The crown did retain veto power over provincial legislation and, ironically, had exercised it over several capital statutes
passed in 1692.324 But the acts of 1749 and 1750, which mandated
the sanction of hard labor, drew no apparent resistance. 325 If anything, the Home Government encouraged such developments by issuing several instructions for the construction of workhouses.326 To
the extent that post-revolutionary animus against English institutions affected Massachusetts at all, it could have discouraged resort
to hard labor as much as it promoted it. In any event, Massachusetts' diatribes against English criminal justice were largely confined
to the bloody code, a body of enactments that had no counterpart in
the province.327
Evidence of a perceived need for new sanctions to halt the deterioration of crime control has already been presented. There is little
evidence of a post-revolutionary expectation that the move to incarceration would serve the more ambitious end of eliminating crime.
Just as Rothman overstates the pessimism inherent in the colonial
concept of original sin, so he also exaggerates the optimism inherent
in the post-revolutionary belief in human perfectibility. Once again,
Massachusetts criminologists drew the practical conclusion that
some offenders could be reformed while others could not. 328 Youths
were still believed to stand the best chance.329 Incarceration could
324. See E. POWERS, supra note 9, at 303-05.
325. Even the "Great Law" of Pennsylvania, instituting hard labor comprehensively in
1682, passed with only limited objection. Its repeal in 1718 constituted a presumed tactical
gambit by the Pennsylvania legislature, not a direct-response to royal indignation. See H.
BARNES, THE EVOLUTION OF PENOLOGY IN PENNSYLVANIA 37-39 (1927); Fitzroy, The Punishment of Crime in Provincial Pennsylvania, 60 PA. MAGAZINE 248 n.24, 247-52 (1936). In 1700,
a Home Government review of Pennsylvania statutes resulted in the disallowance of several
criminal laws on the basis of vagueness, overbreadth, technicalities, and (as in Massachusetts)
unreasonable harshness. See note 324 supra, and accompanying text. Significantly, no per se
objection to hard labor as a penalty was raised, see 2 STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 178, at
479-97.
326. Such instructions were issued annually from 1686-1689, and again from 1702-1715. I
ROYAL INSTRUCflONS TO BRITISH COLONIAL GOVERNORS, 1670-1776, at 342-43 (L. Labaree
ed. 1935).
327. q: Mass. Centinel, Jan. 5, 1785, at 3; id., Oct. 16, 1784, at l; Independent Chronicle,
Feb. 14, 1793, at 2. On the bloody code, see note 90 supra. Notice that the British Hard Labor
Act of 1779, see text at note 204 supra, preceded the Massachusetts initiative. It was ignored
by the early American co=entators.
328. REPORT [ON THE STATE PRISON) 7 (1822); REPORT [ON THE STATE PRISON] 7 (May
1830); REPORT [ON THE STATE PRISON] 25-26 (Sept. 1830) (Harvard Law Library) (also
printed in Mass. Legislative Documents 151 (1830)); REPORT [ON THE STATE PRISON) 24
(1831) (also printed in 1832 Mass. Legislative Documents 218 (1832) (State Library Annex));
G. BRADFORD, supra note I, at 10-11, 17-18; J. QUINCY, supra note 256, at 19.
329. G. BRADFORD, supra note 1, at 29-30, 48; J. QUINCY, supra note 256, at 12, 19-20;
Resolve of Nov. 17, 1786, ch. 134, 1786-1787 Mass. Acts 413; 1817-1822 Mass. Legislative
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prevent some, but not all, crime. While the published criminologists
did, on occasion, refer to the hope that all criminals could be reformed and all crime prevented, they invariably rejected it as
unrealistic.330
•
To be sure, some elements ofrevolutionary ideology did facilitate
the transition to the penitentiary. Many post-revolutionary reformers spoke of the project as an "experiment" at a time when all
America was ablaze with self-conscious experimentalism. 331 And
the very fact of a radical change in government led Americans to
review the efficacy of the institutions that they had inherited from
colonial times.332 Many reformers thus coupled their arguments
against the old sanctions with a plea for new ones more "suited to
the genius of a Republic." 333 Still, the social and demographic forces
that had undermined the old sanctions preceded independence by
many decades; the Revolution was not pivotal to the transition.
Perhaps the most unequivocal evidence of the pre-revolutionary
prospect for criminal incarceration is that Massachusetts had seriously considered implementing such a system as early as 1765. In
that year, the legislature appointed a committee "to prepare a Bill to
make the Punishments of Criminals more subservient to the public
Interest, by altering the punishment of certain Felonies, and by providing a Method for a publick Work-House, to which criminals of
Documents no. I, at 7-9 (1817); Senate 1831 Mass. Legislative Documents 523 (State Library
Annex).
330. G. BRADFORD, supra note I, at 4, 10-11, 16-17; Answer of the House, May 1820 Mass.
Resolves 237; Governor's Message, Jan. 30, 1793, 1792-1793 Mass. Acts 694 (object is to
"check the progress of crime"); Remarks, supra note 80, at 23; I PRISON DISCIPLINE SOCIETY,
supra note 117, at 33-35 (1826); 8 id, 29-30 (1833); Tudor, supra note 80, at 418, 435-36;
Austin, Book Review, 10 N. AM. REv. 235, 246-49 (1820) (reviewing W. RoscoE, supra note
189).
331. See, e.g., Dane & Sewall, supra note 100; Governor's Message, Jan. 10, 1822, Jan,,
1822 Mass. Resolves 396; Communication from Gamaliel Bradford, Jan. 27, 1824, Senate Document no. 7029 (1824) (unpassed) (unpublished manuscript, Mass. Archives); G. BRADFORD,
supra note I, at 4-5; G. DE BEAUMONT & A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, ON THE PENITENTIARY SYSTEM
IN THE UNITED STATES AND ITS APPLICATION IN FRANCE 41-42 (H. Lantz ed. 1964) (1st ed.
Paris 1833); E. POWERS, supra note 9, at 243; Governor's Message, June 2, 1828, 1828-1831
Mass. Resolves 23; Governor's Message, Jan, 6, 1830, id 222; Governor's Message, Jan. 8,
1833, 1832-1834 Mass. Resolves 277, 280. On post-revolutionary experimentalism, see E.
MORGAN, Challenge and Response: Reflections on tire Bicentennial, in THE CHALLENGE OF THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 196-218 (1976).
332. Dissolution of the provincial government in no wise required reconsideration of the
criminal code, however. By the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, prerevolutionary statutes remained in effect; the structural inertia of the legislative process was not
affected. MAss. CONST. of 1780, Pt. II, ch. VJ, art. VI.
333. E.g., Governor's Message, Jan. 30, 1793, 1792-1793 Mass. Acts 694; Answer of the
House, Feb. IS, 1793, in id at 242; Mass. Centinel, Jan.
1185, at 3; 2 PRISON DISCIPLINE
SOCIETY, supra note 117, at 56 (1827).
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every Part of the Province may be committed."334 The list of public
servants recruited for this work reads like a Who's Who of the Massachusetts political aristocracy. Among them were Peter Oliver, Justice of the Superior Court (who would become Chief Justice in
1772), Edward Trowbridge, Attorney General of the province (who
would also rise to the bench in 1767), Thomas Hutchinson, Chief
Justice and Lieutenant-Governor of Massachusetts, and James Otis,
former Advocate General and, since 1761, an influential representative from Boston.3 35
As a preliminary step, the committee prepared a report formally
recommending the replacement of capital and corporal punishments
with "long confinement to hard labor in a House of correction," built
"in one of the maritime towns of the province where work of various
kinds may be procured."336 The plan apparently suited the genius of
a province, if not yet a republic, for the legislature instructed the
committee to go ahead and draft the bill.337 But at this point the
project appears to have been dropped. No further entries, not even a
formal discontinuance of the project, found their way into the house
minutes. The plan, and the committee itself, simply disappeared.
The bits and threads of this curious episode are too scant to provide much more than food for speculation.338 In its brief justification of the proposal, the committee did stress the failure of old
sanctions. Were their plan adopted, the members commented, "the
great end of punishment viz the deterring [of] the criminals and
334. 41 HOUSE JOURNAL, supra note 15, at 186.
335. Also drafted to serve on the committee were Oxenbridge Thacher, a respected lawyer
and Otis ally; Samuel Dexter, a merchant who would serve on the Supreme Executive Council
of State during the Revolution; and Joseph Lee, who sat on the Inferior Court of Common
Pleas. w. DAVIS, HISTORY OF THE JUDICIARY OF MASSACHUSETTS 141, 155 (1900); E. WASHBURN, SKETCHES OF THE JUDICIAL HISTORY OF MASSACHUSETTS 221-24, 300-11 (1840).
336. 44 Mass. Archives 538-39 [n.d.] (unpublished manuscript, Mass. Archives).
337. 41 HOUSE JOURNAL, supra note 15, at 230.
338. It is even possible that the 1765 move to institute criminal incarceration in Massachusetts was not the only such initiative before the Revolution. A legislative report prepared in
1822, briefly tracing the heritage of the State Prison, asserted that "At d!iferent times the House
voted to prepare places of confinement for criminals, where they might be kept at hard labor;
and efter the revolution they were confined for this purpose at Castle William." REPORT [ON
THE STATE PRISON] 2 (1822) (emphasis added) (Harvard Law Libary). Nor was Massachusetts
alone in proposing such projects. In 1773, during the period of relative calm that preceded the
Boston Tea Party, Connecticut passed an act to create a "Public Gaol or Work-House" and to
mandate long-term hard labor as the sole penalty for six property crimes. Act of Oct. 1773,
1773-1783 Conn. Acts & Laws 385-89. The revolution followed, however, and during this
period the Connecticut prison lodged mainly political prisoners. At the end of the revolutionary war, in 1782, the prison was abandoned following a destructive fire, and was not rebuilt as
a state prison for criminals until 1790. R. PHELPS, NEWGATE OF CONNECTICUT 5-9 (2d. ed.
Hartford 1844); N. PHELPS, A HISTORY OF THE COPPER MINES AND NEWGATE PRISON 11-18
(Hartford 1845).
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others from committing the like crimes would be better answered
than it is at present."339 That the proposal emerged in the midst of a
severe crime wave, stretching over 1764 and 1765, further suggests its
connection to social desperation.340
Given such a connection, and the prestige of the politicians appointed to deal with the matter, the suddeµ collapse of this first call
for criminal incarceration seems especially puzzling. Nowhere does
the record indicate Home Government action to head off the proposal - on the contrary, Lieutenant-Governor Hutchinson's service on
the committee hints at the blessing of higher imperial officials. 341
The timing, however, is once again suggestive, for the committee's
labors in the spring of 1765 were quickly overshadowed by the
Stamp Act crisis. Soon, James Otis became immersed in leading the
fight against Parliamentary taxation of the American colonies; for
Thomas Hutchinson, a suspected supporter of the tax, the problem
of protecting the people from crime became subordinate to the problem of protecting his person from the crimes of the people. 342 Under
the circumstances, it may not be so surprising that the proposal for
incarceration fell by the wayside. If this hypothesis is correct, then
the temporal proximity between independence and the penitentiary
must be deemed deceptive: Far from precipitating its rise, the American Revolution may instead have delayed it for a generation. 343
V.

EPILOGUE: TO

1830

A. The Legislative Transition

The legislation establishing the Castle Island prison in 1785 did
not spell the end of the old public sanctions in Massachusetts. The
drafters ventured only a tentative step in that direction. Although
the old punishments seemed to be failing, the alternative of large
scale incarceration - whatever its promise - remained untested.
The experimental zeal of the new Commonwealth government did
not extend to an immediate and total break with the colonial past.
339. See note 336 supra.
340. Boston Gazette, Sept. 27, 1764, at 3; id, Nov. 12, 1764, at 3; Grand Jury Charge by
Hutchinson, C.J., Super. Ct., Aug. 1766, in J. QUINCY, supra note 43, at 223.
341. On the other hand, the combination of Thomas Hutchinson and James Otis did not
bode well for the smooth operation of the committee. On the gulf of animosity that separated
these two politicians, see E. MORGAN & H. MORGAN, THE STAMP ACT CRISIS 266 (rev. ed.
1962).
342. See generally id
343. Perversely, the Revolution may have done more to stimulate the rise of criminal incarceration in England than it did in America. See note 429 infra and accompanying text. See
also note 338 supra.
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Twenty-four categories of crimes were made subject to hard labor on Castle Island,344 yet, with two minor exceptions,345 the sanction constituted an alternative to, not a replacement for, the old
public punishments. The new statutes simply added hard labor to
the judge's list of options. Even where hard labor replaced capital
punishment, the public sanctions were resurrected as alternatives.
Indeed, many of the new provisions significantly widened the latitude of judges to choose among traditional punishments. Whereas
arson against a building other than a dwelling had previously been
punishable by :whipping only, the revised statute of 1785, with typical inclusiveness, authorized sentences to hard labor "for life or
years," the pillory, whipping, imprisonment in the gaol (again, any
term), binding to good behavior, fining, "or to any or all of these
punishments, according to the nature and aggravation of the
offence."346
What can one make of such a statute? Is it a sign of legislative
uncertainty, born of social upheaval? Or does it represent a recognition that, in a time of change, the judicial system would benefit from
a maximum of leeway? Whatever the answer, judges retained their
wide discretion to choose among sanctions for some twenty years and they hardly availed themselves of every opportunity to impose
hard labor.347 The Massachusetts, legal system eased.its way from
pillory to penitentiary.348
344. These were: attempted robbery, fraud, buying or receiving a convict's clothing, assisting or harboring an escapee, accessory after the fact to rape, sodomy, robbery, arson, or burglary, accessory before or after the fact to larceny, three grades of forgery, three crimes against
the Massachusetts Bank, three grades of arson, and five grades of larceny. Act of Mar. 11,
1785, ch. 58, 1784-1785 Mass. Acts 157-58; Act of Mar. 9, 1785, ch. 52, id. at 135; Act of Mar.
14, 1785, ch. 63, id at 167; Act of Mar. 1S, 1785, ch. 65, id. at 169-70; Act ofMar. 15, 1785, ch.
66, id at 171-74; Act of Nov. 1, 1785, ch. 21, id. at 473-74.
345. Prescriptions of hard labor for buying or receiving a convict's clothing, and for assisting or harboring an escapee, were alternative to a fine only. Id at 167.
346. Id at 157.
347. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Ewers, Sup. Jud. Ct., Aug., 1785 ff. 83-84 (two indictments); Commonwealth v. Cleaves, Sup. Jud. Ct., Nov. 1785, ff. 324-26 (two indictments);
Commonwealth v. Tack, Sup. Jud. Ct., May 178S, f. 222. (Suffolk County Court House).
348. The legislative treatment of theft is an interesting side-light to this transitional phase.
Under the provincial statute in force since 1736, common thieves had been subject to a session
on the gallows with a rope around the neck, a whipping, and treble damages payable to the
aggrieved. 2 PROV. LAWS, supra note 12, at 838. (fhe gallows provision was rarely enforced,
see, e.g., King v. Allen, Super. Ct., June 17S2, ff. 64-65 (Suffolk County Court House)). The
treble damages award, ostensibly a form of civil compensation, had also served as a tacit
mechanism of rehabilitation when translated into a term of service. See notes 244-48 supra
and accompanying text. The larceny statute of 1785 reflected the decline of the convict labor
market not by abolishing restitution outright - that decision was not taken until 180S - but
by making it interchangeable with hard labor on Castle Island. There remained, apparently, a
hope that some offenders could be disposed of (or were solvent): the law still provided that all
offenders were to make treble restitution in t:ither specie or service. Only if the aggrieved
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It arrived there in due course. Over its fourteen-year history, the
proved unable to sell the offender within thirty days was the offender to perform up to three
years hard labor "without sentencing him to make satisfaction."
(The quoted explanatory phrase appears in the manuscript draft of the bill, but was omitted (by mistake?) from the printed version, though no deletion was authorized in the bill of
amendments. Compare Act of Mar. IS, 1785, ch. 66, 1784-1785 id. at 171, with 1785 Acts, ch.
66 (passed) {unpublished manuscript, Mass. Archives). The quoted phrase is in fact critical to
the interpretation of the act (i.e., the offender is not "sold" to the state, nor do the profits from
his labor adhere to the aggrieved), without which it would have stood ambiguous; in any event,
it was without question interpreted accordingly.)
The structure of this act invites notice for a number of reasons. For one thing, it underscores once again the rehabilitative intentions of the drafters. Had effective restitution lain
uppermost in their minds, the drafters would have consigned the proceeds of convict labor
under state auspices to the aggrieved, or simply required the aggrieved himself to assume
custody. As drafted, if the aggrieved failed to sell the convict within thirty days, he forfeited
his rights to monetary recovery entirely. If, on the other hand, the drafters had aimed for more
effective deterrence, the obvious move would have been to pile a sentence to hard labor on top
of the restitution requirement. By correlating the two sentences, the drafters ensured that the
offender would perform a set term of labor, one way or the other. Labor was the common
denominator, esteemed, one must conclude, for its rehabituative powers first of all.
If the larceny statute is notable for its ideological underpinnings, it is equally striking for its
anthropological implications. Here we have a statute that mandates a criminal penalty plus a
restitutionary payment to the victim - but which provided that if restitution proves infeasible,
a further criminal penalty (hard labor) will be tacked on in its stead. The result is a thorough
confounding of the concepts of criminal and civil liability, for all appearances a prime speci•
men of rusticum judiciam sure to warm the heart of any remaining exponents of the "frontier
theory" of American law. (The "frontier theory" holds that early American law was rude and
untechnical due to the general scarcity of trained lawyers in the colonies. The classic state•
ment of the theory appears in Reinsch, The English Common Law in the Early American Colo•
nies in I SELECT EsSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 367-415 (1907-1909). The
theory is generally disavowed today, and was the target of one of Professor Goebel's better
known scoffs: "that pons asinorum of American historiography•.." Goebel, King's Law and
Local Custom in Seventeenth Century New England, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 420 (1931).)
Did the drafters of 1785 actually lack the sophistication necessary to distinguish civil from
criminal liability? Of course not. As early as 1662, Massachusetts legislation had, for example,
drawn a legal line between prisoners for debt (or "any persons . . . Committed to Prison in
any Civil Action") and gaol inmates who faced criminal charges, by prescribing special provisions for the former group. COL. LAWS, supra note 13, § 2, at 6-7.
The statute of 1785 therefore indicates something different: a cheerful willingness among
early American legislators to disregard the finer points of legal technicality, when such technicality obstructed, or was simply irrelevant to, American needs. There may be, then, a touch of
rightness in the frontier theory, after all - a reformulation I should like to christen the "missing link" theory of American law.
(One critic of the frontier theory has argued that if a period of untechnical law had prtlceded the common law in America, then the two must have been separated by a conscious
point of "reception" - but no such link can be found. See Chafee, Colonial Courts and the
Common Law, in EsSAYS IN THE HISTORY OF EARLY AMERICAN LAW 74-76 (D. Flaherty ed.
1969). But if early law was, in some instances, untechnical by design, no subsequent intellectual reception would have been necessary; for another possible example of the phenomenon,
see Konig, Community Custom and the Common Law: Social Change and .Development ofLand
Law in Seventeenth-Century Massachusells, 18 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 137 (1974).)
Whatever we choose to call it, the statute of 1785 left the status of the treble damage award
quite ambiguous. The issue reached the Supreme Judicial Court in Commonwealth v. Andrews, a case whose ingenious argumentation must be abbreviated here. Commonwealth v.
Andrews, 2 Mass. 13 (1806). In Andrews, the accused was charged with receiving stolen goods.
Under the larceny statute of 1785, receivers were liable to the "like punishment" as the thief
himself. Act of Mar. 15, 1785, ch. 66, 1784-1785 Mass. Acts 173. So the issue was raised
squarely: did "like punishment" cover only the whipping, or did it include treble damages as
well? The attorney general, taking the latter position, argued inter alia that the treble damage
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Castle Island prison entertained an average of fifty prisoners at a
time, "criminals of almost every species, and from every part of the
Commonwealth."349 By 1797, the sanction of hard labor had become sufficiently familiar to enter the vocabulary of banal humor. 350
But it had also won the confidence of persons in high places. "I believe it will not be doubted," Governor Sumner lectured the legislature, "that the Commonwealth, since the Institution of that mode of
punishment, has been abundantly more free from high-handed offences, than at any former period."351 The question of the sanction's
future came to the fore in 1798, when the federal government prevailed upon the state to convert Castle Island into a federal military
fortification. By allocating funds to build a far larger prison at
Charlestown from the ground up, 352 Massachusetts signalled a quantum leap in its commitment to the sanction of incarceration.353
The criminal statutes of the Commonwealth were revised for the
second time in twenty years to r.eflect this new commitment. The legislature appointed Nathan Dane and Justice Samuel Sewall to draft
a code "applicable . . . to the spirit and nature of the proposed esaward should be equated with its alternative: confinement to hard labor. "Will it be said that
this is no part of the punishment?" he demanded. The defense counsel, arguing for the contrary construction, denoted the hard labor contingency inter alia "an inducement to the defendant [thief] to make the satisfaction." The Court, however, held for the state: restitution
had been transformed into a criminal sanction. 2 Mass. 13, 27, 28 (emphasis added). See
Smith v. Drew, 5 Mass. 513 (1809). (Both opinions imply that the restitution requirement
would have been categorized differently before the contingency provision of the 1785 act was
added.) For an early case in this line, in accord with the later holdings, see Commonwealth v.
Cleaves, Sup. Jud. Ct., Nov. 1785, ff. 324-26 (2 indictments).
This issue was, in any event, mooted in 1805, when the provision for treble damages was
eliminated from the code. Act of Mar. 16, 1805, ch. 143, 1804-1805 Mass. Acts. 240.
349. Governor's Message, Nov. 5, 1785, ch. 39, 1784-1785 Mass. Acts 755. See note 191
supra.
350. "The punishment of the man of ninety-three for a rape, it seems, is imprisonment for
two years, and to be kept at hard labor! This proceeds upon a very nice calculation, a rape at
ninety-three equal to two years hard labor/" Massachusetts Mercury, Mar. 28, 1797, reprinted
in Trivia, 3 ser. 36 WM. & MARY Q. 460 (1979) (emphasis in original).
351. Governor's Message, Jan. 11, 1799, 1798-1799 Mass. Acts. 636. Castle Island also
earned an international reputation. See s. STEARNS, THE AMERICAN ORACLE 258-59 (London
1791). Massachusetts' position in the vanguard of the penitentiary movement in America has
often been overlooked. In fact, Castle Island was the first operational experiment in criminal
incarceration in post-Revolutionary America, preceding both Pennsylvania (1786) and New
York (1796). Cf. note 338 supra.
352. Castle Island had likely been selected as the first site for criminal incarceration because its pre-exisiting facilities minimized the size of the requisite capital investment. Castle
Island had received special prisoners on occasion since colonial times. E. POWERS, supra note
9, at 220-21. The initial fl.ow of inmates was accommodated in the existing barracks, although
an additional "gaol" was soon constructed on the Island. Governor's Message, Nov. 5, 1785,
ch. 39, 1784-1785 Mass. Acts 756; Governor's Message, Nov. 7, 1786, ch. 78, 1786-1787 Mass.
Acts 950.
353. See notes 65-67 supra, and accompanying text.
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tablishment."354 Adopted to coincide with the opening of the State
Prison in 1805, the new code .finally abandoned the public sanctions
that had been used in Massachusetts for almost two centuries. From
that point on, all crimes were punishable by .fine, incarceration, or
the death penalty, in the vein of all modem American statutory
schemes.355
There remains one curiosity in this legislative transition: the lag
in efforts to formalize it. A catch-all statute making hard labor the
alternative sanction for every crime meriting corporal punishment
was passed by the House in 1785 but rejected by the Senate. 356 This
statute did not become law until 1813, years after the corporal punishments had been effectively interred.357 Meanwhile, a law to formally abolish the old punishments was drafted by Dane and Sewall
as part of their code of 1805, but it too died in the Senate, even as the
rest of their statutes were passed.358 Corporal punishments were not
abolished de Jure until 1826.359 Just what caused the legislators to
delay these enactments is difficult to say. It was apparently less jarring to tum the pages of the old laws than to close the book on them
entirely.
B. Pattems of Ideology

The prison on Castle Island conformed to the workhouse tradition. Congregate hard labor by day and congregate confinement by
night set the tone of the facility. But in the years following that
prison's inception, the ideological innovations then dawning in England began to infiltrate Massachusetts. Harmonious in 1785, the theory of carceral rehabilitation soon developed divergent strands, and
the proponents of each alternative fought for control of the state's
prison program.
The new ideological element that caused all the commotion was
solitary confinement and the theory of reclamation. Not a whisper
of this approach was audible in 1785; but humanitarian prison litera354. Resolve of Feb. 23, 1804, ch. 108, 1802-1803 Mass. Acts & Resolves 906-07. For the
duo's report, see Dane & Sewall, ~pro note 100.
355. See 1804-1805 Mass. Acts 172, 179, 202, 209, 240, 504, 517, 522, 546.
356. Senate Document no. 333 (1785) (unpassed) (unpublished manuscript, Mass.
Archives).
357. Act of Feb. 27, 1813, ch. 134, 1807-1816 Mass. Acts 427.
358. Senate Document no. 3283 (1805) (unpassed) (unpublished document, Mass.
Archives); Dane & Sewall, supra note 100.
359. Act of Feb. 28, 1826, ch. 105, 1826-1828 Mass. Acts 174.
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ture rapidly became available in Massachusetts and elsewhere.360 In
fact, another state's effort may have served to focus attention on the
new ideology. In 1790, the Pennsylvania legislature ordered the construction of an inner block of solitary cells within the Philadelphia
prison at Walnut Street. Whereas most prisoners suffered hard labor,
"the more hardened and atrocious offenders" were thereafter to undergo a solitary regime. 361 Caleb Lownes, a Pennsylvania reformer,
soon published a pamphlet extolling the Walnut Street facility and
its system of solitary confinement. When in 1799 the Massachusetts
legislature began to plan a replacement for Castle Island, it ordered
three hundred copies of Lownes' pamphlet.362
Still, the legislature proceeded cautiously. The committee appointed to study the Walnut Street plan was impressed,363 but the
representatives decided only that the Massachusetts Prison should
"be constructed with interior cells and apartments [,] that the Legislature may adopt if they see fit, the mode of confinement in solitary
apartments without any alteration in said buildings."364 An inroad
had nonetheless been made, and when Dane and Sewall drafted the
new code in 1805, they provided for a combination of the two
schemes. Upon conviction under any criminal statute mandating incarceration in the State Prison, the judge was to set two successive
terms: an initial term of solitary confinement, and a subsequent term
of hard labor, each to be served within the Charlestown facility. 365
This dual sentencing structure may well have been fashioned to satisfy both of the emerging ideological camps.3 66
360. See, e.g., the Howard extracts in 1 MAss. MAGAZINE 639-40 (1789), continued in 2 id.
at 476-78, 685-88 (1790); Tudor, supra note 80, at 440.
361. H. BARNES, supra note 325, at 118-20.
362. Lownes, supra note 178; Senate Document no. 2445 (1799) (unpassed). This narrative
corrects E. POWERS, supra note 9, at 242. Lownes was a member of the Board of Inspectors of
the Walnut Street prison. His pamphlet is by and large descriptive and does not contain an
elabo~ation of the underlying ideology.
363. Report Respecting Convicts, supra note 30.
364. Resolve of Feb. 19, 1799, ch. 135, 1798-1799 Mass. Acts 273.
365. See note 355 supra.
366. No surviving legislative history speaks to this matter, nor does the Dane-Sewall report
to the legislature offer any sort of explanation for the extraordinary sentencing structure contained in the drafters' bills. Oddly, the Dane-Sewall report never once mentions solitary confinement, only "imprisonment and confinement to hard labor'' (imprisonment in this context
almost certainly referred to imprisonment in local gaols mandated for some minor offenses,
not to solitary confinement See, e.g., 1804-1805 Mass. Acts 202), Dane & Sewall, supra note
100. But years later, Dane complained that "When Judge Sewall & myself drew the bills
enacted for governing the State prison[,] we fully expected that adequate means would be
provided for giving full effect to solitary confinement." Letter from Nathan Dane to Josiah
Quincy (May 6, 1822) in Quincy Papers, reel 40 (unpublished document, Mass. Historical
Society).
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If this was a compromise, it did not endure. By the beginning of
the 1820s, different reformist circles vied for influence on the Prison's
internal management. At one extreme stood the Board of Directors
of the Massachusetts State Prison. Thoroughgoing advocates of solitary confinement, the Board members insisted that the only way to
reform a convict was ''to turn the mind in upon itself [and] awaken
remorse" - in short, to bring about a "change of heart."367 From
the Directors' perspective, hard labor had no therapeutic value. On
the contrary, labor obstructed the process of arousing remorse, by
offering "relief. . . [from] the painful monotony of self-contemplation."368 Hard labor did, however, generate revenue to help support
the facility. On this basis, the Directors concluded that "economy
and reformation are adverse objects in the establishment of the Massachusetts State Prison. They .are antagonistic principles . . .
[S]training the one relaxes the other." The problem was to bring the
two into some reasonable balance, so that neither was altogether
sacrificed.369
At the other extreme stood Gamaliel Bradford, warden of the
State Prison from 1812 to 1824. His was the voice of the rehabituative tradition, under which hard labor remained the be-all and endall of the rehabilitative process: "Industry is the nurse of virtue, and
the enemy of vice . . . . [T]o overcome habits of idleness, and beget
a custom and taste for labour, would be the most acceptable offering
which could be laid on the altars of religion and morality."37° From
this perspective, both economy and reformation flowed from the
same source and were not antagonistic principles at all.371
Though well-acquainted with the theory of solitary confinement,
Bradford remained decidedly skeptical of its rehabilitative powers.
This skepticism emanated, perhaps, from the lingering influence of
Puritan axioms. 372 One of the most essential of these axioms was
361. Remarks, supra note 80, at 4, 21-22.
368. Id. at 4-5.
369. Id. at 4, 9-10, 27. For other expositions of this philosophy, see J. QUINCY, supra note
318, at 20-26; 1817-1822 Mass. Legislative Documents no. 2, at 3 (1818) (State Library Annex);
Austin, supra note 330, at 249-50, 259.
370. G. BRADFORD, supra note 1, at 13, 20, 24, 45. See the report of a committee investigating alternative American prison systems, 1817-1822 Mass. Legislative Documents no. I, at
8-13 (1817).
371. G. BRADFORD,supra note 1, at 19, 24, 38-39; 1817-1822 Mass. Legislative Documents
no. 1, at 17-18 (1817) (State Library Annex); 3 PRISON DISCIPIJNE SOCIETY, supra note 117, at
14-15 (1828).
372. Edmund S. Morgan has argued that the revolutionary generation perpetuated, and
often pursued policies directly shaped by, Puritan values. See Morgan, The Puritan Ethic and
the American Revolution, 3 ser. 24 WM. & MARY Q. 3 (1967) (reprinted in E. MORGAN, supra
note 331, at 88).

May 1982]

Pillory to Penitentiary

1253

that men must live within their sinful world, and not seek to escape
it.373 Bradford echoed that
Man was made for society, and although some men, for pious purposes, have withdrawn themselves from the world - and to avoid the
corruptions which abound in it, have shut themselves up in monasteries or caves, yet it is not allowed that the cause of religion and virtue
is promoted by such retirement .... [A] long confinement in total
solitude, might destroy [the convict's] social feelings, and produce a
sort of stupid apathy which would render him very unfit for an useful
or happy member of any society.374
In addition, Calvinist perceptions of human frailty suggested that attempts to influence fundamental moral values held little promise of
success.375 Finally, a term of idle solitary confinement ran counter to
the work ethic.376 Bradford concluded that, because of its relative
severity, solitary confinement could play a useful role within the
prison - but only as a deterrent against internal offenses, crimes
committed by persons already serving terms of hard labor.377

In short, both camps were prepared to accept a combination of
solitary confinement and hard labor - but for different reasons and
with different intentions. For advocates ofrehabituation, hard labor
meant therapy as well as economy, and solitary confinement served
373. This theme is treated extensively in E. MORGAN, supra note 9.
374. G. BRADFORD, supra note 1, at 19. Cf. note 149 supra and accompanying text. But
Bradford's philosophical premise was no longer shared universally in Massachusetts. See, e.g.,
Ode to Solitude, 4 MAss. MAGAZINE 517 (1792).
375. "[W]hat faith may be placed in resolutions (let them, when made, be perfectly sincere,) formed in the bosom of solitude, against the temptations of the world when that solitude
is at an end? It requires but a slight knowledge of the human heart to answer this question. St.
Paul has answered it- 'when I would do good evil is present with me.'" G. BRADFORD, supra
note 1, at 19. See G. DE BEAUMONT & A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 331, at 90. The early
Puritans had sought to enlighten the consciences of offenders, but only those of community
, members whose histories and characters were well known, and whose subsequent progress
could be carefully scrutinized. See notes 228-32 supra and accompanying text.
376. A term of reclamatory solitary confinement would ''leave the men enfeebled, and
unable to work, when they left the Prison; and as ignorant of any useful business, as when they
were committed." In contrast to the gloomy silence of a solitary prison, institutions of labor
reverberated with ''the busy hum of industry." 2 PRisoN DISCIPLINE SOCIETY, supra note 117,
at 58, 66 (1827); G. BRADFORD, supra note 1, at 19; Rl!PoRT [ON THE STATE PRisoN] 12-13
(May 1830) (Harvard Law Library). See note 399 infra and accompanying text. Cf. G. DE
BEAUMONT & A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 331, at 57, 84 (mirroring English humanitarian
theory, note 153 supra and accompanying text).
377. G. BRADFORD, supra note 1, at 47-48. See 1817-1822 Mass. Legislative Documents
no. 1, at 20 (1817); id no. 2, at 3 (1818) (State Library Annex); G. BRADFORD, supra note 67, at
36; Act of Mar. 14, 1806, ch. 113, 1804-1805 Mass. Acts 549-50. The idea of using solitary
confinement as a deterrent may have originated with John Howard, see J. HOWARD, supra
note 3, at 40, and it has continued to be used in that capacity to the present day. Some
advocates of rehabituation did allow that the "reflection" and "remorse" induced by solitude
could have a positive impact, but they did not stress it, see G. BRADFORD, supra note 1, at 19; 1
PRISON DISCIPLINE SOCIETY, supra note 117, at 8 (1826); Governor's Message, Jan. 2, 1828,
1824-1828 Mass. Resolves 635; Governor's Message, June 2, 1828, 1828-1831 Mass. Resolves
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as a deterrent; the object of the exercise was to break bad habits. For
advocates of reclamation, hard labor meant economy only, and solitary confinement served as the therapy; the object of the exercise was
to reach the offender's heart. This conceptual disagreement ultimately caused trouble within the prison administration. The Directors made "repeated representations" to the legislature for funds to
extend the use of solitary confinement; the Warden favored other
priorities.378 An overlap in the administrative responsibilities of the
contending factions further aggravated matters. 379 By 1824, the two
sides were not on speaking terms, and the Directors sought to have
the Warden's office abolished.3 BO
Even as rival advocates locked horns over policy, they also
locked arms in a rear-guard action against die-hard opponents of the
penitentiary system. Like Castle Island, the State Prison at Charlestown had been devoted from the beginning "to the purposes of safe
confinement and penitentiary reformation,"381 and like Castle Island, the State Prison had therefore been subject from the beginning
to extensive regulations and oversight.382 Had these been the only
378. Introduction of extended solitary confinement would have required structural
changes, for the solitary cells proved unfit for long terms of confinement. As a consequence,
judges generally restricted the solitary confinement stage of prison sentences to ten days or less.
J. QUINCY, supra note 318, at 20-22, 25; Remarks, supra note 80, at 20-21; 1817-1822 Mass.
Legislative Documents no. 2, at 3 (1818); id. no. I, at 20 (1817) (State Library Annex). Bradford opposed construction of additional cells for full time solitary confinement, though he
favored construction of the smaller cells necessary for separate confinement at night. Significantly, Bradford's first priority was greater space for the prison workshops. G. BRADFORD,
supra note I, at 49-51; Letter from G. Bradford to W. Roscoe (Sept. 10, 1823) in W. RoscoE,
A BRIEF STATEMENT OF THE CAUSES WHICH HAVE LED To THE ABANDONMENT OP THE
CELEBRATED SYSTEM OP PENITENTIARY DISCIPLINE IN SOME OF THE UNITED STATES OP
AMERICA 52-53 (Liverpool, n.d.) [c.1827); Co=unication from Gamaliel Bradford to the
Legislature, Jan. 27, 1824, Senate Document no. 7029 (1824) (unpassed) (unpublished manuscript, Mass. Archives).
379. Both parties complained of this problem. G. BRADFORD, supra note 1, at 33-34, 49;
Remarks, supra note 80, at 18-19; see 1 PRISON DISCIPLINE SOCIETY, supra note 117, at 29-31
(1826); 3 id. 37-39 (1828).
380. See G. HAYNES, supra note 321, at 45-46; Remarks, supra note 80, at 18-19 (claiming
to be on good terms with Bradford, personally). Haynes speculates that Bradford's state of
"indisposition" may have caused the conflict; he had sickened, and died in 1824.
381. Resolve of June 23, 1802, ch. 54, 1802-1803 Mass. Acts 380-81.
382. Even before the State Prison was constructed, the subject of its proposed internal
administration (or "prison discipline") had been recognized as "intimately connected with the
peace & welfare of the Public." Report Respecting Convicts, supra note 30. For subsequent
reaffirmations, see Answer of the Senate, Jan. 1807, Jan. 1807 Mass. Resolves 6; Answer of the
Senate, June 15, 1811, May 1811 Mass. Resolves 193; Governor's Message, May 31, 1817, May
1817 Mass. Resolves 397-98; Answer of the House, n.d., id. at 404. The object was expressly to
avoid the shortcomings of the local gaols, Answer of the House, Jan. 18, 1804, 1802-1803 Mass.
Acts 875; Governor's Message, Jan. 13, 1804, id. at 980-81. Thus, plans for the structure of the
State Prison were carefully reviewed for their efficacy, and reco=endations put forward for
frequent inspection and a code of internal bylaws. Id. at 875, 980-81; note 67 supra. These
reco=endations were followed: A physician and chaplain were appointed to the State Prison
staff, and a Board of Directors was established to furnish the facility, appoint its officers, write
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similarities between the two institutions, all might have been smooth
sailing for the early advocates. But unfortunately, the State Prison
also shared a third characteristic of Castle Island: for all the government's interest, it was an administrative fiasco.
A generation after the State Prison opened, Governor Levi Lincoln looked back and demanded, ''Whence it arises, that disappointment in results so often follows the best promises of success, in the
affairs of that establishment."383 The disappointment had not been
long in coming. From at least 1809, the prison had been plagued by
inmate violence, escapes, and expenses far in excess of earnings. In
1813, the inmates contrived to burn their workshops, and three years
later they staged a full-scale insurrection that resulted in one death.
The frequency of recommitments, moreover, cast doubt on the facility's rehabilitative capability.384
By 1818, a popular reaction had set in. Rothman·,contends that
the early administrative failure of American penitentiaries helped to
draw attention away from statutory schemes of deterrence ap.d toward an emerging ideal of rehabilitation..385 In Massachusetts, at
least, precisely the opposite occurred: The legislators considered
abandoning "the beautiful and brilliant theory of reclaiming the unprincipled," as ''vain and illusory," and substituting a policy intended "to deter and restrain the atrocity of o.ffenders."386 Many of
the critics favored an increase in both the length of sentences and in
the harshness of the prison regime. A few refugees from the seventhe bylaws ("not repugnant to the laws of the Commonwealth"), and inspect the Prison
monthly. In addition, the Governor, Council, and Supreme Judicial Court justices were all to
make an annual inspection of the Prison. Act of June 15, 1805, ch. 23, 1804--1805 Mass. Acts
427; Act of Mar. 14, 1806, ch. 113, 1804--1805 Mass. Acts 546; G. Haynes,supra note 321, at 2527. Sketchy at first, the bylaws of the State Prison were ultimately elaborated in detail and
periodically updated. Id at 17; G. BRADFORD, supra note 67, at 27-37; Remarks, supra note
80, at 44-62; LAWS OF THE COMMONWEALTH FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE STATE PRISON
(Boston 1839).
383. Governor's Message, Jan. 2, 1828, 1824-1828 Mass. Resolves 632. See, e.g., 1817-1822
Mass. Legislative Documents no. 2, at 3 (1818) (State Library Annex).
384. G. HAYNES, supra note 321, at 20-38; Governor's Message, Jan. 25, 1811, Jan. 1811
Mass. Resolves 66; Governor's Message, June 7, 1811, May 1811 Mass. Resolves 189; Answer
of the Senate, June 15, 1811, id at 193; Governor's Message, Jan. 8, 1812, Jan. 1812 Mass.
Resolves 282; 1817-1822 Mass. Legislative Documents no. 1, at 4 (1817) (State Library Annex);
G. BRADFORD, supra note 67, at 9-12; REPORT [ON THE STATE PRISON) 1 (1827) (Harvard Law
Library). In 1825, it was discovered that counterfeiters had been carrying on their trade within
the State Prison's walls. 2 PRISON DISCIPLINE SOCIETY,supra note 117, at 11-12, 21-23 (1827).
In the area of prison hygiene, however, the State Prison did achieve a record of sustained
success - prison mortality was consistently low. See, e.g., May 1811 Mass. Resolves 189; 2
PR!sON DISCIPLINE SOCIETY, supra note 117, at 35 (1827).
385. D. ROTHMAN, supra note 50, at 62.
386. Answer of the Senate, n.d., May 1818 Mass. Resolves 587; Governor's ~essage, June
2, 1818, id at 578-79; ·1817-1822 Mass. Legislative Documents no. 2, at 2 (1818) (State Library
Annex).
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teenth century even advocated a return to the ancient public punishments, scrapping criminal incarceration entirely. 387
This popular reaction against the prison brought the rival advocates together. All advocates in unison defended the penitentiary's
potential for rehabilitation by emphasizing the number of inmates
who never returned, as opposed to the recommitment rate. 388 All
advocates in unison underscored the penitentiary's value as a means
of incapacitation.389 And all advocates, though not quite in unison,
disputed the adequacy of a system of criminal law that relied entirely
on deterrence, as some legislators had proposed.390
Prison advocates in Massachusetts also wrestled with the old
problem of reconciling rehabilitation and deterrence. A charge repeatedly leveled by armchair critics of the State Prison ("men who
sit quietly over a fire or round a luxurious table on a cold winter
day'') was that, the facility lacked sufficient hardship to terrify prospective offenders. The advocates responded by detailing the dreadful severity of prison life and recounting the long record of escape
attempts. What few amenities the prison offered were essential to
the rehabilitative process, the advocates explained; any further
harshness would tip the precarious balance.391
All of the advocates also defended the :fiscal responsibility of the
State Prison, in spite of its persistent deficits. Like the English humanitarians, American advocates portrayed the penitentiary as a
philanthropic enterprise. The costs represented "a beneficent gratu381. Id no. 1, at 8, 15 (1817) (State Library Annex); id no. 2, at 1-3 (1818); REPORT [ON
THE STATE PRISON] 2-3 (1822) (Harvard Law Library); Rl!PoRT [ON THE STATE PRISON] l
(1827); Tudor, supra note 80, at 423-25; Austin, supra note 330, at 245.
388. G. BRADFORD, supra note 1, at 17-18; Remarks, supra note 80, at 22.
389. G. BRADFORD, supra note 1, at 11-12, 15-16; G. BRADFORD, supra note 67, at IS;
Remarks, supra note 80, at 3-4.
390. Whereas Bradford demonstrated the inadequacy of deterrence on the basis of sensational psychology, the Directors did so on the basis of religious notions of the "lost soul."
Compare G. BRADFORD, supra note 1, at 15-16, and Rl!PoRT [ON THE STATE PRISON] 13-14
(May 1830) (Harvard Law Library), with Remarks, supra note 80, at 25-26.
391. Remarks, supra note 80, at 22-25 (quote at 24); G. BRADFORD, supra note I, at 14-15,
31-33; Rl!PoRT [ON THE STATE PRlsON] 8-9 (1822); Rl!PoRT [ON THE STATE PRISON] 11-12
(May 1830) (Harvard Law Library); Tudor, supra note 80, at 434-35. Like English reformers,
Bradford believed it therapeutically necessary for each prisoner to be "made to understand,
that this punishment has been inllicted from necessity, and with a view to his own improvement; that he has brought it upon himself; that the government can have no pleasure in chastisement, and that it holds out encouragement, and rewards for good behaviour, for the very
purpose of avoiding the painful ·necessity of punishing." G. BRADFORD, supra note 1, at 47.
Cf. note 155 supra and accompanying text. In its quest to discourage ''revengeful" attitudes,
however, the State Prison was not always successful. See G. BRADFORD, supra note 67, at 10;
Report [on the State Prison] 7 (May 1830). The criticism that incarceration lacked sufficient
severity was so outlandish as to cause some of the usually patient advocates to lose their tempers: "Another error which it might be presumed a moment's reflection would destroy, has
been propagated with thoughtless alacrity.•••" Rl!PoRT [ON THE STATE PRISON] 8 (1822).
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ity . . . which humanity and heaven required,'' and were alleged to
be fewer per capita than those of other social projects borne by the
state.392 To satisfy persons unmoved by such appeals, the advocates
also insisted that what appeared to be red ink on the State Prison's
balance sheet was in reality black. As Warden Bradford explained, a
system of incarceration and hard labor ensured that each offender at
least "produces something." Without it he produced nothing, "and
probably would have been twice as much damage to society as the
amount of all the expenses of the Prison establishment." Consequently, any amount that he earned "ought to be considered as clear
gain to the State."393 But even as advocates argued the sufficiency of
prison labor, they were whipsawed by the converse accusation that
convicts "work too much,'' undercutting the market for goods produced by free labor. So, from the other comer of their mouths, the
advocates depicted the economic impact of prison production as
minimal.394
The problem of maintaining the rehabilitative integrity of the
penitentiary system could not be as easily dismissed. Critics charged
that the State Prison ha<;! become "a sink of corruption;" a collection
point where novices in crime learned the state of the art from older,
more accomplished, offenders. Contact between prisoners, so the argument ran, harmed inmates morally more than the rehabilitative
therapy helped them.395 In fact, as early as 1799, a legislative com392. Remarks, supra note 80, at 9-11; J. QUINCY, supra note 318, at 12, 23-26; G. BRADFORD, supra note 67, at 15; Austin, supra note 330, at 250-51, 257, 259.
393. G. BRADFORD, supra note 1, at 12-13, 16-17; Remarks, supra note 80, at 3; Austin,
supra note 330, at 252,259. C.f. 1817-1822 Mass. Legislative Documents no. 1 at 7, 15 (1817)
(State Library Annex). William Tudor spiced the argument with a dash of ridicule:
To that class of economists, and unfortunately they are not few in number, who are apt to
look at this branch of legislation exclusively in reference to expense, and to calculate
every thing only in dollars and cents, it may be suggested, that the hanging of one culprit
costs the co=unity in the loss of labor of the thousands who flock to behold it, a thousand times as much as it would to keep him in prison a century.
Tudor, supra note 80, at 431-434.
394. Remarks, supra note 80, at 13, 26-27; G. BRADFORD, supra note 1, at 45; R.EPoRT [ON
nm STATE PRISoN] 13-14 (1822) (Harvard Law Library). This compWnt was also heard in
England. Henriques, supra note 165, at 67.
395. Prisoner association was also believed to facilitate collusive disruptions and escape
attempts. See 1817-1822 Mass. Legislative Documents no. 1, at 7 (1817) (State Library Annex); 2 PRISON DISCIPLINE SocIETY, supra note 117, at 58 (1827); Governor's Message, Jan. 9,
1822, Jan. 1822 Mass. Resolves 392-97; Governor's Message, Jan. 4, 1826, 1824-1828 Mass.
Resolves 252; Governor's Message, Jan. 6, 1830, 1828-1831 Mass. Resolves 223-24. See generally J. QUINCY, supra note 318, at 20, 26; Governor's Message, Jan. 6, 1830, 1828-1830 Mass.
Resolves 223-34; Letter from N. Dane to J. Quincy, supra note 366; Remarks, supra note 80, at
4-5, 8; G. BRADFORD, supra note 1, at 16, 29-30; 1817-1822 Mass. Legislative Documents no. 1,
at 2-4, 6-8 and passim. (esp. 7) (1817); R.EPoRT [ON THE STATE PRISON) 6-7 (1822); 1 PRISON
DISCIPLINE SOCIETY, supra note 117, at 15-16 (1826); Governor's Message, Jan. 4, 1826, 18241828 Mass. Resolves 252; Report Respecting Convicts, supra note 30; S. BURROUGHS, supra
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mittee had identified prisoner congregation as a critical flaw in the
Castle Island facility. The planners of the State Prison at Charlestown had been urged to take steps to remedy it. But this warning
had fallen upon deaf ears: As .finally constructed, the State Prison
provided supervised, congregate workshops for hard labor in the
daytime and unsupervised, congregate cells for the night hours cells that eventually lodged anywhere from four to sixteen prisoners
each. The block of cells provided for solitary confinement in the first
phase of a sentence was far too small to be put to any more extensive
use.396
Rather than deny that inmate congregation created a problem,
the advocates answered the indictments with a call for prison renovation. Advocates of reclamation seized on the problem as yet another argument in favor of using solitary imprisonment throughout
the inmate's confinement.397 Advocates of rehabituation, on the
other hand, were caught in a bind. While they felt compelled to
agree (if somewhat less enthusiastically) that congregation could corrupt, 398 they still considered it necessary to the process oflearning a
practical skill. Solitary hard labor, as suggested by some advocates
of solitary confinement, would not do, for it reduced productivity
and tended to "render labor irksome and disgusting" instead of making it "habitual and easy."399 Warden Bradford thus urged continued supervised congregate hard labor by day, but single-celling by
night, when supervision was impractical. This was the system prescribed in the English Hard Labor Act and advocated by many Engnote 182, at 177-78; 1825-1826 Mass. Legislative Documents no. 40, at 4-7 (1826) (State Library Annex).
396. Report Respecting Convicts, supra note 30; Governor's Message, Jan. 4, 1826, 18241828 Mass. Resolves 252; I PRISON DISCIPLINE SOCIETY, supra note 117, at 38 (1826); Report
of 1815, in G. HAYNES, supra note 321, at 232.
397. Solitary confinement of course represented the neplus ultra of separation. J. QUINCY,
supra note 318, at 20-21; Remarks, supra note 80, at 4-5, 8; Report Respecting Convicts, supra
note 30.
398. "We have it from the highest authority, that 'evil communications corrupt good manners' (I Cor. 15:33] - but the communication even between convicts is not always evil - they
have been known to pray in their rooms with each other, and to form associations for religious
purposes - and it is not altogether unreasonable to suppose, that examples and practices of
this kind should have their influence, as well as wicked ones." G. BRADFORD, supra note I, at
18-19; see Tudor, supra note 80, at 438.
399. "(A] man works much more cheerfully when in company than when alone; when he
sees all around him at work, it encourages him to be active from example, and a sort of feeling
of sympathy: he becomes industrious." Id at 18-20. A standard solitary prison industry was
treadmill pumping (to grind grain, or, often, mere air), hardly a useful trade. See REPORT [ON
THE STATE PRISON] 12-13 (May 1830) (Harvard Law Library); G. DE BEAUMONT & A. DE
TocQUEVILLE, supra note 331, at 202; G. HAYNES, supra note 321, at 45; Remarks, supra note
80, at 4-5.
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lish rationalists. 400
The advocates ultimately succeeded in rebuffing the critics' assaults; the State Prison, and the goal of rehabilitation, were not
abandoned. Instead, in 1818, the legislature made its first attempts
to reform penal reform in Massachusetts.401 An act passed in that
year for "the better regulation of the State Prison" set sterner guidelines for enforcing discipline in the facility and provided for progressively harsher sentences for second and third offenders.402 And
while the legislature was reluctant to mandate expensive structural
changes to separate convicts,403 it did take a less costly step in that
direction: henceforth, the prison population was to be split into three
classes according to deportment, each class lodged and employed
separately from the others.404 Another law gave judges discretion to
divert offenders sentenced to three years or less to local gaols, to
avoid contamination by contact with more hardened State Prison
inmates.405
Initially, the Massachusetts government felt confident of these reforms. Governor Brooks and the legislators congratulated each
other for setting matters right at the State Prison and reacclaimed the
principle of carceral rehabilitation as ardently as each had con400. G. BRADFORD, supra note 1, at 49, 51; Communication from G. Bradford, Jan. 27,
1824, Senate Document no. 7029 (1824) (unpassed) (unpublished document, Mass. Archives);
Letter from G. Bradford to W. Roscoe, supra note 378, at 53; 1817-1822 Mass. Legislative
Documents no. 1passim. (1817) (State Library Annex); note 204 supra.
401. The internal reform efforts of the 1820s ·were uniformly described not as a break with
a prior deterrent prison discipline, or a careless prison discipline, but rather as a means of
curing and improving a rehabilitative prison discipline implemented "before accurate ideas
had been obtained of the wants of such an establishment." Remarks, supra note 80, at 20. See
REPORT [ON THE STATE PRISON] 8 (1829) (also printed in 1829-1830 Mass Legislative Documents 135 (1829); Governor's Message, Jan. 8, 1833, 1832-1834 Mass. Resolves 280; Governor's Message, Jan. 9, 1822, Jan. 1822 Mass. Resolves 395-97; REPORT [ON THE STATE PRISON]
6 (1822); Answer of the Senate, n.d., May 1819 Mass. Resolves 33; G. BRADFORD,supra note 1,
at 4-5; 1817-1822 Mass. Legislative Documents no. 1, at 21-23 (1817) (State Library Annex);
REPORT [ON THE STATE PRISON] 1-2 (1827) (Harvard Law Library); Governor's Message, Jan.
5, 1831, 1828-1831 Mass. Resolves 451-52.
402. Act of Feb. 23, 1818, ch. 176, 1815-1818 Mass. Acts 602-05;see also REPORT [ON THE
STATE PRISON] 18-19 (1831) (Harvard Law Library). For the first time, guards were given
explicit authority to use deadly force to compel obedience (a right previously ambiguous). Cf.
. G. HAYNES, supra note 321, at 20-22, 38-39.
403. As a subsequent committee report noted dryly, ''The legislature . • . adopted every
[proposal] which involved no expenditure, and rejected or postponed every [proposal], that
required an appropriation." REPORT [ON THE STATE PRISON] 3 (1822).
404. See note 402 supra. On the notion that classification substituted for separate confinement, see G. BRADFORD, supra note 1, at 48; 1 PRISON DISCIPLINE SOCIETY, supra note 117, at
15 (1826). This concept, once again, sprang from England. See Henriques, supra note 165, at
66-67.
405. Act of Feb. 19, 1819, ch. 123, 1818-1822 Mass. Acts 196. This provision had been
strongly pressed for in 1817-1822 Mass. Legislative Documents no. 1 passim. (1817) (State
Library Annex).
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demned it the year before.406 But these jubilations proved premature. Escapes and disruptions continued as before, and the
closefisted measures to ensure separation of convicts quickly disintegrated.407 In 1826, Governor Levi Lincoln reported that the
State Prison was at last turning a profit, but added "a melancholy
reverse to the picture" - namely, "the system is utterly ineffectual,
to purposes of reform or amendment." Structural alterations to accommodate separate confinement were still "imperiously required,"
and the legislators finally resigned themselves to this expense.408
By this time the two competing rehabilitative ideologies had matured into full-fledged institutional systems in other states. In Pennsylvania, the Walnut Street Jail with its experimental block of
solitary cells was replaced in 1826 by the Western State Penitentiary,
where all prisoners underwent solitary confinement without labor. 409
In New York, at around the same time, the Auburn Prison thoroughly overhauled its system of discipline. The new Auburn system
featured separate confinement at night and congregate hard labor by
day (as had been urged in Massachusetts), supplemented by a cluster
of disciplinary innovations: a strict rule of silence, orderly marching
to and from the cells (which became famous as the "lockstep") and
constant oversight by prison authorities while the inmates were at
labor.410 For the advocates of rehabituation, these administrative
406. Compare May 1819 Mass. Resolves 29-30, 33, with May 1818 Mass. Resolves 578-79,
587.
407. G. HAYNES, Sllpra note 321, at 40-46, 131-37; REPORT (ON THE STATE PRISON] 6
(1822) (Harvard Law Library); Governor's Message, Jan. 9, 1822, Jan. 1822 Mass. Resolves
392-95; Governor's Message, Jan. I, 1823, Jan. 1823 Mass. Resolves 564; Governor's Message,
1824-1828 Mass. Resolves 24; Governor's Message, Jan. 6, 1830, 1828-1831 Mass. Resolves
223-24. The Directors argued that the criteria of the classification scheme had, in any event,
been misconceived. See Remarks, S11pra note 80, at 20-21. As for the diversion program for
low level offenders, its creators had neglected to ensure the serviceability of local gaols. The
result was another fiasco. See G. BRADFORD, Sllpra note I, at 22-23; J. QUINCY, Sllpra note
318,parsim; REPORT [ON THE STATE PRISON] 3-5 (1822); Austin, Sllpra note 330, at 255-59.
408. Governor Lincoln sweetened the pill by shrewdly suggesting that the prison profits
accrued up to that time be allocated to the new construction project, that convict labor be used
to reduce the project's cost, and that future prison profits be pledged to make up the difference.
All of these proposals were followed. Governor's Message, Jan. 31, 1825 ch. 62 1824-1828
Mass. Resolves 105; Governor's Message, Jan. 4, 1826, id. 251-254; Governor's Message, Jan, 3
1827, id. 447-48; Governor's Message, Jan. 6, 1830, 1828-1831 Mass. Resolves 224-25. A similar request by Governor Brooks, made in 1822 under less promising fiscal circumstances, had
gotten nowhere. Governor's Message, Jan. 9, 1822 Mass. Resolves 391-97.
409. In 1829 solitary labor was introduced, and a second, more successful, institution based
on the latter program (which came to be known as the Pennsylvania Plan) was opened. H.
BARNES, S11pra note 325, at 168.
410. See generally W. LEWIS, S11pra note 138, at 81-1 IO. The Auburn measures were homegrown, not borrowed from abroad. See M. IGNATIEFF, Sllpra note 45, at 178. The ideals,
however, of silence, strict discipline, and constant oversight can all be found in Massachusetts
prison regulations long before the Auburn reforms, even if not scrupulously enforced. See
Report of 1815 in G. HAYNES, S11pra note 321, at 232-35; Rules and Orders of 1816 in G.
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devices fully reconciled the dual imperatives of congregate therapy
and inmate separation. Though he labored in a team, each prisoner
under the Auburn system of order and silence would nevertheless
find himself "surrounded by an invisible wall."411
In 1826, the Massachusetts legislators made the critical decision
to renovate the State Prison according to the Auburn model, rather
than the solitary model.412 This decision accorded with Governor
Lincoln's own preference,413 as well as the counsel of Reverend
Louis Dwight, whose influential Prison Discipline Society had been
formed in the preceding year.414 In 1829, the so-called ''New
Prison" opened, administered under a new code of regulations which
ordained the Auburn discipline.415
The underlying philosophy of the Massachusetts State Prison
thus remained decidedly rehabituative. Relying "on the presumption that habit will have some influence," the prison authorities assigned each convict to ''that [prison] occupation . . . for which he
seems best qualified, and by which therefore he may be most likely
to earn a subsistence after his release." Once his sentence expired,
the convict was launched back into the world, prepared to "obtain
an honest livelihood with less exertion and risk than a dishonest one
[whereby he] may perhaps pay some regard to [his] own interest."416
BRADFORD, supra note 67 at 35-36; Rules and Orders of 1823 in Remarks, supra note 80, at 5354, 56-59.
411. W. LEWIS, supra note 138, at 90.
412. Act of Feb. 15, 1826, ch. 84, 1825-1828 Mass. Acts 144; Governor's Message, Jan. 3,
1827, 1824-1828 Mass. Resolves 447; REPORT [ON THE STATE PRISON] 1 and passim. (1827)
(Harvard Law Library).
413. Governor's Message, Jan. 4, 1826, 1824-1828 Mass. Resolves 253-54.
414. The annual reports of the Prison Discipline Society propagandized relentlessly for the
Auburn plan. See, e.g., 1 PRISON DISCIPLINE SOCIETY, supra note 117, at 57-60 (1826). These
reports were widely ciiculated; the first report (1826) went through four editions in a year and
five hundred copies were purchased by the Massachusetts Legislature. In addition, the Society
conducted a lobbying campaign, which, so it claimed, was instrumental in securing the renovation legislation. See 2 id at 60-61. Among other influences that may have swayed the legislators were the Puritan values already mentioned, see notes 372-76 supra and accompanying
text, and the relative frugality of the income-generating Auburn scheme, see W. LEWIS, supra
note 138, at 109. In addition, while solitary confinement continued to constitute a subject of
which ''there is great interest excited at the present time," it had recently been tested in New
York with disastrous results - a bit of empirical data which the Prison Discipline Society
happily trumpeted. See 2 PRISON DISCIPLINE SOCIETY, supra note 117 (1826); 2 id 61-69
(1827); G. DE BEAUMONT & A DE ToCQUEVILLE,supra note 331, at 41-42, 56;
LEWIS, supra
note 138, at 68-70.
415. The "New Prison," later known as the "North Wing," was built within the original
Charlestown prison compound. For a description, see Rl!PoRT [ON THE STATE PRISON] 1-8
(1829). The rule of silence, the lockstep, vigilant inspection at labor, and solitary sleeping and
dining were all introduced,per the Auburn plan. Id at 8-9; Act of Mar. 11, 1828, 1825-1828
Mass. Acts 825; Governor's Message, Jan. 6, 1830, 1828-1831 Mass. Resolves 222-24.
416. Rl!PoRT [ON THE STATE PRISON] 10-14 (May 1830) (Harvard Law Library).
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Retained as an internal sanction, solitary confinement all but disappeared as a preliminary stage of a convict's sentence. 417 As if to
crown the rehabituation advocates' victory, the Board of Directors of
the State Prison, having previously sought to eliminate the Warden's
office, was instead itself dissolved. 418
By all accounts, the Massachusetts State Prison turned a corner
in 1829. Internal disruptions ceased under the new discipline, convict labor remained productive, and the voice of opposition to the
penitentiary system finally fell silent.419 In short, the 1828 reforms
settled both the debate over the penitentiary's choice of ideologies
and the debate over its fundamental practicability. While that settlement relied on some home-grown administrative innovations, it also
signaled a final triumph for a deeply rooted intellectual tradition.
417. Id. at 10. Under the Revised Statutes (code) of 1836, the old format of specifying two
successive sentences, the first to solitary confinement and the second to hard labor, standard
since 1805, was terminated. Thereafter, the statutes specified single terms of hard labor, the
judge retaining discretion to set a preliminary term of solitary confinement of up to 20 days in
all cases (far shorter than under previous statutes). MAss. REV. STAT. pt. IV, tit. II, ch. 139, § 8
(1836).
418. Act of Mar. 11, 1828, ch. 118, 1825-1828 Mass. Acts 819; G. HAYNES, supra note 321,
at 47. (Sadly, Warden Bradford did not live to see this outcome). The conflict of ideologies
remained active in other climes, where penitentiaries remained to be constructed. Often European visitors of American penitentiaries carried their ideological allegiances along with them,
coloring their appraisals of what they saw: English inspectors of Auburn Prison thus described
its discipline alternatively as "moral machinery" and as a "mere manufactor[y]." M. IONA•
TIEFF, supra note 45, at 194-95. Within the United States, advocates of the new Auburn plan
struggled with the advocates of the new Pennsylvania plan, see supra note 409, to guide construction in the 1830s and 1840s. While both of these later programs combined elements of
solitude and labor, they appear to have remained sufficiently distinct ideologically to prompt
de Tocqueville's salient contrast:
Now, to what point is this reformation actually effected by the different systems which we
have examined? Before we answer this question, it will be necessary to settle the meaning
attached to the word "reformation". • • The [Pennsylvania] system being also that which
produces the deepest impressions on the soul of the convict, must effect more reformation
than that of Auburn. The latter, however, is perhaps more conformable to the habits of
men in society, and on this account effects a greater number of reformations, which might
be called "legal," inasmuch as they produce the external fulfillment of social obligation,
Ifit be so, the [Pennsylvania] system produces more honest men, and that of New York
more obedient citizens.
G. DE BEAUMONT & A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 331, at 80-91 (quotes at 87, 91). q. D.
ROTHMAN, supra note 50, at 79-88, who draws his ideological distinction between an ancient
deterministic theory and a modem optimistic theory, rather than between alternative contemporary theories (one old and one new). The Auburn advocates "fully shar[ed] the axioms and
optimism of its rival," differing only over the administrative details that would best fulfill the
penitentiary's promise. Id. at 87. Given ''the basic similarity of the two programs," Rothman
traces the "startling" intensity of the debate, id. at 81, to the magnitude of the opportunity:
"With the stakes so high . . . every element in penitentiary organization assumed overwhelming importance." Id. at 85. Facial similarities in the two systems may, however, obscure the
disparity between their intellectual foundations.
419. For a sampling of plaudits, see, e.g., REPORT [ON THE STATE PRISON] 3-4, 18-27
(Sept 1830); REPORT [ON THE STATE PRISON] 4-7 (1831) (Harvard Law Library); 1828-1831
Mass. Resolves 222-24, 451-54; 1832 Mass. Resolves 32-34, 277-80, 596, The disintegration of
opposition was a widespread phenomenon. Lieber, Translator's Preface, in G. DE BEAUMONT
& A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 331 at 13-14 (1833).
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CONCLUSION

The 1830s marked the heyday of the penitentiary in America.
Facilities proliferated, the literature thrived, and visitors traveled
vast distances to·view American prisons in action. As Rothman says,
the penitentiary in the 1830s "became the pride of the nation" - and
the Jacksonians never tired of reminding others and themselves of
their institutional achievement.420
Ballyhoo has always had a way of obscuring context. But even if
contemporaries get caught up in their own excitement, the historian
must not allow himself to be beguiled. The Jacksonians deserve due
credit for their contribution, but the true origins of the penitentiary
in Massachusetts will be found in a coalition of ancient European
criminological theory and immediate, palpable social neeq.
In part, the assumption that the penitentiary was intellectually
novel has probably sprung from an optical illusion. What we see
before us, when we view the Massachusetts State Prison, is a structure without precedent: a facility with looming walls, holding hundreds of prisoners. Its very scale bespeaks innovation. But there is
less here than meets the eye. Once state planners resolved to initiate
a general policy of criminal incarceration, they had little choice but
to design a new facility to accommodate it. The old ones were simply inadequate for the task.
It is unlikely that historians would have been so impressed with
the novelty of criminal incarceration in America had it been instituted in the local workhouses that had long dotted the colonies. This
possibility was pondered briefly in Massachusetts,421 but was rejected as impractical. Without refurbishing, the old facilities simply
could not accommodate large numbers of long-term inmates. When
the sale of Castle Island to the federal government forced the state to
disperse its prisoners among local worlqlouses, the results were so
unsatisfactory that judges temporarily ceased ordering sentences to
hard labor.422 Though the state might have upgraded these old facil420. D. ROTHMAN, supra note 50, at 79.
421. See Report Respecting Convicts, supra note 30; Resolve of June 26, 1798, ch. 47,
1798-1799 Mass. Acts 196-97.
422. Act of Mar. 14, 1785, ch. 63, 1784-1785 Mass. Acts 163 (preamble); Act of Nov. I,
1785, ch. 21, id. at 472 (preamble); Resolve of June 26, 1798, ch. 47, 1798-1799 Mass. Acts 19697; Governor's Message, Jan. 13, 1804, 1802-1803 Mass. Acts 980; Petition of a number of
Prisoners confined in Concord Jail, appended to 1802 Resolves ch. 54 (passed) (unpublished
manuscript, Mass. Archives); Report Respecting Convicts, supra note 30. Supreme Judicial
Court manuscript minute books reveal an abrupt cessation of sentences to incarceration in the
Feb. 1799 term; such sentences did not resume until the State Prison opened in 1805. Part of
the problem was mere security: once the transfer to local workhouses had been effected, nearly
half the previous Castle Island inmates escaped, a fact unsatisfactory in a theoretical, as well as
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ities rather than build one new one on a grand scale, centralization
offered a number of advantages: economies of scale, convenient
oversight, and ready access to the Boston marketplace.423 Thus,
compelling administrative considerations determined the construction of the Massachusetts State Prison. The bare demands of penal
ideology could have been met in far less dramatic a fashion.
Equally deceptive is the wealth of attention that visitors lavished
on the Jacksonian penitentiaries.424 The deluge of European delegations in the 1830s masked a subtle shift in the intellectual center of
penal reform. Before 1800, European theorists dominated the field
of criminology, supplying the basic concepts and programs on which
American facilities were built. Even the name "penitentiary" was
coined by English reformers.425 But as the American efforts got off
the ground, the new builders gained increasing renown. The Jacksonians offered, not fresh theories of what the penitentiary should
accomplish, but fresh ideas about the practical implementation of
old paradigms: primarily innovations in the realm of administration
and design. European delegations flocked to American penitentiaries
to learn these valuable, but secondary, lessons.
The English experience illustrates this intellectual migration.
Having operated workhouses since the sixteenth century, English
lawmakers had toyed with the idea of more extensive carceral programs over the years. The Hard Labor Act of 1779 was drafted by
the towering figures of Howard, Eden, and Blackstone, and reviewed
by Bentham; it certainly owed nothing to the rudimentary American
efforts of that time. Though the Act itself was stillborn, English penitentiaries did open in the late eighteenth century, based upon local
plans without American input.42 6
By 1834, things had ch~ged. Before embarking on a major new
prison project, the English government sent William Crawford to
tour American prisons. When Pentonville opened in 1842, its structure and internal routine strongly reflected the Philadelphia Penitentiary, with which Crawford had been most favorably impressed. Yet
a practical, sense, "for if any hope can be entertained of an escape, the sentence will make but
a feeble impression on the mind, and be of little use in preventing future offences." Report
Respecting Convicts, supra note 30; Governor's Message, Jan. 15, 1802, 1800-1801 Mass. Acts
583. English advocates were also influenced in the direction of new construction by the unsatisfactory state of existing workhouses. J. BENTHAM, supra note 6, at 6.
423. Report Respecting Convicts, supra note 30; Governor's Message, Jan. 13, 1804, 18021803 Mass. Acts 980-81; Answer of the House, Jan. 18, 1804, id. at 875; see 1817-22 Mass.
Legislative Documents no. 2 at 1-2, 4 (1818) (State Library Annex).
424. Cf. D. RomMAN, supra note 50, at 94.
425. M. lONATlEFF, supra note 45, at 94.
426. See generally id at 93-109.
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the later English criminologists never lost track of the facility's lineage. As Crawford insisted, the penitentiary was ''British in its origin,
British in its actual application, British in its legislative sanction."427
And he was right. The J acksonians reared the penitentiary; they did
not conceive it.
In fact, ideological conception is but one chapter in the story of
the penitentiary. Had ideology been all, the penitentiary might have
appeared only in the pages of some dusty tomes. For only under
conditions of intense social crisis could one expect a legislature to
undertake a policy as wrenching and expensive as that represented
by the move from pillory to penitentiary. The theorists themselves
were first to bemoan their inability to make headway against the
forces of legal inertia. "The voice of a philosopher is too weak to
contend against the tumults and the cries of so many who are guided
by blind custom," Cesare Beccaria lamented. "How fortunate humanity would be if laws were for the first time being decreed for
it. . . . If these monarchs, I say, suffer the old laws to subsist, it is
because of the infinite difficulties involved in stripping from errors
the venerated rust of many centuries."428
How much more unyielding is that rust when ·reinforced with the
virtues of economy? Jeremy Bentham learned the answer not once
but twice. As a young critic of the Hard Labor Act, ~entham noticed that the logistical impediments to transportation of convicts
brought on by the American Revolution "gave great weight to the
inducements, if they were not the sole inducements, that led to the
institution of this plan." The novice prison reformer was amused
that it had required "the misfortunes from which those difficulties
took their rise ... [to} force us into the adoption of a plan that
promises to operate one of the most signal improvements that have
ever yet been made in our criminal legislation."42~ But the elaborate
Hard Labor Act was never implemented, and the lesson of the episode, so perceptively recognized, did not sink in. Bentham's imagination had been warmed, and he spent the next twenty years
beseeching Parliament to transform his own carceral scheme, the Pa427. Id. at 193-200 (quote at 195); see 8 PRisoN DISCIPLINE SOCIETY, supra note 117; at 4
(1833); F. GRAY, PRISON DISCIPLINE IN AMERICA 59-61 (1847).
428. C. BECCARIA, supra note 83, at 52.
429. J. BENTHAM, supra note 6, at 5. Added Bentham: "It may not even be altogether
extravagant to suppose, that at the end we may be found to have profitted not much less than
we have suffered by these misfortunes, when the benefits of this improvement [the penitentiary
system] come to be taken into the account."
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nopticon, into reality. These efforts came to naught, 430 and Bentham
eventually abandoned the project embittered rather than amused:
"A jail," he wrote to Lord Pelham, "is not quite so easily built as
talked of, not even in England, as I have had occasion to know but
too well."431
Indeed, Massachusetts was particularly prone to the forces of
resistance, for it lacked a Jeremy Bentham to press the penitentiary's
cause. In Pennsylvania, activist Benjamin Rush and the Philadelphia Society for Alleviating the Miseries of Public Prisons lobbied
tirelessly for reform legislation, while in New York, Thomas Eddy
pushed the idea with equal determination.432 The great names of
prison advocacy in Massachusetts do not appear until well after
criminal incarceration had been instituted in that state. Gamaliel
Bradford assumed his post as Warden (and unofficial cheerleader) of
the Massachusetts State Prison in 1812, while the Reverend Louis
Dwight founded the Boston Prison Discipline Society in 1825. Both
arrived on the scene early enough to help fend off attacks on the
:fledgling penitentiary program, but far too late to influence its
emergence.433
The early stages of the penal reform movement in Massachusetts
were shaped less by intellectuals than by popular clamor for action.
The dominant theme was not enlightened principle but glaring necessity. "It appears to be the general and ardent desire of the people,
that our penal laws may be immediately revised and corrected," one
spokesman contended.434 Another warned the legislature that the
growing crime rate was "truly alarming - to your august body we
430. The story of Bentham's crusade has been often told. See, e.g., C. PHILLIPSON, THREE
127-31 (1923).
431. J. BENTHAM, supra note 122, at 194-95.
432. See N. TEETERS, THEY WBRE IN PRISON 1-50 (1937); w. LEWIS, supra note 138,
at 1-5.
433. For a biographical sketch of Dwight, see 0. LEWIS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN PRISONS AND PRISON CUSTOMS, 1776-1845 at 289-92 (1922). On Dwight's influence, see
supra note 414. Bradford wrote a pamphlet to "vindicate" the institution in the face of its
detractors, see G. BRADFORD, supra note I (first published in the Palladium), see also Communication from Gamaliel Bradford to the Legislature, Jan. 27, 1824 Senate Document no. 7029
(1824) (unpassed) (unpublished) (Mass. Archives), and encouraged outside manufacturers to
contract for prison labor. In one letter, Bradford assures a businessman: "I think there is no
doubt but you could have the mechanical part of your work done cheaper here than at any
other place, but I should decline your friendly offer of becoming personally interested in any
work established here, from motives of propriety." Letter from G. Bradford to F. Rotch, July
2, 1815, in Rotch Family Papers (unpublished manuscript, Mass. Historical Socy.). See letter
from G. Bradford to F. Rotch, Aug. 18, 1815, in id. On the importance of individual efforts to
spur reform, see generally Cooper, Ideas and Their Execution: English Prison Reform, 10
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY STUD. 87, 93 (1976).
434. Mass. Centinel, Oct. 20, 1784, at I. See 2 A. BRADFORD, supra note 188, at 251.
CRIMINAL LAW RE.FORMERS

May 1982)

Pillory to Penitentiary

1267

look for redress - from you we have a right to expect it - and from
you we will no doubt receive it."435 These were the sorts of arguments that could get things moving in the Massachusetts statehouse.
Intellectual imagination had little influence on the process. As another columnist put it, ''That the mode of punishment with respect to
criminal cases, now in force, is derogatory to the principles of humanity, as well as impolitick, needs no great stretch of philosophy to
discover."436 Only after the publicly perceived need for change had
overcome the forces of inertia and economy did Massachusetts move
in the direction of criminal incarceration.
Indeed, the years of reform were numbered by this stubborn fact.
Once the immediate perception of crisis had passed, criminologists
who sought additional institutional improvements encountered the
familiar roadblocks. We have already noticed the legislature's reluctance to authorize funds for renovation, above the initial outlay to
construct the State Prison.437 On another front, the legislature in
1819 responded to the pleas of activists by passing a sweeping reform
oflocal houses of correction for juveniles and low level offenders.438
But the crucial section of the act mandating construction of individual cells and workshops was repealed within four months,439 and the
rest of the act soon stood ''little more than a dead letter upon the
statute book." ''Why'' Josiah Quincy grieved, "should not the ancient houses of correction be revived? . . . There is but one reason;
- that mistaken reason; - that abused word; - economy! The expense! - As if any expense was of weight, when put into the scales
against humanity; against the duty, incumbent on every society, to
multiply the means of moral advancement."440 Quincy's cry from the
heart has a timeless quality: In the real world, it takes a crisis to
open the window to reform.
And therein lies the real tragedy in the rise of the penitentiary.
For it is hardly clear, however much the theorists touted this reform,
that the penitentiary ever really constituted an effective solution to
crime. Under the early schemes of public punishment, the commu435. Mass. Centinel, Oct. 16, 1784, at 1.
436. Mass. Centinel, Jan. 5, 1785, at 3.
431. See notes 403 & 408 supra and accompanying text.•
438. Act of Feb. 19, 1819, ch. 123, 1818-1822 Mass. Acts 196. .
439. Act of June 18, 1819, ch. 158, id at 246.
440. Quincy continued: "It is not pretended, that there is any thing new, in these suggestions. Would to heaven that there did not rest upon our state any deeper stain than that of
ignorance!" J. QUINCY, supra note 318, at 12-19. Mayor Quincy's personal efforts did bear
fruit within his own domain ofinfiuence: Boston. See J. QUINCY, supra note 256, at 102-09;
1826-1827 Mass. Legislative Documents no. 100, at 7 (1827).
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nity had played an integral role in the rehabilitative process, reaccepting the offender, or even shepherding him back into the fold of
society. Demographic change rendered these mechanisms of reconciliation increasingly unworkable and, rather than endeavor to cure
them, the turn to incarceration sealed their abandonment. In this
sense, the transition represented a retreat in the face of adversity, not
an effort to forge ahead. With the rise of the penitentiary, the rehabilitative focus shrank from the offender and his place in the community to the offender alone. His orientation was the only factor
that the process sought to correct. And once the penitentiary was
frozen into place, the old, wider approach to rehabilitation was irretrievably lost.·
The reformers themselves eventually came·to appreciate the importance of their omission. "[T]~e system is incomplete," the Directors of the State Prison admitted in 1823,
and therefore the evil complained of necessarily occurs. Convicts are
discharged who have no friends, acquaintances or money; or who, by
being known as convicts, are avoided as infections and driven by necessity to commit new crimes. They are willing to labour, but can get
no employment; and cannot consent to starve, even at the hazard of
renewed imprisonment.441

Nor, in their haste to isolate offenders, had reformers kept sight of
another shortcoming of criminal incarceration: its impact on the offender's innocent dependents. The early Puritans had not been so
careless. In 1695, a statute mandating a fine or twenty days imprisonment for unlicensed sale of liquor was abruptly amended to make
whipping the alternative to the fine. As the new preamble explained
the change, "divers ill disposed and indigent persons . . . if detected
and convicted of any such offense, are unable to satisfy the fine imposed by law for the same, and cannot be punished by imprisonment
without wrong to their families." 442 Yet the later criminologists' efforts to correct these systemic defects were pitifully meager and
simplistic.443
441. Remarks, supra note 80, at 26. See S. BURROUGHS, supra note 182, at 173, 176, 178;
Report Respecting Convicts, supra note 30; REPoRT [ON nm STATE PiusoN] 8 (1822); 18171822 Mass. Legislative Documents no. 1, at 20-21 (1817) (State Library Annex). The problem
was also recognized in England. See, e.g., W. PALEY, supra note 87, at 293 & n.lc, who went so
far as to oppose incarceration of petty criminals "until this inconvenience be remedied." The
practice of tattooing State Prison inmates, instituted in 1818, hardly improved the situation.
See Act of Feb. 23, 1818, ch. 176, 1815-1818 Mass. Acts 602-05; Act of Mar. 11, 1828, ch. 118,
1825-1828 Mass. Acts 830; G. HAYNES, supra note 321, at 40-41; REPoRT [ON nm STATE
PlusoN] 11 (1829) (Harvard Law Library).
442. 1 PRov. LAWS, supra note 12, at 287 (1695). An interesting twist on this theme appears in 2 COURT OF AsslSTANTS, supra note 23, at 65, 125 (1.Dlprisonmcnt of a servant unjust
to the master!).
443. The practice of tattooing inmates was abolished in 1830, Act of Mar. 12, 1830, ch. 114,
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The ultimate irony of the rise of the penitentiary is that even as
reformers waxed eloquent about the promise of rehabilitation, the
scheme that they devised to accomplish it merely reinforced the conception of a criminal underclass. It built a wall, instead of a bridge,
between offenders and society. If rehabilitation is inherently a reciprocal process, if it requires not only contrition but forgiveness as
well, then the concept of criminal incarceration was flawed from the
start.
Still, the penitentiary persists. Hallowed by time, it has ceased to
constitute an "experiment" and instead has become second nature just as the pillory had been before it. In an age of spiraling costs,
explosive int~mal conditions, and escalating crime rates despite all, a
sufficient crisis may well be approaching to sweep away the penitentiary and move on to something else. In any event, the historian can
do his part by broadening the modem criminologist's horizons. If
legal history does not tell us how things ought to be, it can at least
tell us that they need not be the way they are. If ''the venerated rust
of many centuries" can be loosened a bit, then perhaps others will
step forward to strip the errors bare.

1828-1831 Mass. Acts 459. The warden and the chaplain gave recommendations to those convicts whom they deemed worthy, and by statute in 1828, every convict left the State Prison
with "a decent suit of cloths" and up to five dollars in cash (at the warden's discretion). Act of
Feb. 23, 1818, ch. 176, 1815-1818 Mass. Acts 602-05; Act of Mar. 11, 1828, ch. 118, 1825-1828
Mass. Acts 825, 830; RBl'oRT [ON THE STATE PrusoN) 15-16 (1827); RBl'oRT [ON THE STATE
PrusoN) 11 (May 1830); REroRT [ON THE STATE PrusoN] 21 (1831). Warden Bradford simply
asserted that society was "obligat[ed]" to welcome ex-convicts back into the fold and suggested
that community groups participate in the process. G. BRADFORD, supra note 1, at 51-52. At
least one prison official acted on his own initiative to help ex-convicts find employment. Austin, supra note 330 at 254. Government-sponsored programs to provide employment to exconvicts, or to open a half-way house, were contemplated at various times, but never implemented. See 1817-1822 Mass. Legislative Documents no. 1, at 20-21 (1817) (State Library
Annex); Resolve of Mar. 3, 1826, ch. 93, 1824-1828 Mass. Resolves 307; REl'oRT [ON THE
STATE PrusoN] 15, (1827): Resolve of Mar. 4, 1830, ch. 64, 1828-1831 Mass. Resolves 283;
Governor's Message, May 31, 1830, ch. 2, id at 392; and the delightfully reasoned REPORT
(ON THE STATE PrusoN] (May 1830) (Harvard Law Library). An '.'agent" whose sole duties
were to "counsel and advise" discharged convicts was finally appointed in 1845, sixty years
after criminal incarceration had been instituted, Act of Mar. 22, 1845, ch. 176, 1845-1846 Mass.
Acts 504; Act of Mar. 24, 1848, ch. 82, 1847-1849 Mass. Acts 647. The problems posed by the
loss of support for convicts' dependents received even less_ attention. Bradford could be so
callous as to identify loss of support as part of the deterrence inherent in the punishment. G.
BRADFORD, supra note 1, at 14-15. The custom of "overstint," by which convicts could earn a
salary for work performed over and above the daily stint assigned to them, was instituted in
piut to facilitate family support But the practice was associated with internal abuses, and was
abolished c. 1829. See Remarks, supra note 80, at 21; RBl'oRT [ON Tim STATE PrusON] 9-11
(1827); REPORT [ON Tim STATE PrusoN] 11-15 (1828) (also printed in 1827-1828 Mass. Legislative Documents 734 (1828) (State Library Annex); RBl'oRT [ON Tim STATE PRisoN] 8-9
(1829).

